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INTRODUCTION
AIMS AND OUTLINE
7INTRODUCTION
Organ trade constitutes the sale and purchase of organs for financial or material gain 1,2. 
Although prohibited since the 1980s, an increasing number of reports indicate its prolifer-
ation across the globe 3,4. Defined as a form of human trafficking 5, the prevailing discourse 
on organ trade is that of an organized crime, driven by mafia-like networks that exploit 
the poor for their organs 6-8. In 2007 the World Health Organization estimated that 5-10% 
of all organ transplantations are conducted illegally each year 9. Ranking the organ trade 
in the top 10 of most lucrative transnational organized crimes, Global Financial Integrity 
estimated in 2011 that the trade’s annual profits lie between $615 mln. and $1.2 bln 4. 
These claims however, are made in the absence of thorough, empirical research. The 
empirical literature on organ trade comprises mostly of studies performed amongst donors 
who sell their kidneys on the black market and who report a deterioration in physical, 
psychosocial and financial well-being 10,11. Yet, practically no knowledge exists on the scale 
of patients who are reported to buy organs for transplantation, and how and where they 
purchase organs. Most patients are reported to purchase organs abroad and are generally 
assumed to obtain these organs illegally because of a lack of available (legally procured) 
donor organs in their countries of residence. Yet, this does not explain why some patients 
buy organs and why others do not. Only three empirical studies exist that describe patients’ 
motivations and experiences in buying organs. However, these present small samples and 
offer limited information on the potential illegality of their transplants 12-14. 
In addition, no studies exist on the role of health care professionals who treat 
patients who buy organs. What is unknown, for instance, is whether these professionals 
know if their patients bought organs, how often they encounter the issue and how they 
respond to their patients if they find out they are going to, or have purchased organs. In 
the absence of this knowledge, no information exists on factors that may help sustain the 
trade. For instance, the trade may persist because professionals are reluctant to report, or 
prohibited from reporting suspicions of organ trade, and/or because organ trade is (moral-
ly) tolerated in certain cultures despite its prohibition. 
There is also limited knowledge on the modus operandi of organ trading net-
works 15. Any explanation for the persistence of the trade requires an understanding of 
the criminal networks involved. Yet, the limited number of convictions has hampered the 
performance of case study research that could enable the collecting of information on 
how these networks operate. In addition, this has hampered research into how police and 
prosecutors detect and convict cases and what possible obstacles and successes they en-
counter. Possible hurdles in enforcing organ trade cases may explain why the crime is rarely 
prosecuted. 
8AIMS AND OUTLINE
The overarching objective of this thesis is to fulfil the abovementioned gaps in knowledge 
by presenting the results of five empirical studies. Adopting a range of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods (a systematic literature review, a national survey and inter-
views), this thesis addresses the following aims: 
1  Provide insight into the scale of patients who buy organs for transplantation and 
  describe why, where, how and from whom they purchased organs (chapter 3)
2  Acquire knowledge and understanding of the experiences, attitudes, behaviors and 
  needs of transplant professionals who treat patients before and/or after they buy 
  organs (chapter 4)
3  Examine the modus operandi of those who facilitate illegal transplantations and 
  study the investigation and prosecution of organ trade networks (chapter 5)
4  Assess the possible implications of a punitive, legislative approach (chapter 6)
5  Propose alternative strategies that may deter organ trade more effectively (chapter 7)
Adopting a multidisciplinary approach, the objective is not only to acquire a better em-
pirical understanding of organ trade, but to use this knowledge to explore and encourage 
strategies that may eliminate—or regulate—the trade more effectively with lesser risk 
of harms. 
Although in the literature numerous terms are used to denote the trade’s various 
practices such as ‘organ trafficking’ 16, ‘trafficking in human beings for the purpose of or-
gan removal’ 15, ‘transplant commercialism’ 17 and ‘transplant tourism’ 18, in the underlying 
thesis, the term ‘organ trade’ is largely used as an umbrella term to cover these activities. 
Because kidneys are the most commonly traded organ 3, this thesis focuses predominantly 
on kidneys. The outline of this thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the background of the studies presented in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 provides insight into the scale of patients who buy organs for transplantation 
and describes why, where, how and from whom they purchased organs.
Chapter 4 acquires knowledge and understanding of the experiences, attitudes, behaviors 
and needs of transplant professionals who treat patients before and/or after they buy organs.
Chapter 5 examines how illegal organ transplants are facilitated and studies the investiga-
tion and prosecution of networks.
Chapter 6 assesses the possible implications of a strict prohibition of organ trade.
Chapter 7 proposes strategies to regulate and deter organ trade.
Chapter 8 provides the conclusion and discussion of the findings.
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ETHICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS  
OF K IDNEY DONATION
F. Ambagtsheer, W. Weimar
Department of Internal Medicine, Section Nephrology and Transplantation, Erasmus MC, University Medical Center Rotterdam 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
P.J. Morris and S.J. Knechtle, (eds.) Kidney Transplantation. Principles and Practice.  
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World Health Organization (who) The United Nations specialized agency that coordinates international public health
Specified direct donation When a person donates directly to his or her intended recipient 1
Specified indirect donation When a person donates indirectly to his or her intended recipient or donates to a 
specified recipient through an exchange program 1
Unspecified donation Donation to an anonymous and unspecified recipient such as donation to the 
waiting list or to the recipient of an exchange couple in the case of domino-paired 
exchange 1
Principle of nonmaleficence This principle stems from the Latin phrase, ‘primum non nocere’, which means 
‘first (or above all) do no harm’ 2
Hippocratic Oath Requires doctors to do what they consider beneficial for their patients and to 
‘abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous’ 3
Volenti non fit iniuria When the person concerned consents, no injury is done 4
Informed consent Medical doctors provide a patient with all relevant information about a proposed 
procedure or treatment prior to obtaining the consent of the patient to carry out 
the procedure. Ensures that the autonomy of the individual is respected 5
Paternalism Neglecting a competent person’s will or even acting against it 6
Altruism A moral act intended to promote the happiness of others
Subsidiarity Removal of organs or tissue from a living person may be carried out where there is 
no suitable organ or tissue available from a deceased person 5
Home based education programmes Patient and family education on transplantation and donation in the patient’s 
own environment 7
Pre-emptive transplantation Transplantation that takes place prior to commencement of dialysis
Black market of organs Illegal market that coexists to meet the demand that altruistic systems fail to fulfil 8
Organ trafficking The recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of living or deceased 
persons or their organs by means of the threat or use of force or other forms 
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability, or of the giving to, or the receiving by, a third party of 
payments or benefits to achieve the transfer of control over the potential donor, 
for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of organs for transplantation 9
Transplant commercialism A policy or practice in which an organ is treated as a commodity, including by 
being bought or sold or used for material gain 9
Travel for transplantation The movement of organs, donors, recipients or transplant professionals across 
jurisdictional borders for transplantation purposes 9
Transplant tourism Travel for transplantation that involves organ trafficking and/or transplant 
commercialism or if the resources (organs, professionals and transplant centers) 
devoted to providing transplants to patients from outside a country undermine 
the country’s ability to provide transplant services for its own population 9
Monopsonistic market A market with multiple vendors but only one purchaser 10
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INTRODUCTION 
In organ transplantation growing emphasis is given to ethical and legal aspects. The main 
reason for this, is the increasing organ scarcity 11. The range of ethical and legal consider-
ations in relation to organ donation that is focused on in scholarly literature is considerable. 
This chapter introduces ethical and legal principles that arise in contemporary, everyday 
medical practice concerning living organ donation (lod) and transplantation. In particu-
lar, this chapter presents ethical and legal considerations that arise in the expansion and 
encouragement of living kidney donation (lkd) and commercialisation of organs. Because 
organ trade largely comprises of trade in living donor kidneys, the focus of this chapter is 
on live kidney donation and transplantation. Ethical and legal aspects concerning deceased 
donation are therefore not addressed. 
EXPANSION AND ENCOURAGEMENT  
OF LIVING KIDNEY DONATION
NEW DONOR-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIPS
Due to the shortage of deceased donor kidneys, living kidney donation has become the 
most important alternative to fulfil the need of the increasing amount of patients with 
end-stage renal disease (esrd) in need of transplantation. 
World Health Organization 
In 1991, the who, drew up Guiding Principles on Human Organ Transplantation. The aim 
of the Guiding Principles was to provide ‘an orderly, ethical and acceptable framework for 
regulating the acquisition and transplantation of human organs’ 12. Principle 3 stated that 
organs for transplantation ‘should be removed preferably from the bodies of deceased 
persons’. Adult living persons ‘may donate organs, but in general should be genetically 
related to the recipient’ 12. Thus, for many years living donation was commonly restricted 
to genetically related adults. 
Expansion of the donor pool
However, due to the organ scarcity, strong advancements in transplant technology and ex-
cellent results in lkd, the donor pool has expanded over the last three decades from genet-
ically related donors to spouses 13, friends, acquaintances and even anonymous donors 14. 
The need to expand the living donor pool has been recognized by transplant professionals 
and international organizations worldwide. By 2015, genetically unrelated donors account-
ed for 2726/5773 (47%) of lkd in the us 15, 688/1322 (52%) in the Eurotransplant area 16, 
and 315/513 (61%) in The Netherlands 17. In 2008 the who updated its Guiding Principles. 
14
Principle 3 now states, ‘living donors should be genetically, legally or emotionally related 
to their recipients’ 18. 
Spouses, friends, acquaintances and other non-genetic related donors are often 
referred to as ‘unrelated’ donors, to distinguish them from genetically related donors. Yet, 
many of these genetically unrelated donors have an emotional relationship with their re-
cipient. The use of the term, ‘unrelated’ is thus said to be ‘inappropriate’ 1. The introduction 
of new schemes such as paired exchange programmes has contributed to the complexity 
of donor-recipient relationships. 
Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects of Organ Transplantation (elpat)
For this reason, a Working Group of the European Platform on Ethical, Legal and 
Psychosocial Aspects of Organ Transplantation (elpat) developed a new classification for 
living organ donation 1. The group distinguishes between specified and unspecified dona-
tion. Specified donation, in turn, can consist of direct and indirect donation through an 
exchange programme. This classification is presented in table 2.
Specified donation Direct donation
When a person donates directly to his or her intended recipient
Donation to genetically and emotionally related recipient (e.g., to one’s child, parent, or sibling)
Donation to genetically unrelated but emotionally related recipient (e.g., to one’s spouse, friend, 
or acquaintance)
Donation to genetically related but emotionally unrelated recipient (e.g., to an estranged child, 
parent, or sibling)
Donation to genetically and emotionally unrelated recipient, but the recipient (or the group to 
which he/she should belong) is specified (e.g., to persons younger than 18 yr or a specific person 
in need of a transplantation, who was interviewed by the media)
Indirect donation
When a person donates indirectly to his or her intended recipient
Donation to a specified recipient through an exchange program
Unspecified donation Donation to an anonymous and unspecified recipient (e.g., donation to the waiting list or to the 
recipient of an exchange couple in the case of domino-paired exchange)
Alternative living donation programmes
Examples of successful alternative living donation programmes 19 are national kidney-ex-
change programmes 20-22 abo incompatible programmes 23, desensitization in hla-in-
compatible recipients 24 and domino-paired anonymous donation 25,26. National kidney 
exchange enables incompatible couples to donate and receive a kidney indirectly through 
exchange with another incompatible couple. This is also referred to as indirect specified 
donation (table 2). Abo incompatible programmes make it possible to transplant patients 
despite abo incompatibility when, after adequate immunoabsorbent and immunomodu-
lating treatment an adequate decrease in anti abo titer can be realized. Desensitization 
involves the use of preconditioning, either with high-dose intravenous immune globulin 
or with plasmapheresis plus low-dose intravenous immune globulin to enable transplan-
tation across hla barriers 24. In a domino-paired anonymous donation, the anonymous 
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donor donates to the recipient of an incompatible couple, while the potential donor of 
this couple donates to a patient on the waiting list (dominodonor) or to a recipient of 
another incompatible couple 19. This is referred to as unspecified donation (table 2). The 
contribution of exchange programmes to the overall number of lkd has been significant. 
THE WELFARE AND PROTECTION OF THE L IVE DONOR
The principle of nonmaleficence
The expansion of specified and unspecified lkd raises ethical and legal considerations. 
One of the most frequently mentioned considerations is that lod violates the principle of 
non-maleficence. This principle stems from the Latin phrase, ‘primum non nocere’, which 
means ‘first (or above all) do no harm’ 2. The origins of this phrase however are unknown. 
It is not a literal translation of the Hippocratic Oath, which requires doctors to do what 
they consider beneficial for their patients and to ‘abstain from whatever is deleterious and 
mischievous’ 3. The oath does not mention anything about ‘first or above all do no harm’ 3. 
The Hippocratic Oath, although a prominent principle in medical practice, is not 
absolute 2. It is a prima facie obligation—one that can be overridden if there are compelling 
counter obligations. Indeed, many medical procedures cause harm even as they benefit the 
patient 27.
Risks versus benefits
In lod, the health of one individual is put at risk in order to benefit another 27. The justifi-
cation for lod, especially lkd, thus lies in the expectation that the benefits outweigh the 
harms 28. Thus, if the benefits to the donor (psychological and moral) override the risks 
to the donor (physical and possibly psychological), then lod is morally permissible  14,28. 
Therefore, arguments given against lod on the claim that it violates the physician’s re-
sponsibility not to do harm are unconvincing 28. 
Donor risks in living kidney donation
The foregoing implies a need of understanding of the physical and psychological risks for 
the donor. The protection of live donors from these possible harms is emphasized in vari-
ous national and international (legal) rules and regulations. The eu Directive on Standards 
of Quality and Safety of Human Organs intended for Transplantation states that ‘the high-
est possible protection of living donors should be ensured’ 29. The who underpins that ‘live 
donations are acceptable when the donor’s informed and voluntary consent is obtained, 
when professional care of donors is ensured and follow-up is well organized’ 18.
Even though lkd transplantation has acquired an outstanding record worldwide, 
lkd involves risks including morbidity and mortality for the live donor. Nevertheless, these 
risks are very low. One study reported that the risk of donors developing esrd was 0,47% 30. 
Another study found this risk to be 0,1% 31. Despite these varying results, the reported 
incidence of esrd among living donors remains lower than in the general population 32. 
The risk of death is cited as 1 in 3000 (0,03%) and the risk of postoperative morbidity is 
16
2-4% 33,34. It is conceivable that the more widespread use of laparoscopic nephrectomy 
techniques will decrease morbidity in the coming years 35.
Psychological harms of the donor may involve coercion. Arguably, there is always 
coercion in lkd, especially when the person suffering is a loved one. Pressure may be put 
on people to donate, leading those who are hesitant to do so to feel coerced 36. 
Elliott has argued that to minimize the likelihood of coercion or other psychological 
harms of the live donor, lkd should be restricted to relatives 37. This belief is shared by 
Glannon, who also states that the risk in nephrectomy is justified because of shared emo-
tions amongst family members, but that these factors are lacking when the donor is not 
a relative 27. The argument here is that the suffering of another person is perceived to be 
felt more intensively if the person concerned is a relative. If, for example a mother offers 
to donate her organ to her daughter, her explanation that her donation occurs for the sake 
of her child will be deemed sufficient. On the contrary, if an altruistic or Samaritan donor 
offers to donate his organ to a stranger, the motivation is often not well understood 38. 
Furthermore, these donors do not have the opportunity to witness and enjoy the benefits 
from the donation. Hence, it is perceived to be more acceptable to benefit from the do-
nor’s selflessness when he or she is a relative rather than a stranger 37.
Coercion may also arise as a result of the expansion of alternative living donation 
programmes. With the increased reliance on exchange programs, for example, comes the 
increased number of potential, suitable organ donors. In the past, when persons were 
eventually reluctant to donate, transplant doctors were willing to identify a plausible med-
ical excuse, so that the person could ‘bow out gracefully’ 36. In alternative ld programs the 
possibility of a medical excuse for unwilling donors no longer exists 39. In a study performed 
by Kranenburg et al. amongst 48 donors and recipients, the question was asked whether 
they felt additional pressure or coercion into donating within the exchange donation pro-
gram. All except two responded that this was not the case 39. 
Legal restrictions in Europe
The possible physical and psychological risks underlie the justifications given for restrictions 
in de law regarding donor-recipient relationships. In Estonia for instance, lod is allowed 
only for the benefit of the donor’s descendant, spouse, cohabite, parent, grandparent or 
their descendants. In the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland and 
Sweden, in addition to the listed relationships, additional donor-recipient relationships are 
possible due to an open clause. Denmark, The Netherlands and Switzerland, by contrast, 
do not have any regulations addressing whether donor and recipient have to be related, or 
whether any specific procedure must be followed 5. 
National kidney exchange problems are legal in the countries that do not require a 
defined donor-recipient relationship (Belgium, Denmark, England, Latvia, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Scotland, Spain and Switzerland). On the contrary, in Germany, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, cross-over lod is illegal 5.
17
Indeed, the differences in these national legal regulations are reflected in the wide dispar-
ity in numbers of lkd across Europe 40. 
Equal donor risks in direct, indirect and unspecified living organ donation
Lopp 5, Van Dijk and Hilhorst 6, and others 14,28,33,41 argue that none of the arguments used 
to justify restrictions in donor-recipient relationships (based on possible harm inflicted on 
the donor) are convincing. 
First of all they point out that the donor’s risks are equally high in direct, indirect 
and unspecified lod 28,42. Practice and research show that there is no important differ-
ence between specified and unspecified lkd in terms of motivations and outcomes 43,44. 
Motivations and reasons to donate to strangers, for instance, are found to be equally un-
derstandable as donations to relatives. Medical evaluations of unspecified donors have 
shown these donors to be truly generous and selfless 44,45. 
In fact, when comparing the donation to benefit a stranger to the donation to ben-
efit a relative, the unspecified donation could be regarded as the highest expression of 
altruism 5. Indeed, altruism may ‘receive its highest expression in the absence of personal 
relationships’ 41. The special relationship between a donor and recipient, according to Van 
Dijk and Hilhorst, is ‘not the morally relevant key feature that provides a justification for 
lkd’ 6. Both specified and unspecified donation, Lopp argues, should be treated equally 5. 
Donor autonomy
The same authors claim that these restrictions violate the donor’s right to autonomy. 
When the donor voluntarily decides to take part in the surgery, he exercises his or her right 
of autonomy and thus cannot be considered to be harmed. This argument is also referred 
to as the ‘volenti non fit iniuria principle’ 4. This principle means that in case the person 
concerned consents, no injury is done 4,5. 
The concept of informed consent is closely related to the right of autonomy 5. 
Informed consent ensures that the autonomy of the individual is respected 5. Deception 
and coercion are mitigated by consent procedures, which is why such procedures have be-
come standard requirements in most countries. Reasons to refuse the donation that refer 
to the donor’s best interests can be called paternalistic, that is: ‘neglecting a competent 
person’s will or even acting against it’ 6. 
The principle of autonomy is applicable to all donors, be they specified or unspec-
ified. From this perspective it has been argued that ‘if a competent adult wants to act 
altruistically and offers to donate his organ to a stranger unconditionally, and the adult 
understands the risks and benefits of the procedure, and gives informed consent to the 
procurement, then his or her wishes should be respected’ 28. 
Besides moral arguments to support organ donation by indirect or unspecified 
donors, there is also a pragmatic reason. Indeed, as illustrated above, there is increasing 
support for unspecified and indirect donation to relieve the ever increasing demand for 
organs 14,38. 
18
Subsidiarity 
Considering the excellent results in lkd, some transplant professionals have raised the 
question whether ‘health care professionals should encourage lkd’ 33,42. This question 
touches upon the question whether lkd should be ‘subsidiary’ to deceased donation. 
The Additional Protocol to the Biomedicine Convention concerning Transplantation 
of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (Article 9) declares that ‘Removal of organs or 
tissue from a living person may be carried out […] where there is no suitable organ or tissue 
available from a deceased person’ 46. Many countries, such as Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Portugal and Slovakia follow this 
proclamation and prohibit the performance of lod when an organ from a deceased person 
is available 5. 
Other countries such as England, Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland do not regulate the relationship be-
tween lod and post-mortem donation. In these countries both deceased and living dona-
tion are considered equal 5. 
ENCOURAGING L IVE K IDNEY DONATION 
Van Dijk and Hilhorst write that good medical and ethical reasons exist to promote the 
many options of lkd 42. The advantages of lkd over cadaveric donation are manifold: lkd 
helps patients to circumvent the waiting list and relieves them of the burden of dialysis. 
Furthermore, the kidney survival rates for living kidneys are significantly better (50% still 
functioning after 20 years; for post-mortem organs this is only 10 years). Many patients 
prefer living to cadaveric donation 47. Transplant care professionals may therefore feel an 
obligation to bring these facts to the attention of patients and their relatives 42.
Cronin argues that given the low risks for the donor it is not unethical for doctors to 
encourage healthy adults to donate their kidneys, even to strangers. Demonstrating that 
such encouragement is unethical, requires a powerful argument against it 33. 
Home-based education programmes 
There are a number of approaches to patient and family education on living donation. 
One is the so-called ‘Norwegian approach’ where the doctor discusses potential living 
donors with the patient and then personally contacts these individuals and invites them 
for evaluation 48. Another approach (done in the us) is home-based, where a psycholo-
gist gives transplant education to the (pre) dialysis patient and family and friends in the 
patient’s home 7. This programme has proved successful in increasing knowledge and will-
ingness to communicate about living donation and in decreasing living donor transplant 
concerns 49.  
The home-based programme by Massey et al. (The Netherlands) is similar to the us 
‘house-call’ but offers the educational meeting earlier in the clinical course to include the 
option of pre-emptive transplantation 49. Pre-emptive transplantation, that takes place pri-
or to commencement of dialysis, offers optimal graft and patient survival when compared 
19
to transplantation after dialysis 49. Massey et al. state that the ‘interference in people’s 
lives’ is justified if a number of criteria are fulfilled. The criteria that they propose include 
that the patient decides whom to invite, the invitees have the right to withdraw at any 
point and confidentiality should be maintained at all times 49. 
In the foregoing chapter, we addressed the ethical and legal issues that arise in 
expanding living kidney donation. The following chapter focuses on the various consider-
ations that arise in the debate on commercialization of organs. 
COMMERCIALISATION OF ORGANS
This section is based, in part, on own, previously published work: Ambagtsheer F, Weimar W, Zaitch D.  
The Battle for Human Organs. Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism in a Global Context. Global Crime 2013;14(1): 1-26
THE RISE OF ORGAN TRADE
Organ scarcity
Transplantation is becoming a victim of its own success, with demand for organs being far 
higher than supply. With the aging of populations and growth in heart and vascular dis-
eases, demand for transplantation is increasing exponentially 50. In the United States (us) 
for instance, in 2015, 17,878 donor kidneys were reported to the Database on Donation and 
Transplantation 15. As of the end of October 2016, 99,382 kidney patients were on waiting 
lists for transplantation 15. In the Eurotransplant region which covers 8 countries, 10,797 
patients were waiting for a kidney at the end of 2015. In this region, a total of 4780 kidney 
transplants took place in 2015 16. An estimated 10 people in the European Union die every 
day waiting for an organ. Annual mortality rates range from 15% to 30% 51. 
Organ markets
Despite strategies to increase the donor organ pool such as adopting presumed consent 
systems, broadening deceased donor criteria and increasing the number of living (mainly 
kidney) donations, the worldwide organ shortage persists. Under these circumstances pa-
tients seek strategies to obtain organs from outside their home countries. With organs’ 
increased value comes their increased potential profitability, causing some people to trade 
and sell. Hence, next to altruistic procurement systems of organ supply, black markets 
exist to meet the demand that altruistic systems fail to fulfil 8. 
Trends and patterns 
Recurring trends and patterns of organ trafficking generally occur around a group of 
‘donor-exporting’ countries (Egypt, China, India, Pakistan and The Philippines), ‘demand’ 
countries (us, Canada, Israel, uk and some other European countries) and countries where 
the transplants take place including the us, Israel and South Africa 52,53. 
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Organ trade does not only involve organised, cross-border networks. It may also involve 
milder, more voluntary forms. In a survey performed by Van Buren amongst 250 living kid-
ney donors in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, some donors reported that they had received 
‘rewards’ or ‘gifts’ from their recipients. Examples were weekly meals, exotic vacations, a 
race car, jewellery, a racehorse and a painting 54. 
THE CONDEMNATION OF ORGAN TRAFFICKING,  
TRANSPLANT COMMERCIALISM AND TRANSPLANT TOURISM
Universal prohibition 
Organ trade is prohibited worldwide. The United Nations (un) Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children supplementing 
the un Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is the first international legal 
instrument to define and prohibit trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ 
removal. In this definition, organ trade is viewed as a form of organised crime and defined 
in the context of trafficking in human beings 55. 
The who first prohibited transplant commercialism in 1987, claiming that such 
trade is inconsistent with the most basic human values and contravenes the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 56. Its Guiding Principles declare that organs should be ‘do-
nated freely, without any monetary payment or other reward of monetary value’ 18. The 
reason given is that ‘payment for organs is likely to take unfair advantage of the poorest 
and most vulnerable groups, undermines altruistic donation, and leads to profiteering and 
human trafficking. Such payment conveys the idea that some persons lack dignity, that 
they are mere objects to be used by others’ 18. The belief is that altruism and financial mo-
tivation cannot coexist. Although trafficking in human beings for organ removal and trans-
plant commercialism are separate crimes, commercialism is perceived to lead to trafficking. 
Organ trade is also forbidden by the Council of Europe in the Protocol concerning 
transplantation of organs to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 46. Article 
21 declares that ‘the human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain 
or comparable advantage’. It also states that ‘advertising the need for, or availability of, or-
gans or tissues, with a view to offering or seeking financial gain or comparable advantage, 
shall be prohibited’ 46. Article 22 states that ‘organ trafficking shall be prohibited’ 46.
The Declaration of Istanbul
In 2008 the Transplantation Society and International Society of Nephrology convened 
in Istanbul to establish the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant 
Tourism (the Declaration) 9. This is the first document, established by transplant profes-
sionals, that defines and condemns organ trafficking, transplant commercialism and trans-
plant tourism. 
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Organ trafficking is the recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of living or deceased persons or their organs 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving to, or the receiving by, a third party of payments or benefits to achieve the 
transfer of control over the potential donor, for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of organs for transplantation.
Transplant commercialism is a policy or practice in which an organ is treated as a commodity, including by being bought or 
sold or used for material gain.
Travel for transplantation is the movement of organs, donors, recipients or transplant professionals across jurisdictional 
borders for transplantation purposes. Travel for transplantation becomes transplant tourism if it involves organ trafficking 
and/or transplant commercialism or if the resources (organs, professionals and transplant centers) devoted to providing trans-
plants to patients from outside a country undermine the country’s ability to provide transplant services for its own population.
The Declaration, although legally nonbinding, has proven to have significant influence. 
Over 100 transplant organizations endorse it. Whereas the Declaration’s aim is to influ-
ence transplant professionals and societies, the who is aimed at governments. Both act in 
concert to address growing problems of transplant commercialism, transplant tourism and 
trafficking by strict prohibition and penalization 57. As a result of the universal prohibition, 
almost all countries have implemented the prohibition into their domestic laws. 
REWARDED GIFTING
The Iranian model
Iran is an exception. Iran allows the sale of kidneys through a government-related, regulat-
ed, organ procurement system. Because of low deceased donation rates, the government 
in 1988 introduced a model of ‘rewarded gifting’ to promote live kidney transplantation 58. 
People who wish to donate can refer to a government institution who matches them to 
a prospective recipient. Middlemen and brokers, it is claimed, remain uninvolved 59. All 
donors receive a payment (the equivalent of $4,000) and a 1-year health insurance from 
the government. A large number of donors also receive an award or gift from the recipient. 
This reward is considered a private matter that is not interfered with 60. 
The ‘Iranian model’ is scrutinized by many 61-63, yet others claim that incentives for 
donation could—and should—be explored in other countries to increase the number of 
donations 64. Rewards or incentives can be applied to deceased organ donation and to lkd. 
A ‘reward’ is defined as a ‘gesture of gratitude for someone’s trouble’ 10.
Rewards for deceased organ donation
In 2007 Van Dijk and Hilhorst submitted an advisory report on incentives for donation to 
the Dutch Health Minister. The report presents two ways of encouraging deceased organ 
donation by allowing rewards. 
The first is rewarding someone for registering as a donor 10. The report suggests 
rewards including small gifts (e.g. a discount card or a free first-aid kit), a small sum of 
money, a free passport, discount on health insurance premiums and priority on the wait 
list, if the registree were to need an organ 10.
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The second way of encouraging deceased organ donation is by rewarding surviving rela-
tives. This can occur by giving them a sum of money or by paying the funeral expenses 10.
The authors conclude that although these measures may have some impact, finan-
cial incentives to stimulate deceased donation are unlikely to produce a really significant 
effect because the number of organs available is limited and continues to fall 10. 
Rewards for living kidney donation
Already in 1997, about ten years after the prohibition of organ sales was first proclaimed, 
the Bellagio Taskforce wrote that international declarations against commercialism are 
‘put forward in one or two terse sentences with no supporting arguments’ 65. The authors 
wrote that ‘the grounds for condemnation are not as obvious as declarations imply’. For 
that reason it could not find an unarguable ethical principle that justified the ban on organs 
sales under all circumstances 65. 
The debate over rewarded gifting for live kidney donors has been ongoing since 
the 1980s and has not achieved consensus 66,67. It is conducted from various perspectives, 
which are outlined below. 
Ownership 
The concept of ownership addresses the question who is the owner of the organs. These 
answers vary from God, the government to the individual, depending on legal, historic, 
religious and medical contexts 5. 
In most (Western) states, the principle of autonomy is dominant, meaning that 
(living) individuals are considered to be the owner of their organs 5. This is why we have 
full autonomy for dangerous activities such as hang gliding, smoking, bungee jumping and 
eating to excess 68. Governments restrict autonomy if it harms others (e.g. speeding, drunk 
driving, fire arms possession). That is why organ donation is permitted but sale is prohib-
ited 10,69. Payment is presumed to harm the poor and vulnerable 18. According to Radcliffe 
Richards, this prohibition means that people are unable ‘to enter freely into contract from 
which both sides expect to benefit, and with no obvious harm to anyone else’ 70. 
Indeed, the degree of harm perceived to be inflicted upon organ sellers is not 
without controversy. Some authors point out that it is a matter of social perception and 
acceptance of norms. Societal norms differ over time. Issues that used to be considered 
shocking, such as women’s equality, interracial marriage, children born out of wedlock, 
necropsies, and cadaver organ transplants, are now accepted aspects of Western soci-
ety. Societal norms also vary across countries. Whereas euthanasia, prostitution, abortion 
and drug sales are prohibited in many countries, they are accepted phenomena in some 
others 68. 
According to authors such as Radcliffe Richards, the prohibition of organ sale vio-
lates our right to ownership over our bodies 71. She argues that individuals should be free to 
trade organs between themselves and that the burden of proof lies with the government 
to put forward arguments that justify this prohibition. Friedlaender argues that a future in 
which people have autonomy in selling their own body parts is not unimaginable 68. 
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Payment is repugnant 
Some people believe that the idea of paying for an organ is ‘repugnant’ 72. Yet, others do 
not agree with this argument. They point out that people who buy and sell organs clearly 
do not feel this repugnance. They argue that something may cause feelings of repugnance 
without being immoral or being banned. Prostitution, pornography and the drugs trade 
can also be repugnant, but that is not a good enough reason to ban them 10. 
Payment undermines human dignity and human integrity 
Another reason why payment for organs is prohibited is because it is presumed to ‘convey 
the idea that organ sellers lack dignity’ 18,66. An organ is not something for which you 
should be able to pay. Against this, people claim that it has never been empirically verified 
whether those selling organs, eggs or sperm indeed felt diminished self-dignity 73,74. 
It is also claimed that this argument would be a reason to prohibit all living dona-
tion, even unpaid ones. The fact that transplants are possible already turns an organ into a 
commodity, something that has value also outside the body, and that can even be bartered 
through exchange programs. The organ thus becomes a (potentially) tradable good 10. Why 
are we permitted (in some countries) to barter organs in exchange programs, but not to 
trade or exchange them to financially benefit the individuals involved? 
Payment undermines altruism
One of the most widely-used arguments against payment is that payment for organs 
‘undermines altruistic donation’ 18. Against this, authors claim that ‘altruism as a value is 
overestimated’ and that we ‘set ethical standards far too high as a result’ 10. In practice, 
people donate for many different reasons. Why is it considered an act of altruism if a father 
in The Philippines donates his kidney to his daughter who is suffering from a serious kidney 
disease, but morally reprehensible for the same father to sell his kidney to raise money to 
pay for a life-saving treatment for his daughter? 10,70
Organ sale can occur for many different reasons, some of which are altruistic. 
Several motivations can co-exist. As Radcliffe-Richards points out, ‘Selling in itself is not in 
itself at odds with altruism, it all depends on what the money is wanted for’ 70. 
Altruism also plays another part in the debate on rewarding organ donations. Why 
would you, as a relative, still donate if your intended recipient can obtain a kidney from an 
anonymous, paid donor instead? Against this it has been argued that this should not nec-
essarily be regarded as a problem. Those who think that transplants between people who 
know each other are more desirable than those between strangers would see a decline in 
related donations as a shortcoming. But for those who prefer anonymous donations, for 
example because they have less impact on family relationships would see this as a benefit. 
In short, the view that living donation is or should always be an act of altruism is incorrect 
both empirically and morally. People can have numerous different reasons for donating an 
organ without payment 10. 
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Payment jeopardizes free will 
Prohibition of organ sales exists to protect those (the vulnerable poor) most prone to 
sell 66. The argument is that payment jeopardizes their free will, because the poor will feel 
pressured to sell. 
Against this, authors have put forward several counter arguments. First, the ques-
tion must be raised how money affects the behaviour of potential sellers. If a large sum of 
money is offered, this might be attractive, even irresistible, to some persons. But there is 
an important distinction between irresistible and forced: ‘putting a gun against one’s head 
to make them donate is force; offering someone a load of money in return for an organ is 
an attractive offer’ 75. The statement that the donor’s free will might be jeopardized is not 
an argument against payment, but against involuntary donation. Absence of free will is a 
risk that is associated not only with paid donations, but also with unpaid ones. If donors 
can be forced to sell a kidney, then arguably they can also be forced by circumstances such 
as family pressure or the intolerable sight of seeing a loved one suffer. 
In addition, it is said that money is only one factor among many others that in-
fluences decisions. Not all people will sell their organs for the sole purpose of payment. 
Indeed, in a study by Rouchi et al, performed among 600 kidney sellers in Iran, 60% report-
ed their motivations to be partly emotional/altruistic and partly financial 76. This shows 
that payment and free will are not mutually exclusive. 
Payment exploits the poor 
Prohibition of organ sales also exists because payment is expected to exploit or traffic the 
poor. Against this argument various counter arguments have also been given. The first is 
that prohibition of payment utterly fails to protect the poor and vulnerable. Prohibition 
does not prevent victimization. On the contrary, prohibition of organ trade has the par-
adox of increasing the likelihood of commercialism and trafficking. Prohibition of organ 
payment keeps organ supply low, thus increasing their scarcity. If organs are scarce, they 
become valuable, and ultimately, profitable to buy, trade and sell 57. This has the unintend-
ed consequence of driving illegal trade underground where victimization (as illustrated 
above) of the vulnerable is far more likely to occur that in regulated markets. Furthermore, 
criminalization of sellers makes it more difficult to identify and help potential victims of 
trafficking 77. Concern over exploitation of the poor should lead to regulation of a market, 
not its continued prohibition 78. Indeed, this argument (prevention of abuses in the black 
market) was one of the main reasons why prostitution, pornography, abortion and soft 
drugs were legalized in The Netherlands. Evidence-based studies have illustrated that le-
galisation has significantly reduced the abuses of the black market 79. 
The second counter argument is related to free will. To justify the prohibition of 
kidney sales by poor donors, it is necessary to illustrate that organ selling must always 
be against their interests. According to Radcliffe Richards, ‘Removing their option to sell 
leaves them poor, and makes their range of options smaller still’ 69. The poorer the poten-
tial seller, the more plausible it is that the sale of the organ will be worth whatever risk 
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there is. ‘If a living donor can do without an organ, why shouldn’t the donor profit and 
medical science benefit?’ 69.
To die or let buy? 
Some people argue that perhaps it is a good thing that money persuades people to donate. 
Not only may it more effectively deal with the abuses in current illegal markets, it may also 
relieve the shortage of organs 10. Matas states ‘organ sale simply does not feel right; but 
letting candidates die on the waiting list (when this could be prevented) also does not feel 
right’ 80. Are doctors ‘failing their patients’ 68 as long as the ban on payments is maintained? 
This may not be applicable in all countries. In some jurisdictions such as The 
Netherlands, the number of lkd is now so high, that the waiting list has decreased sub-
stantially. Models of rewarded gifting may not be necessary in countries with high lkd 
rates. 
The live kidney donor contributes financially to society 
Proponents of financial rewards or incentives for live kidney donors say that the ban on 
payment is ‘hypocritical’ 81. In contemporary transplant medicine, everyone profits, except 
the donor: society benefits, the hospital benefits, the surgeon and the medical team are 
paid, the transplant coordinator gets paid and the recipient receives an enormous benefit. 
Donors, if they are lucky, will be compensated for costs made as a (direct) result of 
the donation. Compensating live organ donors for certain costs is legitimate, but is not 
common practice in transplant centres 40. Who Guiding Principle 5 states: 
‘The prohibition on sale or purchase of cells, tissues and organs does not pre-
clude reimbursing reasonable and verifiable expenses incurred by the donor, 
including loss of income, or paying the costs of recovering, processing, pre-
serving and supplying human cells, tissues or organs for transplantation’ 18. 
The who thus permits compensation for the costs of making donations, lest they operate 
as a disincentive to donation. The need to cover legitimate costs of procurement and of 
ensuring the safety is acceptable as long as the human body and its parts are not a source 
of financial gain 18. 
Yet, opponents of the ban on payment say that donors deserve much more than 
mere compensation or reimbursement of costs. Organ transplants are expensive proce-
dures, yet, the long-term care needed while waiting for the transplant (kidney dialysis for 
instance), is more expensive than the transplant procedure itself. Transplantation of kidney 
patients saves the costs patients would otherwise have had on dialysis. 
Thus, one live kidney donor makes a significant contribution to society. How much 
does this contribution entail? De Charro et al 82 and Matas and Schnitzler 83 illustrate the 
enormous economic benefit gained with one (live) kidney transplantation. Combining 
information about quality adjusted life years, De Charro et al. estimated that the total 
benefit to society of one live kidney transplantation equals €80,000 annually (for Western 
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countries). Matas and Schnitzler, using the same analysis in the us, calculate an amount of 
$100.000 each year 82,83. 
The authors of these studies suggest that giving such large payments to donors in 
return for their organs is not impossible. Furthermore, they illustrate that if a regulated, 
vending system would be established for kidney donors, a significant payment could be 
made to them without increasing the overall costs to the health care system 83. 
Van Dijk and Hilhorst on the other hand say that the risk of offering too large a sum 
of money is that the wrong people, or people with wrong or dubious motives, may register 
as donors. These may be people who are medically unsuitable or who are not acting freely. 
It would be better to offer small amounts or ‘indirect’ rewards such as life-long exemption 
from health insurance fees 10.
De Charro et al. claim that given the high amounts, trade is inevitable, albeit legal 
or illegal. Therefore conditions should be implemented, based on regulation, that are fa-
vourable from the sellers’ and patients’ perspectives 82. Others also state that an effective 
and appropriate response is regulation or a monopsonistic market 10,81,84. Erin and Harris, 
for instance, propose the following standards or conditions for such a market: 
1  The market would be limited to a state or the European Union.
2  Only the country’s citizens can sell into the system. They and their families would 
be equally eligible to receive organs. Thus, organ sellers would know they were 
contributing to a system which would benefit them and their families and friends. 
3  There is only one purchaser; a national agency would buy and distribute the organs 
according to fair allocation and medical priority. 
4  There would be no sales or purchases between patients and sellers and no exploita-
tion of low income countries and their populations. 
5  The organs would be tested for viruses and there would be strict controls and pen-
alties to prevent harms. 
6  Prices would have to be high enough to attract people 81. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis further explores strategies to regulate and deter organ trade. 
CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate that with the growth of organ demand, ethical 
and legal aspects become more important. Transplant doctors and other professionals are 
increasingly confronted with these considerations. In contemporary transplant medicine, 
considerations of ethical, legal and psychosocial nature can no longer be ignored.
The authors wish to thank Leonie Lopp, Gert van Dijk, Medard Hilhorst and the elpat Working Group on Living Organ 
Donation (led by Annette Lennerling and Frank Dor) for allowing us to use and refer to their materials. 
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While the trade in human organs remains largely in the darkness as it is hardly report-
ed, detected or scientifically researched, a range of key institutional stakeholders, 
professionals, policy makers and scholars involved in this field show remarkable high 
levels of moral condemnation and share a rather unanimous prohibitionist line. Some 
have equated this phenomenon to genocide or talk about ‘neo-cannibalism’, others 
present it as dominated by mafias and rogue traders. However, organ trafficking takes 
very different shapes, each one with their own ethical dilemmas. Simplistic formulaic 
responses purely based in more criminalization should be critically evaluated. Based 
on a qualitative study conducted on the demand for kidneys (transplant tourism) 
in and from The Netherlands, we present in this article some of the main empirical 
results and we discuss their implications. But before doing that, this contribution 
briefly describes the global patterns of contemporary organ trade and the way the 
problem has been framed and constructed by international policy bodies, profession-
al (transplant) organisations, and some scholars.
1   INTRODUCTION
In September 2010, a South African hospital pleaded guilty to charges stemming from 
having allowed its employees to conduct over a hundred illegal kidney transplant oper-
ations between June 2001 and November 2003 1. In addition to this hospital, the parent 
company (Netcare), its ceos, five transplant physicians, two transplant administrative co-
ordinators and a translator were charged for the illegal kidney transplants. Charges against 
the hospital and its staff included fraud, forgery, uttering, assault and breaches under the 
Human Tissue Act and the Prevention of Organized Crime Act 2. A month later in Kosovo, 
indictments were filed against six physicians and a former senior level representative of the 
Ministry of Health. They are among others accused of trafficking in human beings for the 
purpose of organ removal. The trial of this case (also known as the Medicus Clinic Case), is 
now before the District Court of Priština 3. Both cases can be considered landmark cases: 
never before were organ trafficking networks of this scale discovered involving so many 
legal players.
These cases illustrate the multifaceted, complex nature of the trade in human or-
gans including the wide range of criminal activities, its integration in legal institutions, 
its cross-border nature, the different actors involved and the dedicated investment that 
is needed to eventually bring perpetrators to justice 4. Inherent to organ trade is also the 
distress of those ‘forced’ to sell 5 and the despair of patients confronted with the dilemma 
to die or to buy 6. Organ trade involves different varieties, ranging from human trafficking 
for organ removal, selling the body parts of deceased persons 7, the sale of kidneys by the 
poor 8, the purchase of organs by patients on the black market 6 to advertising the sale of 
organs online 9. Other forms involve financial or material benefit between willing donors 
and recipients 10. The cross-border variety involves recipients travelling to ‘supply’ coun-
tries to receive a new organ, a phenomenon known as ‘transplant tourism’ 11. 
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This article starts by describing the global patterns of contemporary organ trade. We sub-
sequently focus on the way in which the trade in human organs is portrayed by internation-
al public organisations, professional transplant societies and in literature. In section 3, we 
present arguments that refute the universal condemnation of organ trade and transplant 
tourism. In section 4, the empirical findings of a study conducted in The Netherlands on 
‘transplant tourism’ are presented, showing that the phenomenon is ethically and legally 
more complex than portrayed by instruments such as the Declaration of Istanbul and the 
World Health Assembly Resolution. The last section addresses the ways in which organ 
trade can best be approached.
2   THE GLOBAL TRADE IN HUMAN ORGANS
Organ transplantation is one of the most remarkable medical inventions. Ever since the 
first transplant in 1954, organ transplantation has saved and prolonged the lives of thou-
sands of patients. Until the 1980s it was regarded a risky and experimental procedure. 
After the introduction of immunosuppressive drugs (which moderate the body’s response 
while not suppressing the immune system’s reactions to infectious diseases) it became a 
standardized procedure, now conducted in hospitals in more than 90 countries 12. Survival 
rates of transplant patients have risen dramatically over the past decades. According to the 
Global Observatory and Database on Donation and Transplantation more than 100,000 
solid organ transplantations including kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs and pancreases are per-
formed annually 13. Human organs for transplants have two sources, the most common 
being deceased donors. The second source is living donors who can donate a whole kidney, 
half of a liver or the lobe of one lung. 
Transplantation is becoming a victim of its own success, with demand for organs 
far outpacing supply. In the United States, in 2007, 21,489 deceased donors were reported 
to the Global Database on Donation and Transplantation. As of the end of February 2010, 
105,966 patients were on waiting lists for transplantation 14. At the end of 2010, in the 
European Union (eu), 47,773 patients were waiting for a kidney. The average waiting time 
for a deceased donor kidney, for example, is now 3-5 years. An estimated 10 people in the 
eu die every day waiting for an organ. Annual mortality rates range from 15% to 30% 15.
Despite strategies to enlarge the donor organ pool, the worldwide organ shortage 
persists. Under these circumstances, desperate patients seek strategies to obtain organs 
from outside their home countries. With organs’ increased value comes their increased 
potential profitability, fuelling desire with some people to trade and sell. Hence, next to al-
truistic procurement systems of organ supply, a black market coexists to meet the demand 
that altruistic systems fail to fulfil.
The first accounts of organ trade date from the late 1980s by transplant doctors 
in the Gulf States who were confronted with patients for follow-up who had received 
transplants of purchased kidneys in India 16. Around the same time, Scheper-Hughes wrote 
about ‘body snatching rumours’ that she picked up during her ethnographic research in 
Brazilian shantytowns 17. Most accounts of organ trade in the 1990s were not regarded very 
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seriously. They were regarded as modern folklore or ‘global mass hysteria’ 18. Actual cases 
were never verified 19. 
In 1997, the Bellagio Task Force was established to address the international trade 
in human organs. The group could not find reliable evidence to substantiate allegations of 
kidnappings and murder for organs. It mentioned organ selling and organ buying reports 
in Asian and Gulf countries, pointing out that physicians were pursuing ethically dubious 
strategies for obtaining organs in a number of countries 20. 
From the beginning of the twenty-first century, cases of more verifiable nature 
came to light. Researchers began to report on negative outcomes of people selling their 
kidneys in countries such as India 5, Pakistan 21, Egypt 22 and The Philippines 23. An increasing 
number of physicians publish articles on the medical outcomes of ‘transplant tourism’ 24-26. 
Organ trade patterns generally evolve around a group of ‘donor-exporting’ countries 
(Egypt, China, India, Pakistan and The Philippines), ‘demand’ countries (the United States, 
Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom and some other European countries) and countries 
where the transplants take place including the United States, Israel and South Africa 2,12. 
In November 2012, a man from New York was convicted to 2.5 years in prison for 
brokering kidney sales between Israeli recipients and ‘donors’ recruited from mainly Eastern 
European countries. The patients paid up to $160,000 for the transplants, conducted in 
New York City hospitals and were consequently reimbursed by their health insurance 
companies 27. This case and the before-mentioned Netcare and Medicus Clinic cases have 
similarities. They illustrate how organ trafficking networks operate in various countries, 
bringing patients in need of transplants together with organ ‘donors’, with the help of legal 
players such as insurance companies. 
Whereas the aforementioned examples involve organised, cross-border trafficking 
networks, there are indications that milder, more voluntary forms of organ trade exist. In a 
survey performed by Van Buren amongst 250 living kidney donors in The Netherlands, some 
donors reported that they had received ‘rewards’ or ‘gifts’ from their recipients. Examples 
were weekly meals, exotic vacations, a race car, jewellery, a racehorse and a painting 10. 
By 2007, the World Health Organization (who) estimated that out of all transplants 
worldwide, 5-10% is conducted illegally 8,11. In 2011 a Washington Institute, Global Financial 
Integrity estimated that the illicit organ trade generates illegal profits between $600 mil-
lion and $1.2 billion per year 28. It ranks the trade in human organs on number ten of the 
twelve illegal activities studied in terms of illegal profits made. The most common report-
ed form of organ trade is the live kidney trade 12. 
3   THE CONDEMNATION OF ORGAN TRAFFICKING,  
TRANSPLANT COMMERCIALISM AND TOURISM
Organ trade is prohibited worldwide. The who first prohibited organ trade in 1987, claim-
ing that such trade is inconsistent with the most basic human values and contravenes the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 29. Its ‘Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue 
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and Organ Transplantation’ (hereafter Guiding Principles) declare that organs should be 
‘donated freely, without any monetary payment or other reward of monetary value’ 30. 
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (otherwise known as the Palermo Protocol) sup-
plementing the un Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (untoc) was the 
first international legal instrument to define and prohibit trafficking in human beings for the 
purpose of organ removal (often referred to as organ trafficking). In this definition, organ 
trafficking is regarded as a form of organised crime and defined in the context of trafficking 
in human beings (thbs). This provision does not prohibit organ sales for financial gain or 
other rewards. Key is the trafficking element, which involves force, exploitation or coercion 
of any kind 31. 
Whereas the untoc prohibits organ trafficking as a form of organised crime, the 
who Guiding Principles highlight the prohibition of financial gain (often referred to as 
transplant commercialism). The distinction between commercialism and trafficking is fol-
lowed by other organisations, such as the Council of Europe 32.
Professional transplantation societies also condemn organ commercialism and 
trafficking. In 2008 the Transplantation Society and International Society of Nephrology 
convened in Istanbul to establish the ‘Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and 
Transplant Tourism’ (hereafter referred to as DoI). This is the first universal document, 
drawn up by transplant professionals, which condemns transplant tourism globally (next to 
commercialism and trafficking). It defines transplant tourism as travel for transplantation 
that involves ‘organ trafficking and/or transplant commercialism or if the resources (organs, 
professionals and transplant centres) devoted to providing transplants to patients from outside 
a country undermine the country’s ability to provide transplant services for its own popula-
tion’ 33 Despite its non-binding character, the influence of the DoI is significant. More than 
100 transplant organisations endorse it 34. 
In addition to international organizations and transplantation societies, the crime 
is also condemned by some academic researchers and doctors in their writings. Scheper-
Hughes argues how the body—as part of the contemporary global capitalist economy—is 
treated as an object and as a ‘commodity’ that is bartered, sold or stolen in divisible and 
alienable parts 35. Prof. Delmonico, president of the Transplantation Society and one of the 
founders of the DoI, writes: ‘organ trafficking, transplant tourism and transplant commer-
cialism threaten to undermine the nobility and legacy of transplantation worldwide because 
[…] the vulnerable in resource-poor countries are exploited for their organs as a major source 
of organs for the rich patient-tourists’ 36. 
These and other authors have played a prominent role in the last decades to es-
tablish universal principles in organ donation and transplantation. Organ donation should 
occur altruistically 30, with respect for human dignity, without financial gain or comparable 
advantage and with voluntary and informed consent of donors 32. The belief is that al-
truism rules out any financial motivation for donation. Whereas ‘reasonable and verifiable 
expenses’ 30 incurred by the transplant are allowed, the practice of selling, buying or oth-
erwise facilitating trade in human organs is prohibited 32. Also, advertising the need for, 
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or availability of, organs with a view to offering or seeking financial gain or comparable 
advantage, shall be prohibited 32. 
As a result of the condemnation against organ commercialism and trafficking, almost 
all countries have implemented the prohibition into their domestic laws. Iran is the only 
exception. It permits transplant commercialism through a governmental, regulated, organ 
procurement system. Confronted with very low deceased donation rates, the government 
in 1988 introduced a model of ‘rewarded gifting’ to promote live kidney transplantation. 
People who wish to donate can refer to a government institution who matches them to 
a prospective recipient. Middlemen and brokers, it is claimed, remain uninvolved  37. All 
donors receive a payment (the equivalent of $1200) and a health insurance from the gov-
ernment. A large number of donors also receive an award or gift from the recipient. This 
reward is considered a private matter that is not interfered with 38. The ‘Iranian model’ is 
critically scrutinized by some authors 39, yet others claim the model could—and should—
be explored in other countries to increase the number of donations 40. 
Indeed, the condemnation against organ trade may not be as universal as it may 
seem. Evans argues that the organ trade prohibition is a Western belief that is wrongly in-
flicted universally. He accuses contemporary position statements against transplant tour-
ism of being ‘ethnocentric’, regarding the world primarily from the perspective of Western 
culture 41. 
The condemnation of organ trade as a serious (organised) crime problem is ques-
tionable for various reasons. The Bellagio Taskforce stated that ‘the grounds for condemna-
tion are not as obvious as declarations imply’. For that reason it could not find an unarguable 
ethical principle that justified the ban on organs sales under all circumstances 20. A group 
of doctors and philosophers published a paper in the Lancet in 1997, explaining why ar-
guments commonly offered for prohibiting organ sales do not work and arguing that ‘the 
debate should be reopened’ 42. The debate continues until this day 43,44. Below we present 
arguments that have been put forward in an attempt to refute the universal prohibition of 
organ purchases and sales. 
4   A  CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE:  
FROM TRAFFICKING,  TO COMMERCIALISM,  TO TOURISM 
Perhaps the strongest claim of all is that transplant commercialism is prohibited for the 
wrong reasons. Transplant commercialism and trafficking are prohibited to protect those 
most prone to sell. Scholars have raised the question whether there is anything intrinsically 
wrong with the buying and selling of organs (commercialism), or whether what is wrong 
in practice is the circumstances under which it occurs and their undesirable consequenc-
es 45. They claim that harm (trafficking) already caused to donors and recipients in prohib-
ited black markets is sufficient proof that the protection argument is no longer valid. As 
Radcliffe-Richards et al. wrote, ‘there is much more scope for exploitation and abuse when 
a supply of desperately wanted goods is made illegal’ 42. The point here is that prohibition 
does not prevent victimization. On the contrary, prohibition and criminalization of sellers 
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renders it more difficult to identify and help potential victims of trafficking. The argument 
made in favour of prohibition (namely that putting as price on organs will automatically 
lead to trafficking) is devoid of any empirical substance and is thus unconvincing 46. 
Radcliffe-Richards et al. further argue that to justify the prohibition of kidney sales 
by poor vendors, it is necessary to illustrate that organ selling must always be against the 
interests of potential vendors. Removing their option to sell leaves them poor, and makes 
their range of options smaller still. The only way to improve their situation is to tackle the 
root cause of the problem (poverty) and develop effective strategies to help vulnerable 
donors 42.
Another critique is made against the belief that selling body parts violates human 
integrity and dignity. It is claimed that it has never been empirically verified whether those 
selling organs, eggs or sperm indeed felt diminished self-dignity or are considered to be or 
feel less altruistic 46,47. 
It is said that the alarming organ shortage and resulting deaths on the wait list justi-
fies the exploration of a legal, regulated market in organs (especially kidneys) 48. The ban on 
organ sales keeps organ supply low, increasing their value, their potential profitability and 
thus reinforcing the problem. Furthermore, the ban is ‘hypocritical’ 48,49. In contemporary 
transplant medicine, everyone profits, except the donor: the hospital benefits, the surgeon 
and the medical team are paid, the transplant coordinator gets paid and the recipient 
receives an enormous benefit. In an ethical, regulated organ market, organ vendors should 
equally benefit and be rewarded for their gift to the recipient and society. 
The foregoing arguments shed a different light on the negative image of trans-
plant commercialism. But they are more theoretical than empirical, thus raising the need 
for an evidence-based approach. Yet, this is impossible to achieve with a maintained ban 
on organ sales. Opponents of regulation often point to harms committed against organ 
vendors, yet these harms are the result of transactions in unregulated markets. The large 
number of organ vendors included in studies on outcomes of kidney vending stand in 
stark contrast to the number of organ recipients included in studies on outcomes of organ 
purchase. Studies on transplant tourism exist, yet the number of reported organ buyers is 
much lower than reported organ sellers 24,25. 
There are strong indications that transplant tourism takes place in the same hospi-
tals and clinics where transplants to locals and other medical procedures are carried out. 
Search engines lead to websites of centres worldwide that offer organ transplantations 
amongst many other common medical procedures. Health insurance companies see the 
benefit of outsourcing transplants to contracted centres in places including Bangkok, New 
Delhi and Bombay. Patients are encouraged to bring their own ‘legitimate donor with a 
desire to donate’ 50. 
Transplant tourism is increasingly referred to as a perilous procedure involving evils 
and dangers for recipients and suppliers 8. The DoI declares that ‘transplant tourism violates 
the principles of equity, justice and respect for human dignity and should be prohibited’ 33.
It is questionable whether transplant tourism, derived from the universally and 
legally accepted phenomenon of medical tourism, deserves the reputation of a crime 51. 
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Closer scrutiny of studies that present data about transplant tourism reveals that the ma-
jority in fact do not present any real evidence that the organs were illegally obtained 24,25. 
An information gap exists about micro-level interactions between physicians and their 
patients who opt for presumed commercial transplants abroad. 
The next section addresses this gap by presenting the results from a fieldwork study 
conducted in The Netherlands on transplant tourism. First of all, the methodology of the 
study is presented. Second, we briefly describe the scale and dark number of transplant 
tourism from The Netherlands. Third, we address the reasons why patients go abroad. The 
fourth and final part focuses on the way physicians deal with transplant tourism. 
5   CROSS-BORDER QUEST:  AN EXPLORATIVE STUDY  
ON TRANSPLANT TOURISM FROM THE NETHERLANDS 
5.1  Methods
In 2005, the Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings (nrm) initiated an 
explorative, empirical field study on organ trafficking that we performed by interviewing 
transplant professionals in Dutch transplant hospitals 52,53. The main research question was 
whether the professionals knew kidney patients who wanted to, had tried to or had suc-
ceeded in buying a kidney for transplant in The Netherlands or abroad. 
Nineteen half-structured interviews were conducted with transplant profession-
als (considered as gatekeepers), and policy-makers. The respondents are listed in table 1. 
A  topic list with open questions was used. All respondents were contacted by a letter 
(by e-mail) of introduction stating the nature and aim of the study and stating a request 
for an interview. Thirteen transplant professionals were interviewed: eight kidney spe-
cialists (nephrologists), four transplant coordinators and one transplant surgeon. Because 
the seven transplant centres are specialized in giving post-transplant medical aftercare, it 
was expected that these centres would have the most knowledge and information about 
transplant tourism. The focus was predominantly on kidneys because kidneys are the most 
commonly traded organ. We interviewed physicians in all transplant centres to ensure 
a good geographic coverage. In addition, two patients were interviewed, one of whom 
bought a kidney in China. This interview was conducted in the patient’s home. The other 
received a kidney through the Dutch wait list. Finally, we interviewed four policy makers 
for background information on organ donation policy. 
The interviews lasted between 1-2 hours. All interviews, except for three (one with 
the transplant surgeon, one with a nephrologist, and one with the patient who went to 
China) were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The interviews with physicians and 
patients were handled anonymously. 
5.2  The scale of transplant tourism and its dark number
All transplant physicians and three transplant coordinators were confronted with patients 
who had expressed a desire to obtain organs for transplantation abroad. They also knew 
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or had heard of patients who had succeeded in travelling abroad for kidney transplanta-
tion. The policy-makers did not have any information or knowledge about patients going 
abroad.
Almost all respondents referred to the number of patients going abroad for kidney 
transplants as ‘incidental’. The number of cases mentioned by the doctors per centre rang-
es from two patients a year to less than five over three decades. Nationally, the estimated 
total number is four per year. The incidental scale of transplant tourism corresponds with 
studies from other countries that report small numbers of patients engaging in transplant 
tourism 24-26. 
Most cases became known to doctors and coordinators after the transplant abroad 
had taken place and the patient returned to the transplant centre with complications. On 
some occasions, cases became known in the pre-transplant stage because patients told 
their physicians that they had found information on the Internet and were exploring the 
possibility of undergoing a transplant abroad.
Patients who go abroad for kidney transplants are not reported or registered. Various 
implications arise when attempting to assess the true number of transplant tourism cases. 
Below we present five reasons why a dark number of transplant tourism likely exists. 
First of all, this study was performed in transplant centres, but not in regional hos-
pitals or local dialysis centres. It is possible that transplant tourism cases are known with 
local dialysis doctors and in regional hospitals, but not reported to the larger transplant 
centres. One doctor said:
The problem is that we don’t see it. We never know for sure. We also do not have 
a clear view of what patients do. When patients engage in transplant tourism, 
their dialysis doctors will come to us for advice and refer the patients to us. 
—Nephrologist iv
Second, some patients who have travelled abroad may not be known to the medical sys-
tem because they may not require medical help due to lack of complications. Some may 
not even be registered on the wait list when they go abroad for a transplant 54. Transplant 
tourism commonly becomes known when patients seek medical care after undergoing a 
transplant abroad. A transplant coordinator claimed that:
We know because they come back. They live here. They come back because of 
complications or because of their regular checkups […] we give them medical 
care, but we don’t ask them anything. —Transplant coordinator i
It is possible that some patients are successfully transplanted and that they do not require 
(immediate) post-transplant care. These patients may stay out of sight of the medical sys-
tem. The latter seems unlikely however, as almost every patient will require regular check-
ups and immunosuppressant drugs to prevent the body from rejecting the implanted graft. 
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However, as long as this has not been properly investigated, the possibility of this dark 
number must be taken into account. 
The third explanation for a possible dark number in this study is that our respon-
dents often needed to recollect from memory to answer our questions such as the number 
of ‘transplant tourists’ they knew, the destination countries, the date or year of the trans-
plant and the nature of the complications that patients experienced. Due to the lack of 
registered cases, the respondents were not able to provide exact numbers of transplant 
tourism cases. Instead, they gave estimations based on how many times it occurred each 
year, or every five, or 10 years. 
Legal aspects, in particular the doctor’s professional secrecy oath, the patient’s right 
to privacy and the privilege of non-disclosure, are a fourth explanation why a dark number 
likely exists. Doctors have a professional secrecy oath and are therefore exempted from 
the duty to report their patients’ crimes to the police 55. Most doctors in the study empha-
sized their secrecy oath. This secrecy oath strongly affected our findings, first, because 
respondents were not always willing to provide detailed information to us, including the in-
formation in patient’s medical records. They were reluctant to give us specific information 
and thus spoke about their patients in a generalized manner. Second, respondents were 
not always able to give us detailed information. They told us that they commonly did not 
talk with their patients about their alleged wrongdoing and thus were not aware of what 
had happened exactly. One nephrologist noted:
I did not want to interrogate the patient, for I am his doctor and I will remain 
his doctor. —Nephrologist viii 
Another doctor said that it was not his responsibility to discover more about his patients’ 
wrongdoings.
I don’t know how the procedure works and what happens to them [the patients]. 
I don’t ask them, because they won’t tell me. They will act as if they don’t under-
stand me. Anyway, it’s not my responsibility. —Nephrologist vi
Many nephrologists emphasized that they believed patients would not come to them to 
talk about ‘these kind of things’ (nephrologst vi). ‘They know better than to tell their doctors 
about it’ (nephrologist v), was an explanation given for physicians’ lack of knowledge and 
information about transplant tourism. 
Under law, the professional secrecy and privilege of non-disclosure prevail over 
crime enforcement. Thus, if the physician reports information confidentially entrusted 
upon him by the patient without patient consent, the doctor can be held (criminally) li-
able. For these reasons, doctors interviewed in this study may have chosen to withhold 
certain information to us about transplant tourism, despite the anonymity of the study. 
The privilege of non-disclosure is also the reason why ‘transplant tourists’ are not reported 
or registered in The Netherlands. Given the firm entrenchment of this right in national 
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legislation, it is also very unlikely that doctors can be legally bound to report or register 
this information. 
Our fifth and final explanation for a dark number lies with the definition of trans-
plant tourism. As explained in section 3, the DoI is the only (international) document that 
defines transplant tourism. Whereas it considers ‘travel for transplantation’ as the legiti-
mate ‘movement for transplantation purposes, ‘travel for transplantation becomes ‘trans-
plant tourism’ if it involves ‘organ trafficking and/or transplant commercialism’ 33.
Legal complexities arise in attempting to identify, prove and enforce transplant 
tourism by relying on this definition. Commercialism and trafficking are prohibited acts in 
almost every single country. However, a closer look at how these laws are framed reveals 
that these laws are not always equipped to tackle transplant tourism. Most laws apply to 
acts committed within the territory of the state, not outside it 56-58.
For example, if a patient purchases an organ on the territory of another state (the 
destination state), he or she is criminally liable and can be persecuted under the law of the 
destination state and not of the (resident) state. The main legal implication of transplant 
tourism therefore is that when the patient leaves a country after buying an organ that 
goes unnoticed or is ignored by local enforcement institutions, the legal consequences 
for the patient cease to exist. Consequently, whereas the purchase of organs is illegal, the 
purchase of organs will not (always) be punishable. 
Even if conditions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are fulfilled, this does not auto-
matically legitimize the state to prosecute its patients. It is practically impossible to prove 
whether transplants performed abroad involved commercialism and/or trafficking, i.e. 
whether they were in fact illegal. For instance, when a nephrologist was asked whether he 
knew patients who had purchased organs abroad, he replied:
I do not know patients who bought organs abroad, but I know patients who 
went abroad and came back with an [implanted] organ. They don’t tell me 
whether they bought the organ. —Nephrologist vi
The returning patient’s possession of an implanted organ, by nature a legal good, does not 
constitute proof of commercialism or trafficking. All transplant physicians in this study 
said that the patients bring back no or very limited information about the transplant and 
the donor. If they bring back information, it is commonly a letter, written by a doctor of 
the transplant hospital or clinic. These letters sometimes mention when and where the 
transplant took place, the medicine the recipient received and additional (medical) details 
about the functioning of the implanted graft. In these letters nothing is written about the 
potential illegality of the act, such as costs of the transplant procedure, the costs or finan-
cial profit or the origin of the donor kidney. If something is mentioned about the donor at 
all, this information is limited to blood group, gender and age, or simply stating that the 
organ donor was ‘related’, a ‘cousin’ and/or that ‘the donor was very healthy’. 
The limited documentation available is a recurrent theme in studies on transplant 
tourism 54,59,60. The reporting of donors as being ‘related’ has also been mentioned by 
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Cronin et al. who found that of 245 patients from the United Kingdom who underwent 
transplants abroad, 68 received their organ from a related donor, the majority of which 
were reported as ‘cousins’ 54. Lundin and Berglund also mention that a patient travelled 
abroad and received a kidney from a ‘distant relative’ 6.
The DoI defines and condemns transplant tourism when it involves ‘commercialism’. 
Many studies on transplant tourism mention the costs of the transplant, and conclude 
on this basis that the transplant was ‘commercial’, illegal and/or constituted transplant 
tourism 60. Yet, the costs of the transplant procedure also do not constitute proof of an 
illegal act. There are numerous commercial, legitimate medical procedures that are paid 
for, at home or abroad 58. Transplant procedures are one of them. What makes a transplant 
at home or abroad illegal (under criminal legislation) is the financial profit made with the 
purchase or sale of the organ (the payment overriding the costs) and/or the exploitation of 
the trafficked donor 51,56. 
The meaning thus given to transplant tourism is ‘confusing’ 41. It is ‘emotionally 
charged’ 41 without practical or legal significance. Its attributed meaning lacks the ability to 
distinguish between legitimate ‘travel for transplantation’ and illegitimate ‘tourism’.
To conclude, a dark number of transplant tourism cases likely exists for many rea-
sons. The current definition given to transplant tourism in the DoI fails to identify true 
transplant tourism cases. The taxonomy given between ‘travel for transplantation’ and 
‘transplant tourism’ has more theoretical than practical purpose. Governments that pro-
hibit transplant commercialism jurisdiction and agreements needed to effectively enforce 
tourism. Even if such legal structures were in place, in the absence of clear proof that the 
organ was bought or that a donor was trafficked for the organ, neither the presence of the 
implanted organ (the graft), the presence of medical complications, nor the (lack of) infor-
mation given in the patient’s medical file constitutes sufficient proof that his endeavour 
was an ‘illegal’ act of transplant tourism. 
In section 5.4, we present recommendations to tackle and prevent tourism more 
effectively. The next section focuses on the reasons why patients travel abroad for 
transplants. 
5.3  ‘I was insecure and longing’: 
why patients opt for transplants abroad and the role of culture
All physicians highlighted that the desperation of patients waiting for a transplant is the 
predominant reason why they go abroad or explore the possibility of undergoing a trans-
plant abroad. The average wait time for a kidney transplant in The Netherlands is four 
years. Currently, over 45% of the patients do not survive the wait. The waiting time starts 
with the first dialysis treatment. Dialysis is a process of cleaning and achieving chemical 
balance in the blood of patients whose kidneys have failed. Although dialysis is regarded 
as a life-saving treatment, it has a large impact upon quality of life, since it decreases 
patient’s health. In some cases health deteriorates in such a manner that a transplant is no 
longer an option. Second, dialysis treatments are time-consuming. Patients receive dialysis 
treatments at home or in clinics or hospitals about three times a week. 
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Not only the physicians but also the patients interviewed emphasized the insecurity that is 
accompanied by the long wait on the wait list. One patient (he received a deceased donor 
kidney in The Netherlands through the wait list) expressed:
I was insecure and longing. I was continuously thinking about the average wait-
ing time and how long I still had to wait. And what I could do to somehow 
accelerate my transplant. —Recipient i
A patient who bought a kidney in China said: 
The dialysis treatments were terrible. Once you begin you can no longer do with-
out. You are stuck to it. Going on holiday becomes almost impossible, unless 
there is a dialysis centre nearby. It also became impossible for me to keep my job. 
—Recipient ii
The impact of dialysis treatments on the quality of life of patients was emphasized by a 
doctor, who asked:
Have you ever seen patients on dialysis? If you do, you won’t ask me again why 
they engage in transplant tourism. —Nephrologist iv
Not all doctors shared this view however. One physician explained:
Dialysis is a very humane treatment. You are still capable of many things because 
of it. It is a treatment that is bearable. If the treatment is no longer possible for 
a patient […] he or she can easily get a donor kidney. We [physicians] have that 
power. It is possible to live with dialysis. It’s a different story if you need a heart. 
That’s when it is about your life. Without a heart there is no life. A living donor 
cannot donate his heart. Everything has its price. —Nephrologist ii
Yet, desperation alone is not a causal or driving factor of tourism. It does not explain why 
some patients on the wait list opt for a transplant abroad, but most do not. This suggests 
that more dominant factors, aside from the desperation caused by the illness and the 
(expected) long wait for an organ, play a role. As put by a patient from The Netherlands 
who received a kidney from the wait list:
There are groups of people that do not have ethical objections [to organ trade]. 
They have an ‘everything can be bought’ attitude […] this has to do with culture 
[…]. I do not believe these people fit into my social group. —Recipient i
Indeed, almost all respondents in the study emphasized the ‘ties’ between ‘transplant tour-
ists’ and their countries of destination. They mentioned that patients often have an affinity 
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with the country of destination, either because this is their country of origin, because they 
have family or friends living there, and/or because they have worked or lived there. For 
these patients, they assumed, it was perhaps easier to make the decision to go abroad. For 
example, one physician explained: 
Often they are Dutch, but with a different ethnic background. For the average 
Dutchman it is too big of a step to go to China. They are too compliant. The 
average patient will calmly wait in line for a transplant. There are a few peo-
ple that explore the ethical boundaries of organ tourism, or who will trespass 
them. This kind of people do not come and tell me what they’ve been up to. 
—Nephrologist v
One nephrologist (i) knew four to five patients who travelled to China, Iran, India and 
Pakistan. The patients who travelled to Iran and Pakistan also had the nationality of those 
countries. Another nephrologist (ii) knew three patients who went to China, us and India. 
The patient who travelled to China was Chinese, the other two were Dutch. A third ne-
phrologist (iii) knew two patients of Chinese origin who travelled to China and two who 
travelled to Iraq. Of the latter, one was a young Iraqi woman. The other was a man of 
Turkish, Kurdish or Iraqi origin. Nephrologist vi knew six to seven patients who travelled 
to China, Pakistan and India. Not all respondents remembered the nationality of patients 
who travelled abroad. One transplant coordinator (ii) knew a patient who went to Pakistan, 
but she did not know the nationality. A nephrologist also knew two patients who went to 
China and India, of which he did not know or mention the nationality. 
Not all patients had the nationality of the destination country. One nephrologist 
(vi) mentioned two patients (‘refugees’) of Moroccan and Lebanese origin who travelled 
to China and Pakistan. The fourth patient that he mentioned was a Dutch man who had 
worked for a large multinational company in Singapore and had managed to obtain a 
transplant in India from there. The nephrologist assumed that he obtained his transplant 
in India because his physicians in Singapore had informed him about the transplant oppor-
tunities there. 
Respondents generally referred to the patients as ‘immigrants’ or ‘refugees’. One 
nephrologist (v) spoke of an exchange student who went to his home country (India) for 
the transplant and came back after that. Only one nephrologist (vi) emphasized that his 
patients had varied backgrounds. He explained: ‘they live in luxurious villas but also reside 
illegally in the basements of houses in the big city’.
These findings illustrate that cultural factors play an important role. Ethnic ties be-
tween patients and their destination countries are a recurrent topic in almost all studies on 
transplant tourism. Cronin et al. found that of 245 uk residents that travelled to Pakistan 
and India, 62% were of South Asian ethnic background 54. A study performed in the United 
States amongst 10 patients found that all were foreign-born. Within each ethnic group, 
patients travelled to the same country, being Somalia (8), China (1) and Japan (1) 24. Gill et 
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al. identified 93 Canadian ‘tourists’, the majority of which were ‘ethnic minorities’ travelling 
to their country of origin 61. 
Yet very few authors deal with the role of culture or ethnicity as part of the broader 
global context. Cronin et al. are one of the few who raise the issue that minority eth-
nic groups in the United Kingdom are least likely to receive a transplant and that it is 
therefore not surprising that these groups are more likely to travel to their country of 
origin where they may have a greater familiarity and trust with the country’s health care 
system 54. Studies from The Netherlands 62, the United States 63 and Canada 64 also found 
that minority ethnic communities are far less likely to receive organ transplantations. The 
reasons for this are the greater propensity of certain ethnicities (mainly South Asians and 
African-Caribbean persons) to develop chronic kidney failure 54 and lack of awareness and 
information about treatment options 62. Given this, it is plausible that a link exists between 
the likelihood to receive a transplant in the home country and the propensity of some 
patients to opt for (paid) transplants abroad. 
Only very few researchers have interviewed patients directly about their perspec-
tives and experiences of going abroad for a transplant 6,65.
Recipient ii indicated that his familiarity with the Chinese health system was an 
important reason for him to undergo his transplant there. He explained that his dialy-
sis treatments in The Netherlands and the expected waiting time were not the primary 
reason why he started looking into transplant opportunities in his birth country. An im-
portant reason was the language barrier. He had poor knowledge of the Dutch language. 
Communication with his physicians about his disease was difficult. He complained that his 
physicians ‘spoke too fast’ for him. He felt relieved when he arrived in a hospital in China 
because he could finally communicate in his mother tongue with his physicians about his 
illness and understand the nature of his disease. A third reason why he went abroad was 
because the medical procedure in China was less complicated and bureaucratic than in 
The Netherlands. He explained that it was easier and quicker for him to receive treatment 
in China. 
Recipient ii’s narrative corresponds with Berglund’s and Lundin’s results of three 
interviews conducted with patients, living in Sweden, who underwent transplants abroad. 
All three patients (men) were foreign born (Iraqi, Iranian and Lebanese) and travelled to 
Pakistan, Iran and Pakistan respectively for their transplants. In their research, Berglund 
and Lundin focused on how people assign meaning and give a personal voice to their 
decision to go abroad. One of the main explanations that these patients gave about going 
abroad, were their feelings of alienation and being discriminated against in the Swedish 
health care system. The authors refer to insufficient understanding between the patients 
and medical staff when it comes to each other’s language and culture 6.
Indeed, several nephrologists in our study emphasized the language barrier between 
them and their patients. One doctor pointed out that, ‘[the patients] won’t tell me. They will 
act as if they don’t understand me anyway’ (nephrologist vi). 
In addition to waiting time and feeling of alienation and desperation, we also found 
an important pull factor that explains why some people travel abroad for transplant. An 
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important finding in our study was the importance of ties with family and friends in the 
country of destination. Recipient ii pointed out that he would not have been able to un-
dergo his transplant if it wasn’t for the help of his family and friends in China. Although he 
had looked for information about Chinese hospitals on the internet, his Chinese family and 
friends facilitated his transplant by finding a Chinese physician who was willing to treat 
him. They also paid a large part of the costs of the transplant and found a man who was 
willing to sell his kidney. He could not say exactly how much the transplant eventually cost 
him in total (somewhere between €10,000 and €50,000) because his family had taken care 
of most of the costs. 
Berglund and Lundin also mention that the patient’s transplant in Pakistan was ar-
ranged with help from one of his brother’s employees in the United States, whose brother 
in turn owned a hospital in Pakistan. The other patient who also went to Pakistan ex-
plained that his mother helped him pay for the transplant, by selling a piece of land.
A final reason why patients are found to travel abroad has to do with ethical or cul-
tural norms. Whereas in many Western countries the sale or purchase of body parts is per-
ceived to be repugnant, this belief is not universally felt 41. Perceptions of body concepts, 
ownership, sale, gifting, liberty and personal dignity differ across cultures and religions. 
Berglund and Lundin warn that because those who pay for organs are highly stigmatized, 
they will rarely want to tell their story truthfully 6.
This study revealed that doctors are often the first to encounter, or find out 
about the aspirations of patients to go abroad, or about those who have gone abroad. 
Recommendations against transplant tourism should therefore be primarily aimed at 
doctor-patient interactions. Below, in the final section, we address our findings on how 
doctors perceive transplant tourism and how they act towards patients who travel abroad 
for presumed commercial transplants. In the last section we focus on the way recommen-
dations or guidelines for transplant professionals should best take form. 
5.4  ‘I am the donor’s advocate’: how physicians deal with transplant tourism
The common belief is that transplant commercialism and moral transplant practice do not 
go together. Danovitch, for instance writes that ‘commercialization of transplantation has 
the potential to subvert and distort the traditional advocacy and caring role of doctors when 
they evaluate potential living kidney donors’ 66. Giving financial rewards for donation pres-
sures transplant doctors to act ‘against their best medical judgment and transplant donors 
to act against their best medical interests’ 66. Indeed, the DoI proclaims that the prohibi-
tion of transplant tourism should include ‘penalties for acts—such as medically screening 
donors or organs, or transplanting organs—that aid, encourage, or use the products of, organ 
trafficking or transplant tourism’ 33. 
Consequently, physicians presumed to be involved in trafficking or transplant tour-
ism are considered to be outlaws, ‘renegade’ and detached from the ‘mainstream’ trans-
plantation community 65. The ‘moral’ physicians by contrast are those who take no part 
in organ trade but find themselves burdened with a responsibility for medical care of the 
recipient who returns home after a paid transplant abroad 8. 
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Physicians are often the first to find out about the patient’s endeavour to travel abroad 
for presumed commercial transplants. Considering the growing anti-transplant tourism 
sentiment and the influence doctors can exert on their patients, physicians are expected to 
prevent ‘transplant tourists’ from going abroad 61. But what if physician’s individual consid-
erations and opinions conflict with the prohibition of transplant tourism and its rationale? 
Below we present some of the opinions and attitudes of doctors in this study. Why did 
they condemn transplant tourism? Did their opinions or attitudes influence their behavior 
towards their patients? 
All physicians and transplant coordinators expressed ethical, legal and medical con-
cerns about patients travelling abroad for transplants and therefore dissuade their patients 
from going abroad. 
Ethical concerns involved the likelihood that the organs were procured from im-
poverished, exploited donors. Nephrologists highlighted that although proof of this was 
non-existent, they assumed that patients had bought organs through unregulated, black 
market transactions. ‘I am the donor’s advocate’ one nephrologist (ii) exclaimed. ‘I some-
times tell my patients that I am willing to butcher a cow in order to give them a piece of meat. 
But I won’t slaughter a person to give them a kidney’. Yet, some acknowledged that organ 
sales might not always have adverse negative effects for the donor, required that they get 
proper access to post-transplant medical care. 
One nephrologist (vii) said: 
I would sell my own kidney if I could therefore feed my children or give them 
good education. I cannot be judgmental about that. 
The respondents did not only express an understanding of those who sell, but also of those 
who buy. ‘It’s a matter of life and death’, one nephrologist (i) said. ‘It is to be expected from a 
rational minded person that he will look for other ways to find organs’.
Apart from the ethical risks involved, doctors also dissuade their patients from 
embarking on paid transplants abroad because it is illegal. The respondents emphasized 
that not only patients are forbidden from buying organs but doctors are also prohibited 
by law to (help) facilitate the purchase. Thus, they do not help their patients because the 
law prohibits them from engaging in illegal activities. ‘However, if a patient returns with 
complications, I will help him,’ all respondents said. In one instance legal considerations 
prompted a nephrologist to help a patient of Iranian nationality to undergo a transplant in 
his home country, ‘because it is legal for Iranian nationals to undergo paid transplants there,’ 
the physician explained. He considered this case an exception and therefore decided to 
help. He supported the patient with undergoing medical tests and put the results on paper 
for him prior to his departure. 
The limited knowledge and control over the quality of care that patients will receive 
abroad is a third reason why physicians dissuade their patients to engage in it. Respondents 
often emphasized the medical risks involved in getting a transplant in countries where 
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safety and protection measures are likely to be poor. Dutch nephrologists’ experiences 
with the well-being of patients that underwent commercial transplants abroad vary. One 
nephrologist stated that he gets back ‘rubbish’, another exclaimed that ‘in the end, all those 
tourist kidneys did not do well. Eventually justice is done!’ Yet the same physician stressed 
that the transplantations in China of two patients were performed ‘…very neatly. It was 
state of the art. Not just a third-world transplant, but the same as they do here’.
These varying outcomes are also reflected in the literature. A systematic review 
performed by Sajjad et al. of 30 studies on the medical outcomes found in recipients who 
were transplanted abroad reported detrimental outcomes including lower graft survival, 
incomplete peri-operative information, wound infections, thrombosis, urinary leaks, malar-
ia and fungal infections 60. Yet other studies report comparable outcomes to control group 
patients who received a transplant through a ‘regular’ transplant procedure in the home 
country 24.
Physicians’ concerns affect the way they cope with transplant tourism. One ne-
phrologist (viii), when asked why he did not try to gather information about one of his 
patient’s organ purchases in China, said: 
I refrained myself from knowing […] I believe it was my way of ostracizing. I 
wanted to keep my hands clean and not be accessory to things that are ethically 
unacceptable. I did not want to feel guilty. 
The prohibition to engage in activities that are potentially illegal versus the duty of medical 
care causes a dilemma for physicians. Some doctors emphasized that by providing medical 
care to patients that potentially aids them with a paid transplant abroad (such as giving 
them their medical file upon departure) they may potentially breach regulations under 
criminal law that prohibit doctors to help facilitate commercial transplants. Reversely, if 
doctors would refuse to provide medical care, such as withholding patients’ medical files, 
they would breach vital health care regulations including patients’ rights to care.
Despite this conflict of duties, all physicians emphasized that they would provide 
medical care to ‘transplant tourists’, not only out of professional duty, but also out of a 
sense of moral obligation. Thus, the perceived dilemma between prohibition of commer-
cialism and duty of care did not affect the way they treated their patients. 
However, many physicians remained secretive and defensive about transplant tour-
ism. They emphasized their secrecy oath. Their guarded, cautious attitude became clear 
when they trivialized transplant tourism by emphasizing that it occurs ‘only incidentally’, 
and that when it occurs, it happens without them knowing. Most doctors and transplant 
coordinators regard it as a phenomenon that occurs outside the Dutch medical sphere and 
that is beyond their control. 
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6  THE WAY FORWARD:  REFLECTIONS ON HOW THE TRADE  
IN HUMAN ORGANS SHOULD BEST BE TACKLED
An effective approach to organ trade acknowledges that it takes on a wide variety of 
forms. Only after we agree on the definition of commercialism and trafficking, and on 
what we find condemnable, can we agree on their prohibition. Putting a price on organs 
(commercialism) is different from coercing someone into selling one (trafficking) 67. 
International instruments, such as the DoI, correctly define and differentiate traf-
ficking from commercialism and tourism, yet they do not mention how both acts should 
be approached by policy. They wrongly conflate organ trafficking and transplant com-
mercialism to constitute one and the same problem that both warrant equally repressive, 
punitive responses. Policies aimed to suppress or reshape an illegal market work differently 
from policies addressing coercion and other harms associated with trafficking. Evaluative 
studies in other illegal markets have shown that criminalization of commercialism is likely 
to reinforce trafficking 68. 
In section 3, we explained that organ trade can be broadly distinguished into three 
categories: transplant tourism, transplant commercialism and trafficking in human beings 
for the purpose of organ removal (organ trafficking). Below we introduce an approach for 
each form of trade. 
6.1  A bottom-up approach to transplant tourism 
The cross-border and complex nature of transplant tourism possibly makes it one of the 
most difficult crimes to prove and prosecute. This complexity raises challenges for doctors 
and other health carers. Transplant tourism shifts the traditional role of doctors as medical 
carers to ‘agents’, encouraged to deter and prevent transplant tourism 61. What would be 
the appropriate way of action if a health carer is confronted with a patient who considers 
going abroad for a—presumably—paid organ transplant? The type of response warranted 
depends on ethical, legal and medical factors. These factors differ for each individual situ-
ation. Any guidelines or recommendations developed for doctors on dealing with tourism 
should thus distinguish between different scenarios 51.
First and foremost, when a patient enquires about the possibility to undergo a trans-
plant abroad, the doctor should not immediately speculate that this will be an illegal trans-
plant constituting transplant tourism. Without evidence pointing to the contrary, the pa-
tient’s intention to go abroad should be regarded as a legitimate endeavour. Nevertheless, 
considering the medical complications that accompany transplants abroad 60, health carers 
should dissuade the patient from going abroad by warning him/her against the medical 
risks. Contrary to what Gill et al claim 69, doctors should refrain from informing or ‘ed-
ucating’ all patients about going abroad: this may bring the unintended consequence of 
putting ideas into the heads of patients who otherwise might not have considered the 
possibility at all. Such warnings should only be directed towards the individual patient who 
has expressed an interest or desire to undergo a transplant abroad. 
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If the patient is adamant on leaving and asks for his medical records and additional medical 
support, this falls within the duty to provide care. Refusal to give the medical record to 
a departing patient, or any other medical support, even if the physician is certain that 
the patient is going to buy the organ, constitutes medical negligence and thus breaches 
the physician’s duty to give care and the patient’s right to receive it. Not providing care 
to those in need, be they uninsured, imprisoned for atrocious crimes, or planning to buy 
an organ is likely to be considered a flagrant violation of human rights as laid down in 
the European Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine 70. The European Court of 
Human Rights has stated that medical care prevails over other interests 71. 
Whereas the patient’s right to receive medical care remains untouched, it could be 
claimed that the doctor may consider disclosing patient information to the police. This 
consideration may arise in the situation where the patient outright declares to his doctor 
that he is going to buy an organ for transplant abroad from a trafficked or paid donor. 
Generally, the declaration of the patient that he is going to commit a crime falls 
within the scope of the patient’s right to privacy. The professional secrecy oath, derived 
from the patient’s right to privacy, is a right of the patient, of which the doctor merely 
is keeper 71. What flows from the right to privacy is the privilege of doctors not to dis-
close patient information to police authorities. The professional secrecy and privilege of 
non-disclosure prevail over crime enforcement. Thus, if the physician reports information 
confidentially entrusted upon him by the patient without patient consent, the doctor can 
be held criminally liable. However, from established case law, it is clear that the doctor’s 
privilege of non-disclosure is not absolute. In very exceptional cases, when overriding 
interests or conflicts of duties are at stake, a duty may arise to breach the professional 
secrecy oath when the doctor is confronted with information that, if not reported, will 
lead to ‘direct and severe’ harm to another individual 71. 
The question thus arises whether a patient’s declaration that he is going to buy an 
organ for transplant abroad from a paid donor, constitutes sufficient justification to report 
the patient to the police. Considering contemporary case law it is very unlikely that a paid 
donor provides sufficient justification to breach professional secrecy and report the patient 
to police authorities. ‘Direct and severe harm’ is generally defined in the context of intend-
ed homicide or child abuse. The purchase of an organ from a paid donor will likely not be 
equated as a similarly severe crime. However, if the organ would be taken by force from a 
severely exploited (trafficked) donor, or a murdered donor, this is likely to be accepted as 
sufficient justification to report the patient to police. Yet, considering that the doctor must 
clearly motivate breach of professional secrecy, the physician would need to require clear 
evidence, such as a patient declaration or confession that the donor is going to be directly 
and severely harmed. In the absence of such information, a breach of the professional 
secrecy oath is likely to be considered illegitimate. 
The foregoing focuses on pre-transplant scenarios, yet these considerations are 
equally relevant for post-transplant situations. All patients returning from (presumed ille-
gal) transplants abroad are entitled to medical care. Only in the case of clear evidence of 
direct and severe harm to the trafficked donor, may a doctor consider reporting the patient 
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to the police. Legal implications for patients and doctors will differ in each individual case. 
Doctors will need to weigh the information known to them before deciding to treat pre-
sumed ‘transplant tourists’ differently from other patients. Providing suboptimal care to 
patients should not be based on speculations or presumptions that the transplant abroad 
was illegal. 
In conclusion, rather than relying on strict measures aimed to prevent and pun-
ish transplant tourism, we believe it is more effective to focus on a bottom-up strategy 
that tackles the root cause of the problem, namely the demand for organ transplanta-
tion. Doctors should make patients aware of safe alternatives such as a live kidney dona-
tion. Living kidney donation is acquiring an outstanding record worldwide. Although live 
donation involves risks including morbidity and mortality for the live donor, these risks 
are very low 72. Bottom-up initiatives to prevent patients from going abroad, should also 
take account of more sensitive, cultural issues that play a role in everyday patient-doctor 
interactions. 
6.2  Transplant commercialism: a plea for regulation 
An increasing number of transplant professionals claim that the ban on transplant com-
mercialism is not justified. Some people argue that perhaps it is a good thing that money 
persuades people to donate. Not only may it more effectively deal with the widespread, 
documented abuses in current illegal organ markets, it may also relieve the shortage of 
organs 40. Matas states: ‘organ sale simply does not feel right; but letting candidates die on 
the waiting list (when this could be prevented) also does not feel right’ 46. Are doctors ‘failing 
their patients’ 73 as long as the ban on payments is maintained? 
Various authors have proposed standards or conditions that a regulated or ‘monop-
sonistic market’ should fulfil 48. Erin and Harris mention, amongst others, that the market 
should be confined to a self-governing geopolitical area such as a nation state or the eu, 
with only one purchaser. Only citizens resident within the union or state could sell into the 
system. There would be no direct sales or purchases and no exploitation of low-income 
countries and their populations. Sellers of organs would know they had saved a life and 
would be reasonably compensated for their risk, time and altruism 48. 
Matas et al. add that such a system would need to comply with ‘protection’ (risk 
to the donor should be in accordance with currently accepted standards as defined for 
current donors), ‘regulation and oversight’ (each country will need to enact guidelines for 
evaluation and selection of donors, institution of the program of incentives and oversight), 
and ‘transparency’ 40.
6.3  Organ Trafficking: improving the non-legislative response 
As a result of the ratification of the Palermo Protocol 31, organ trafficking (the trafficking 
of persons for their organs) is prohibited practically worldwide. There is little doubt that 
organ trafficking should remain universally prohibited. However, this prohibition largely 
remains a paper exercise. Organ trafficking prosecutions are practically non-existent. 
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Legislative prohibitionist efforts, no matter how sophisticated, are fruitless if they are not 
accompanied by enforcement by local, national and international policing agencies. 
In 2010 in Vienna, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc) organized 
an expert meeting about the incidence of trafficking in persons for the removal of organs 74. 
At this meeting three issues became evident: first, organ trafficking researchers may have 
information about organ trafficking, but this information is hardly shared amongst them. 
Doctors also do not share information about organ trafficking. Second, there are no part-
nerships between researchers, transplant doctors and judicial/law enforcers. Third, there 
is no awareness of the crime with judicial/law enforcement authorities. Organ trafficking 
is not on the ‘enforcement agenda’ of these authorities. The lack of multinational partner-
ships hampers effective, non-legislative response to organ trafficking. 
Awareness about the crime should be raised with local, national and international 
law enforcement institutions. Partnerships should be established between various groups. 
Target groups are for instance Judicial and law enforcement authorities, transplant pro-
fessionals, international organizations and human rights ngos involved in protection of 
thb victims.
Enhanced collaboration between these partnerships can be encouraged by eu-fund-
ing mechanisms for research projects and cooperation actions, such as by the European 
Commission Home Affairs Program. In 2012 this program will start funding a project that 
aims to improve the non-legislative response to human trafficking for organ removal (the 
hott project), coordinated by the Erasmus mc University Hospital in Rotterdam. 
Other platforms with opportunities for enhanced collaboration lie with the Council 
of Europe, the who and the osce. These organizations are known to have written organ 
trafficking reports, yet little collaboration exists between these organizations and law en-
forcement institutions. Toolkits for Member States and Competent Authorities should be 
developed that provide indicators for police personnel to identify organ trafficking activities.
Training of police investigators should be encouraged regarding evidence gathering 
of organ trafficking cases and know-how about the modus operandi of the actors involved, 
training of prosecutors and judges. Bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation in cross- 
border criminal procedures should be encouraged and established. 
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Respondents Number of  
years in practice
Number of 
‘ transplant 
tourists’ 
Countries of 
destination
Nationality Year 
Nephrologist i 30 years 4-5 patients China, Iran, India, 
Pakistan 
Iranian, Pakistani Not known
Nephrologist ii 30 years 3 patients China, us, India Chinese, Dutch,  
Dutch
2004, 1990
Nephrologist iii 20 years 4 patients China, Iraq Chinese, Iraqi 2002, 2003
Nephrologist iv 25 years 3 patients Iran, unknown, us Iranian, unknown, 
Dutch
unknown
Nephrologist v 25 years 1 patient India Indian unknown
Nephrologist vi 27 years 6-7 patients Pakistan, India, 
China
Moroccan, Libanese, 
Chinese, Dutch
unknown
Nephrologist vii 12 years 1-2 patients  
each year
Pakistan, India Pakistani, Indian Each year since 1994
Nephrologist viii 10 years 2 patients us, China Dutch, Chinese 2004 (China) 
Transplant Surgeon 30 years None
Transplant 
Coordinator (tc) i
25 years Would not say China, Pakistan, 
Colombia 
Not known
tc ii 8 years 1 patient Pakistan Not known 2003
tc iii 11 years None
tc iv 4 years 1 patient Not known Not known
Policy maker i Not anonymous None Not known Not known
Policy maker ii Not anonymous None Not known Not known
Policy maker iii Not anonymous 
nigz
None Not known Not known
Policy maker iv Not anonymous None Not known Not known
Year of transplant Country of 
destintion
Origin of organ How procured Nationality 
Recipient i 2005 The Netherlands Deceased donor 
kidney
Through the  
national organ 
transplant wait list
Dutch
Recipient ii 2004 China Living donor kidney Bought from  
a living donor 
Chinese
ta
bl
e 
1 
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The international transplant community portrays organ trade as a growing and se-
rious crime involving large numbers of traveling patients who purchase organs. We 
present a systematic review about the published number of patients who purchased 
organs. With this information, we discuss whether the scientific literature reflects 
a substantial practice of organ purchase. Between 2000 and 2015, 86 studies were 
published. Seventy-six of these presented patients who traveled and 42 stated that 
the transplants were commercial. Only 11 studies reported that patients paid, and 
eight described to what or whom patients paid. In total, during a period of 42 years, 
6002 patients have been reported to travel for transplantation. Of these, only 1238 
were reported to have paid for their transplants. An additional unknown number of 
patients paid for their transplants in their native countries. We conclude that the 
scientific literature does not reflect a large number of patients buying organs. Organ 
purchases were more often assumed than determined. A reporting code for trans-
plant professionals to report organ trafficking networks is a potential strategy to 
collect and quantify cases.
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the trade in human organs has become an object of international concern. 
While first regarded as an organ theft rumor, organizations including the World Health 
Organization (who), the Council of Europe, and Global Financial Integrity now present it as 
a lucrative and serious form of organized crime that exploits vulnerable donors worldwide. 
The who estimated in 2007 that 5-10% of the approximately 60 000 kidney transplants 
performed annually around the globe occur via organ trade 1,2. According to the Council of 
Europe, the trade is growing worldwide 3. Global Financial Integrity ranks the trade among 
the top 10 of the world’s most profitable crimes, with an estimated annual illegal profit of 
$614 million to $1.2 billion 4.
A closer look at these reports reveals that they lack empirical foundations for their 
claims that the organ trade is widespread and growing 5. Nonetheless, these estimates 
are relied on to emphasize the trade’s seriousness and to underscore the need to make it 
an object of punitive crime control 6-8. The prevailing response to the trade is illustrative 
thereof: countries are implementing strict(er) laws against all commercial dealings in or-
gans. However, it remains unclear whether this type of response is proportionate to its 
nature and scale 5,9,10. What is needed is a better understanding of the trade, in particular 
of its prevalence. This knowledge can help the transplant community, together with poli-
cymakers, to develop effective measures to prevent and curb it.
Here, we systematically review the literature on the number of patients who buy 
organs. With this information, we discuss whether the scientific literature reflects a sub-
stantial practice of organ purchase. We begin by describing the number of patients who 
traveled for transplantation, including their departure and destination countries. Next, we 
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examine whether they paid for their transplants and, if yes, to whom or what they paid. 
We also describe payment for organs within countries (travel abroad not involved).
METHODS
Data sources
In conformance with the prisma guidelines 11, we retrieved articles from online databases 
and cross-checked reference lists. The following databases were searched in cooperation 
with a medical information specialist (W.B.): Embase, medline (Ovid), Web of Science, 
Scopus, and Cochrane Central. Additional references were retrieved from PubMed (limited 
to the subset as supplied by publisher, to identify the most recent articles) and Google 
Scholar (limited to the 200 most relevant articles). The databases were last searched on 
17 June 2015.
Selection criteria
The searches consisted of two elements: ‘organ transplantation’ and ‘commercial phe-
nomena.’ All databases were searched for synonyms for ‘commercialism’ in close proximity 
with synonyms for ‘organs.’ When controlled terms were available (medline and Embase), 
appropriate thesaurus terms were combined using ‘and.’ To reduce off-topic references, 
exclusions such as ‘blood,’ ‘gametes,’ and ‘bone marrow donation’ were added with ‘not.’ 
The searches can be found in the (online) supplementary material.
We then selected peer-reviewed, empirical (quantitative and qualitative) English-
language publications about patients who received organ transplants abroad and/or who 
purchased organs domestically (no travel involved). We also included studies among do-
nors and/or physicians who provided information about patients who purchased organ 
transplants. Publications published before 2000, opinion articles, and presentations were 
excluded. Two researchers (F.A. and J.J.) screened the titles and abstracts against the in-
clusion and exclusion criteria. Finally, we obtained the full texts of potentially relevant 
abstracts and examined them for eligibility.
Data analysis
The following data were extracted from each article: first author and year of publication, 
number of patients who obtained organ transplants, year of transplant, home country, 
nationality or ethnicity, destination country and number of patients per country, type of 
donation/transplantation, transplant tourism or commercialism (yes, no, not written), 
domestic commercialism (yes/no), and amount/beneficiary. In case of multiple publica-
tions referring to the same patients, data were extracted from the most recent record 
only. One author extracted data, which was reviewed by a second author for accuracy and 
completeness.
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RESULTS
Literature search and definitions
The search yielded 12 472 results. Of these, 2808 were published before 2000 and 3758 
were duplicates. We thus screened 5906 records on title and abstract: 5636 articles did not 
meet the inclusion criteria and 270 articles were selected for full-text review. Eighty-six 
articles were considered eligible and included in the final analysis.
We used the definitions given for ‘travel for transplantation,’ ‘transplant commer-
cialism,’ and ‘transplant tourism’ that are presented in the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ 
Trafficking and Trans plant Tourism (doi) 12. The doi defines travel for transplantation as 
the (legitimate) ‘movement of organs, donors, recipients or transplant professionals across 
jurisdictional borders for transplantation purposes.’ Transplant commercialism is defined 
as ‘a policy or practice in which an organ is treated as a commodity, including by being 
bought or sold or used for material gain,’ and transplant tourism is defined as ‘travel for 
transplantation that involves organ trafficking and/or transplant commercialism or if the 
resources (organs, professionals and transplant centers) devoted to providing transplants 
to patients from outside a country undermine the country’s ability to provide transplant 
services for its own population’ 12. Notably, although more than 40 articles were published 
on travel or tourism after the doi, only five present or apply the doi’s definitions.
The majority of the included studies (76 of 86) present patients who traveled. Of 
these, 42 state that the transplants were commercial and/or obtained through transplant 
tourism. Eleven studies report the amount that patients paid for their transplants. Eight 
report the beneficiary of the payment. Fifteen studies present domestic organ trade (five 
of which present overseas as well as domestic purchases). These and other characteristics 
of the included studies are presented in table 1. A flow chart of the inclusion process is 
presented in figure 1.
Travel for transplantation
Scale and geographic scope: The literature that was published between 2000 and 2015 re-
ports that 6002 patients traveled to another country for transplantation between 1971 
and 2013. This number includes traveling patients who were not reported to have paid 
and excludes transplantations within countries. Most patients traveled from Taiwan and 
South Korea to China. China is the most popular destination country, followed by India 
and Pakistan (table 2).
Common trends: Most patients traveled for kidney transplants, the majority of which were 
living unrelated 13-52. Patients also traveled for liver transplants 53-60. Eleven patients trav-
eled for heart transplants 61-64. One person traveled for a lung transplant 63. For many 
kidney and liver transplants, the donor relationship is not reported (table 1). Many patients 
are ethnically affiliated with the countries or regions to which they traveled. Desperation 
as result of the long waiting time and a lower quality of life experienced on dialysis were 
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the main reasons why patients traveled 65,66. Other reported reasons were patients’ cultur-
al and ethnic affinities with the destination country or region 18,67. Inequality in access to 
transplantation is a third explanation of why patients traveled abroad 32,67.
Transplant tourism
Terminology and transplant documentation: Of the 76 articles that present patients who 
traveled, 42 articles describe them as ‘transplant tourists’ 43,68 who ‘bought’ organs 69 by 
undergoing ‘commercial’ 42, ‘self-sponsored’ 70, or ‘paid’ 41 transplantations abroad (table 1). 
Together, these articles report 2921 ‘tourists’ (table 3). Most authors, however, do not ex-
plain what they mean by each of these terms 51,71. Those that do, however, define them 
differently. Gill et al and Alghamdi et al, for example, define transplant tourists as patients 
‘who travel abroad for transplantation’ 23,72. Adamu et al. define commercial transplants as 
transplantations involving organs from ‘non-emotionally related donors’ 15. Others adopt 
the definitions of the doi 12.
Information that patients brought back about their transplantations abroad was 
commonly unavailable or inadequate, in particular the details and circumstances surround-
ing donor selection 73-75. The variations in terminology and inadequate documentation 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to assess whether a commercial transaction was in-
volved. We therefore examined whether the literature reports the amounts that patients 
paid and to what or whom they paid.
The amounts that patients pay and to what or whom they pay: Eleven articles present the 
amounts that patients pay. In total, these articles report 1238 patients who paid between 
$10 000 and $200 000 for kidney transplants. Liver transplants were more expensive (range 
$40 000-$300 000). Eight articles describe to what or whom patients paid. These articles 
report 158 patients in total (one article does not report the number of patients 76). Of 
these, 129 paid their donors, 22 paid brokers, five paid to hospitals, two paid to private 
companies, and an unknown number paid physicians for a transplant (tables 1 and 3).
Domestic transplant commercialism
Not all patients who paid for organ transplants traveled. We identified 15 articles that 
report domestic commercialism (table 1). Most of these articles (10 of 15) do not report 
the number of patients, which prevents us from determining the scale of patients who 
purchased organs domestically. Nevertheless, domestic trade is said to ‘perhaps comprise 
the majority of organs beings trafficked worldwide’ 77.
D ISCUSSION
The underlying review illustrates that (based on the literature published between 2000 
and 2015) 6002 patients were reported to have traveled to another country for transplan-
tation between 1971 and 2013. Of these, only 1238 (21%; 1238 of 6000) were reported to 
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have paid for their organ transplants. Taiwan and South Korea are the most commonly 
reported departure countries. China, India, and Pakistan are the most popular destination 
countries. An additional unknown number of patients were reported to have paid for their 
transplants in their domestic countries.
Because the literature presents inconsistent terminology about what constitutes 
tourism or commercialism, it is not possible to distinguish those who traveled for trans-
plantation from those who traveled to participate in transplant commercialism. While the 
majority of studies present patients as ‘transplant tourists’ who ‘purchased organs’ by un-
dergoing ‘commercial transplants’ abroad, many do not define these terms. Those that do, 
define them differently. For example, some authors define ‘transplant tourists’ as patients 
who travel abroad for transplantation. Others describe transplant tourists as patients in-
volved in organ trafficking and/or commercialism. However, many of the studies preceded 
the doi and its definitions. The issue therefore is not the inconsistency of definitions but 
the inadequate information about the transplants. For instance, although many authors 
write that patients obtained transplants commercially, only 11 (of the 76) articles report 
that patients (1238 in total) paid for their organ transplants. Even fewer articles (8 of 76 (158 
patients in total)) describe what or whom the patient paid. Those that report the amounts 
and beneficiaries provide little detail on how these transplants were facilitated and present 
relatively small samples of patients.
Under many jurisdictions, payments by recipients for organs and the subsequent 
profit made by donors, brokers, or other middlepersons are prohibited 78. Paying a hospital 
for a transplant procedure, however, is not forbidden. When examining the reported pay-
ments, our review reveals that only in a small number of cases were proof of payment and 
illegality presented. We therefore conclude that the literature is speculative about patients 
buying organs: their purchases are more often assumed than determined.
Our documentation of 6002 patients (and 1238 of these involving commercial 
transactions) stands in contrast to the who’s estimate that 3000-6000 organs are traded 
each year. Various explanations may exist for this discrepancy. First, the trade’s clandes-
tine nature by definition makes it difficult to gather reliable data and to confirm trends in 
global patterns, even through rigorous scientific research 78. This limitation is an inherent 
part of crime research: when a particular act is forbidden, the numbers drop. This is not 
because the crime incidence decreases; it simply moves to an underground market 79. For 
instance, it is possible that the remaining 4764 patients paid for their organs but that this 
information was not sought or disclosed. Our reported numbers thus probably represent 
the tip of the iceberg. Second, transplant centers do not routinely publish the number of 
cases of either travel for transplant or transplant tourism 80. In fact, it is likely that there are 
good reasons why they do not publish these figures. A third possible reason is that most 
studies are written by physicians who, because of their duty of confidentiality, may be 
prohibited from or unwilling to write about their patients’ (alleged) illegal organ purchas-
es. Finally, our search strategy excluded materials that are neither published in scientific 
databases nor peer-reviewed, such as media reports, police reports 81, and reports written 
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by international organizations 82,83. The who’s estimate, by contrast, is not only based on 
journal articles but also on media reports. Nonetheless, as pointed out, it remains unclear 
how exactly the who established or corroborated its estimate 5. It indeed recognizes that 
the state of the trade is obscure and acknowledges that its figures should be regarded as 
‘provisional and tentative’ 2.
The anecdotal and speculative nature of the literature is caused, according to the 
who, by a lack of efforts to synthesize available data 2. Many others add that the scholarly 
research of the trade, in particular of organ purchase, is poorly developed 5,84,85. Thus, what 
is needed is not only more rigorous quantitative and qualitative studies but also efforts to 
integrate available information. First, national surveys could be circulated among trans-
plant professionals to document domestic cases of organ purchase 69. Second, transplant 
professionals could contribute to gaps in knowledge by conducting anonymous interviews 
with patients about their motivations and experiences with undergoing commercial trans-
plants abroad 86. Third, targeted searches in registration systems of national police forces 
and other law enforcement agencies have illustrated that such sources can reveal possible 
cases of organ trading that were not recognized as such during the initial stage of police 
investigations 81. An international registry that integrates these data 80 or a reporting code 
that documents trafficking networks 69 is a final strategy to collect and quantify cases.
To summarize, we conclude that the literature is speculative and anecdotal about 
patients buying organs: their purchases are more often assumed than determined. This 
hampers the drawing of firm conclusions about the scale of patients’ involvement in the 
trade. The empirical data published in the literature do not reflect a large number of pa-
tients buying organs. More rigorous quantitative and qualitative research is needed to 
enable a more reliable picture of the trade’s scale.
  The authors thank Arthur Matas, Susanne Lundin, Martin Gunnarson, Ingela Byström, Wilma Duijst,  
  and René van Swaaningen for their helpful remarks and contributions to this manuscript.
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Departure countries No. of patients Destination countries No. of patients
Taiwan
South Korea
Malaysia
Nepal
Turkey
Singapore
Saudi Arabia
United Kingdom
usa
Hong Kong
Canada
Egypt
Macedonia
Dubai
Brunei
The Netherlands
Argentina
Mongolia
Japan
Tunisia
Kuwait
Australia
Ivory Coast
Israel
Sweden
1227
1122
607
452
363
328
324
309
246
128
128
122
51
51
47
45
40
33
24
20
16
16
16
11
3
China
India
Pakistan
The Philippines
Egypt
usa
South Korea
Iran
Iraq
United Kingdom
Japan
Germany
Tunisia
Lebanon
France
Russia
Syria
Lebanon
Mexico
Guyana
Peru
Israel
Thailand
Nepal
Turkey
Australia
Singapore
2700
817
367
83
68
64
33
31
31
8
6
5
5
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Total 6002 Total 4244
* Six articles do not report the number of patients that travel (table 1). In addition, the country to which they travel is not 
reported for all patients. This explains the discrepancy in the total number of patients between both categories.
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No. of patients
Travel for transplantation 6002
‘Transplant tourists’
Paid for transplantation
Paid a donor
Paid a broker
Paid a hospital
Paid a private company
2921
1238
158
22
5
2
70
Records identified 
through database 
searching (n=12472)
Records published before 
2000 excluded 
(n=2808)
Records excluded 
(n=5636)
Duplicates removed
(n=3758)
Additional records  
identified through  
reference lists of 
included studies
(n=6)
Full-text articles 
excluded (n=190)
• Not empirical / no method 
description (n=84)
• Presentation (n=30)
• Not related to main topic  
of the review (n=23)
• Full text not found (n=30)
• Literature review (n=9)
• Duplicate publication (n=10)
• Non-English (n=4)
Titles and abstracts 
screened 
(n=5906)
Full-text articles 
assessed for eligibility 
(n=270)
Studies meeting 
inclusion criteria 
(n=80)
Studies included in the 
review 
(n=86)
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OR sheep OR mouse* OR mice OR fish*) AND NOT (human* OR patient*)))
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  PubMed publisher 
((((purchas*[tiab] OR buy*[tiab] OR bought[tiab] OR commerc*[tiab] OR tourism*[tiab] OR traffic*[tiab] OR overseas[tiab] OR 
abroad[tiab] OR sale[tiab] OR sales[tiab] OR sold[tiab] OR selling[tiab] OR crime[tiab] OR criminal*[tiab] OR vending[tiab] OR 
vendor*[tiab] OR pay*[tiab] OR paid[tiab] OR retail*[tiab] OR trade[tiab] OR trading[tiab] OR business*[tiab] OR market*[tiab] 
OR solicit*[tiab] OR entrepreneur*[tiab] OR financ*[tiab] OR broker*[tiab] OR profit*[tiab]) AND (organ[tiab] OR organs[tiab] OR 
kidney*[tiab] OR liver*[tiab] OR transplant*[tiab] OR graft*[tiab] OR donor*[tiab] OR donation*[tiab])) OR ((donor*[tiab] OR 
donat*[tiab]) AND recruit*[tiab]))) NOT ((blood[tiab] OR cell[tiab] OR tissue[tiab] OR sperm[tiab] OR semen[tiab] OR egg*[tiab] OR 
marrow*[tiab] OR oocyte*[tiab] OR skin[tiab] OR ovocyte*[tiab] OR ovum[tiab])) AND publisher[sb] 
  Google Scholar
purchasing|purchase|commercial|commercialism|tourism|trafficking|overseas|sales|criminal|payment|paid|trade|business|market| 
financial|broker|profit|vendor|retailing transplant|transplantation|donor|donors|donation kidney|liver|organ|kidneys|livers|organs
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Background: Patients travel worldwide for paid kidney transplants. Although trans-
plantations abroad are not always illegal, they are commonly perceived to be illegal 
and unethical involving risks. Aim: We aimed to describe the motivations and experi-
ences of patients who traveled abroad for paid kidney transplantations and to exam-
ine how these transplantations were facilitated. Methods: We interviewed 22 patients 
who traveled from Macedonia/Kosovo, The Netherlands, and Sweden for paid kidney 
transplantations between years 2000 and 2009. Results: Patients traveled because 
of inadequate transplant activity in their domestic countries and dialysis-related 
complaints. However, 6 patients underwent preemptive transplantations. Cultural 
factors such as patients’ affinity with destination countries, feelings of being dis-
criminated against by the health-care system, and family ties also help explain why 
patients travel abroad. Seven of the 22 patients went to their country of origin. They 
were able to organize their transplantations by arranging help from family and friends 
abroad who provided contacts of caregivers there and who helped cover the costs 
of their transplants. The costs varied from €5000 to €45 000 (us$6800-us$61 200). 
Seven patients paid the hospital, 5 paid their doctor, 4 paid a broker, and 6 paid their 
donors. Conclusion: Research should include interviews with brokers, transplant 
professionals, and other facilitators to achieve a full picture of illegally performed 
transplantations.
INTRODUCTION
Worldwide, patients travel abroad for transplantation, mainly for living kidney trans-
plants. 1-3 Although transplantations abroad are not always illegally performed, they are 
commonly perceived to be illegal and/or unethical, involving risks for donors and recipi-
ents. 4 Travel for transplantation becomes ‘transplant tourism’ when transplant commer-
cialism or organ trafficking is involved, according to the Declaration of Istanbul. 5 The trade 
in human organs is prohibited worldwide (except in Iran). 6 The most commonly reported 
explanation for travel for transplantation is the mismatch between the demand and supply 
of organs. 7,8 However, only 3 qualitative studies have been performed that describe pa-
tients’ motivations and experiences of undergoing transplantations abroad. 9-11
Scheper-Hughes, for instance, described how an Israeli patient obtained a kidney in 
South Africa through an organ trafficking network. 9 Huang et al conducted an interview 
study among 15 patients who traveled from Taiwan to China and the United States for 
liver transplantations. One patient organized the transplantation overseas with the help 
of a broker, 1 was referred by his local doctor, and the other 13 organized the transplants 
themselves or with the help of their families. 11
Although these studies offer insight into why and how patients travel for transplants, 
they report only small populations and provide limited information about the potential 
illegality of the transplants. The present study aims to fulfill these gaps of knowledge. It 
presents the results of interviews with 22 patients who traveled abroad from Macedonia/
Kosovo, The Netherlands, and Sweden for paid kidney transplantations. The aim of the 
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study is twofold—first, to describe patients’ motivations and experiences, and second, to 
describe how, where, and by whom their transplantations were facilitated. To date, this is 
the largest group of patients that has been interviewed on this issue.
METHODS
Design
This is a report of one-to-one interviews of patients who traveled outside their country of 
residence to obtain a kidney transplant. We interviewed patients who traveled for a kid-
ney transplant after 2000 from Macedonia/Kosovo, The Netherlands, or Sweden. Ethical 
approval was obtained by the board for ethical approval of research involving humans in 
Sweden (registered under No 2013/769, December 11, 2013) and by the medical ethical 
committee in The Netherlands (mec-2013-577, December 10, 2013). Ethical approval was 
not required in Macedonia/Kosovo.
Geographical Setting
Participants were outpatients from the University Clinic of Nephrology in Macedonia 
(ucm); from the Section of Nephrology and Transplantation at the Erasmus Medical Center 
(emc), Rotterdam, The Netherlands; and from transplant clinics in Sweden. Thirty-five pa-
tients are known at ucm who traveled abroad to buy kidneys. The total number of patients 
who traveled abroad from The Netherlands to purchase kidney transplants is unknown. A 
list compiled by transplant professionals in Sweden contains approximately 40 patients 
who traveled abroad for paid transplants. At the time the patients went abroad, the wait 
time in Sweden and The Netherlands was approximately 3 to 4 years. In Macedonia, there 
was no wait list.
Sample
At ucm, 10 patients were approached for interviews. All agreed to participate. At emc, we 
asked transplant professionals whether they knew patients who went abroad for kidney 
transplantation. In total, the professionals identified 13 patients whom we approached for 
interviews. Six of the 13 patients (2 females, age 42-57 years/median: 48.5 years; ethnicity: 
Somalia, Morocco, Georgia, Pakistan [2x], and China) did not participate: 1 patient died, 
2 moved to another country, 1 patient was no longer being treated at emc, and 2 refused 
to participate. In Sweden, 12 patients who traveled abroad for transplantation were ap-
proached. Information about the 7 nonparticipating patients in Sweden was unavailable.
Data Collection and Analysis
We developed an interview protocol with predetermined topics and questions. These can 
be found in the online Supplementary Material. The topics were patients’ characteristics, 
pretransplant stage, transplant stage, and posttransplant stage (table 1). The protocol in-
cluded questions such as ‘What motivated you to look into transplant options abroad? Did 
you make payments for the transplant? How? How much? To what/whom? How was the 
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trip arranged? Did you meet your donor?’ In The Netherlands and Sweden, the interviews 
were conducted semistructurally—questions were openly formulated, following the list 
of topics. The interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and encoded, which led to 
summaries based on recurring themes. In Macedonia/Kosovo, the study was performed 
more structurally—questions were formulated as stated in the protocol and the answers 
were written down. In addition to the information obtained from the interviews, emc and 
ucm also used information found in the medical records.
Topic Description
Patients’ characteristics Gender, age, place of birth, family situation, education, employment status
Pretransplant stage Domestic transplant attempts, motivations, practical arrangements, payments, and financial support
Transplant stage Destinations, transplant experiences
Posttransplant stage Hospital stay and complications, donors, moral perspectives
Procedure
Interviews were performed between December 2013 and April 2014. During 4 interviews, 
an interpreter was present. The respondents were informed about the aim and methods 
of the study by letter, phone, or during their regular follow-up in the hospital. All were in-
formed that the study was anonymous and that names would be kept strictly confidential. 
The patients who agreed to participate signed an informed consent form.
RESULTS
Patients’ Characteristics
We interviewed 22 patients—10 from Macedonia/Kosovo, 7 from The Netherlands, and 5 
patients from Sweden (table 2). Three of the patients from Sweden have been described be-
fore. 12 Ten of the 12 patients from The Netherlands and Sweden were born in Asia;  patients 
from Macedonia had a Kosovar or Macedonian background. Four of the 5 patients in Sweden 
had a university degree. Patients’ employment status differed per country; the majority was 
unemployed. The unemployment status was highest in The Netherlands (5 of the 7).
Summary of Interviews
Pretransplant stage
Domestic transplant attempts. Sixteen patients underwent dialysis before traveling abroad. 
The dialysis duration ranged from 12 to 140 months (median: 46.5 months). Six patients 
underwent preemptive transplants; 8 patients from Sweden and The Netherlands were 
wait-listed in their domestic country when they went abroad. At the time of the inter-
views, Macedonia/Kosovo did not have a wait list.
Seven patients (4 from Macedonia/Kosovo and 3 from Sweden) explored the possi-
bility of receiving an organ from a living-related donor prior to going abroad for transplan-
tation. Yet their donors were rejected because they were considered unfit for donation 
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n=22 (%)
Gender 
Male
Female
19 (86.4)
3 (13.6)
Age (median: 49; range: 29-65)
25-35 years 
36-45 years 
46-55 years 
56-65 years
4 (18.2) 
4 (18.2) 
8 (36.4) 
6 (27.3)
Family situation
Married, with children 
Unmarried, no children
20 (90.9) 
2 (9.1)
Education
No education
Primary school
High school 
College/university degree
Unknown
1 (4.5) 
6 (27.3) 
4 (18.2)
10 (45.5) 
1 (4.5)
Employment status 
Employed
Unemployed
9 (40.9) 
13 (59.1)
Destination for transplant
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 
India 
India
Iran 
Russia 
Colombia 
China 
Iraq
Country of birth
Macedonia/Kosovo 
Pakistan
Lebanon
Iraq
Somalia 
Macedonia/Kosovo 
Sri Lanka 
Macedonia/Kosovo 
Macedonia/Kosovo 
Curacao
China
Iraq
Country of residence
Macedonia/Kosovo 
The Netherlands 
Sweden
Sweden
The Netherlands 
Macedonia/Kosovo 
The Netherlands 
Sweden 
Macedonia/Kosovo 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands 
Sweden
7 (31.8) 
3 (13.6) 
1 (4.5) 
1 (4.5) 
1 (4.5) 
2 (9.1) 
1 (4.5) 
2 (9.1) 
1 (4.5) 
1 (4.5) 
1 (4.5) 
1 (4.5)
Total transplant costs paid per country (€ and us$) 
Pakistan
India
Iran 
Russia 
Colombia 
China 
Iraq
€6000-€26 000 (us$8200-us$35 400) 
€5000-€22 000 (us$6800-us$29 900)
€13 000 (us$17 700) 
€45 000 (us$61 200) 
€11 500 (us$15 600) 
€25 000 (us$34 000)
€9000 (us$12 200)
Posttransplant complications
Infections (sepsis, hepatitis C, tuberculosis, and infected kidney stone) 
Perineal hematoma necessitating reexploration
Severe rejections
Viral syndrome (origin unknown)
Rupture of bladder
No complications
4 (18.2) 
2 (9.1) 
2 (9.1) 
1 (4.5) 
1 (4.5)
12 (54.5)
Donors
Living unrelated donor 
Related donor 
Deceased donor
14 (63.6) 
5 (22.7) 
3 (13.6)
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and/or because their visas for Sweden were refused. Other patients did not want to bur-
den their family members by asking them for donation of their kidney. Therefore, they did 
not explore this possibility.
Motivations. Four patients said that they initially went abroad to visit family or to cele-
brate holidays, without having intentions to undergo transplantation. Two of them were 
persuaded by their family to be transplanted there. The others had complications during 
dialysis treatment abroad and grasped the opportunity to become transplanted.
Seventeen patients emphasized that they felt there was no other option available 
to them than going abroad for transplantation. The majority mentioned reasons for trav-
elling abroad related to dialysis; they described life on dialysis as depressing, complicated, 
and difficult because of nausea, fatigue, and pain. Another motivation to go abroad, espe-
cially mentioned in The Netherlands but also expressed in Sweden, was the long wait time 
for a deceased donor kidney. Other reasons given by patients in Sweden were feelings of 
being discriminated against by the Swedish health-care system. Patients in Macedonia/ 
Kosovo traveled abroad because of the absence of transplant activity in the country. In The 
Netherlands and Macedonia/ Kosovo, the decision about a transplant abroad was made 
even though the patients expressed confidence in the local health system. The patients 
from Macedonia/Kosovo held the government responsible for going abroad as the only 
chance to become transplanted.
Practical arrangements. Patients from Sweden and The Netherlands were assisted by fam-
ily and friends abroad with obtaining a transplant. Their help consisted of establishing 
contacts with transplant professionals. Family members of 3 patients from Sweden helped 
them by finding donors; the transplant centers abroad recruited donors for the patients 
who traveled from The Netherlands. Relatives of 4 patients from The Netherlands and 1 
from Sweden also accompanied them during their travel. According to the patients, the 
help of their friends and family resulted in reducing transplant costs and shorter wait times. 
Patients in Macedonia/Kosovo, by contrast, organized the trip themselves by contacting 
the hospital or doctor. They knew about the possibility of buying organs abroad from other 
patients who traveled. These patients were all accompanied by family members or friends. 
Three of the patients from Macedonia/Kosovo mentioned that a broker helped them facil-
itate their transplants. Visas, if required, were issued without problems.
Seventeen patients did not tell their domestic caregivers about their intention to 
travel for transplantation. Of the 22 patients interviewed, 5 reported asking for medical 
information to take with them as they traveled abroad seeking transplantation. In all cases, 
the medical evaluation and matching procedures were performed in the country where the 
transplant was performed.
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Payments and financial support. All patients paid for their transplant procedures. The 
amounts varied per destination country (converted at the 2014 exchange rate)—Iran 
(€13 000/us$17 700), Iraq (€9000/us$12 200), India (€5000-€22 000/us$6800-us$29 900), 
Russia (€45 000/us$61 200), Pakistan (€6000-€26 000/us$8200-us$35 400), China 
(€25 000/us$34 000), and Colombia (€11 500/us$15 600). The patients stated that these 
payments included services such as the surgery, the kidney, hospital stay, medications, and 
food. Seven patients paid the hospital directly, 5 paid the doctor, 3 paid a broker, 1 paid a 
‘middle man,’ and in 6 patients it is unknown whom they paid. Six patients said that they 
also paid their donor (range: €600-€2700/us$816-us$3670): 2 stated they paid for the or-
gan and 4 pointed out that they paid their donor out of gratitude. Eight patients received 
financial support from family, and 1 patient was supported financially by the church in his 
domestic country. Five patients in The Netherlands mentioned that they received (partial) 
reimbursements from their health insurance companies.
Transplant stage
Destinations. The patients were transplanted between 2000 and 2009. Most of them went 
to Pakistan (n=13). The others went to India (n=3), Iran (n=2), Russia, Colombia, China, 
and Iraq (n=1). All patients from Sweden and The Netherlands who traveled abroad were 
foreign born; 7 of the 12 traveled to their countries of birth for transplantation. The trans-
plants were performed at 3 days until 7 months after arrival in the country.
Three patients mentioned that the transplant procedure required proof of a rela-
tionship between them and their donors; they had to be family or they had to prove that 
there was a strong emotional relationship. Therefore, their family names, birth certificates, 
and identity documents were verified. However, the patients said that not all donors were 
questioned about their motivations to donate. Based on the Pakistani law, for instance, 
the medical staff at the hospital was required to write a letter that described the patient’s 
health situation, explained why transplantation was needed, and provided information 
about the donor and the donor-patient relationship. This letter was then given to a judge 
for approval of transplantation. Some patients hinted that the procedure could be circum-
vented if you had money or connections.
Transplant experiences. All patients met their surgeons prior to the transplant. Most of 
them emphasized that they had good skills. Patients who went to Pakistan pointed out 
that that their doctors had studied in the United Kingdom or in the United States. The 
majority described the medical care as ‘good’ or ‘sufficient.’ Four patients said that the 
more they paid, the better care they received. However, almost all patients mentioned 
a lack of hygiene in the hospital. Two patients highlighted that there was a trade in and 
a shortage of certain medicines and that these were very expensive. Most patients had 
a private room, sometimes with their family. Nobody shared the room with their donor. 
All patients in The Netherlands saw other foreign, hospitalized transplant patients from 
all over the world (Europe, South America, Asia, and Africa). The patients in Macedonia/
Kosovo saw other patients from the Balkans and Kosovo.
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Posttransplant stage
Hospital stay and complications. The patients were discharged from the hospital 14 days af-
ter the operation, if there were no complications. The duration of the hospital stay varied 
from 1 to 6 weeks. Twelve patients had no complications. Ten patients had severe compli-
cations ranging from a rupture of the bladder (1 patient) and perineal hematoma necessi-
tating reexploration (2 patients), 2 severe rejections, and 4 infections (sepsis, Hepatitis c, 
tuberculosis, and an infected kidney stone). One patient had a viral syndrome of unknown 
origin. If the transplanting hospitals’ discharge sheets that were provided to patients con-
tained any information, it ranged from a list of medications to scarce information about 
the patients’ medical background and hospital stay or the name of the hospital.
Donors. Fourteen patients received a kidney from a living-unrelated donor. Five reported 
to have received a kidney from a related donor and 3 from a deceased donor. Nine patients 
who received an unrelated donor kidney and all 5 patients who received a related donor 
kidney met their donors before or after the operation. Most patients are no longer in 
contact with them, including those who said that they received a kidney from a relative. In 
most cases, the information about the donor provided by the hospital abroad was limited 
(‘a good matching donor’) or even nonexistent.
Moral perspectives. Eleven patients reflected on the ethical considerations of going abroad 
for paid transplantation or, without relating this to their own travel, gave their opinion 
about organ trade in general. A summary of moral perspectives is displayed in table 3.
Topic n=11 (%)
Knew organ trade was forbidden
Had a guilty conscience about their organ purchase 
Experienced a dilemma between their individual circumstances and the moral aspects concerning their donor
Is against a regulated organ market
Is against organ trade
Organ trade goes against religious beliefs 
Would go abroad for transplantation again 
Organ purchase is part of the culture
10 (90.9) 
2 (18.2) 
5 (45.5)
1   (9.1) 
5 (45.5) 
3 (27.3) 
2 (18.2) 
1   (9.1)
All patients from Macedonia/Kosovo knew that it was forbidden to buy a kidney abroad. 
Nonetheless, the majority stated that buying a kidney is not a question of ethics but a 
question of life and death. Two patients said that they had a ‘guilty conscience’ about 
paying for organs and about the possibility of ‘using the poverty of the donors.’ Others 
pointed out that ‘many other things in life are forbidden.’
The patients who traveled from Sweden experienced a dilemma between their indi-
vidual circumstances and the moral aspects concerning their donor. One patient who went 
to Iran said that although paying for kidneys is not forbidden in Iran, she did not think a 
regulated market of organs was acceptable. Another patient blamed his purchase abroad 
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on the situation he was in but also stated that he was not ‘the kind of person who wants 
to buy from others.’
Five patients who traveled from The Netherlands said that they were against the 
organ trade. Three of them stated that selling and buying (parts of) a body went against 
their religious beliefs. Two patients said that they would go abroad for transplantation 
again, if necessary. One patient who underwent a transplant from a 12-year-old deceased 
donor in Colombia said—‘If I have the means, I will go there again. I can highly recommend 
it. It suited me well.’ A patient who went to China mentioned that people in China are 
‘used to paying for everything. You just pay to receive something that is normal in China. 
That is just the culture. The trade is still going on, as long as you can pay.’
DISCUSSION
The present summary of interviews shows patients traveled for paid kidney transplanta-
tions because of inadequate transplant activity in their domestic country—patients from 
Sweden and The Netherlands complained about a long wait time, whereas patients from 
Macedonia/Kosovo had no transplant options in their region at all. Almost one-third of the 
patients were transplanted preemptively, and some patients refused to receive a kidney 
from a relative in their home country. This illustrates that other motivations exist why 
patients travel abroad for transplantation.
One reason is patients’ affinity with the destination countries. As mentioned before, 
all patients from Sweden and The Netherlands who traveled abroad were foreign born and 
most returned to their country of birth for transplantation. In addition, they received help 
from their family and friends abroad who provided contacts for caregivers and helped cov-
er the costs of their transplants. Previous studies also emphasize the importance of friends 
and family ties with countries where patients undergo transplantation. 4,13 Furthermore, 
some patients felt that they were being discriminated against by the domestic health-care 
system, which perhaps enhanced their motivations to go abroad.
Another factor that arose in the present report of interviews is differences between 
countries in perspectives toward the purchase and sale of organs. Patients emphasized 
that mind-sets toward organ trade in the destination countries differ from those in their 
domestic countries, for example, ‘everything is for sale, including organ transplants.’ 
However, none of the respondents mentioned poverty or inequality as the driving force 
behind organ sales. Only few authors have pointed out that cultural aspects and differenc-
es in ethical perceptions may influence patients’ decisions to go abroad for transplanta-
tion. 14,15 Current position statements against transplant tourism have been described as 
‘unapologetically ethnocentric,’ reflecting only Western views of organ trade. 15 This may 
explain why most patients in the interviews did not tell their domestic caregivers that they 
were going abroad for transplantation.
Apart from a lack of suitable donor organs, cultural factors help explain why pa-
tients travel abroad for paid transplants. In addition, the study revealed that health insur-
ance companies (partially) helped to cover the costs of some patients’ transplants. In The 
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Netherlands until 2010, health insurance companies could refuse covering the costs of 
transplants abroad. A regulation established in 2010 allowed health insurers to reimburse 
the costs of transplants performed outside the European Union only if the recipient can 
prove that the donor was a blood relative, a spouse, or a registered partner. 16
Under Macedonian, Dutch, and Swedish law, paying for organs is prohibited. The 
interviews provided no data on whether the patients’ donors were exploited and limited 
data on whether they were paid. As a result, it is not possible to establish with certainty 
whether all transplants were legally performed. The findings raise suspicions of illegality. 
Not only did 17 patients travel abroad without informing their domestic caregivers before-
hand, but also they brought back limited or no information about their donors. Third, most 
patients who claimed that they received a related donor kidney are no longer in contact 
with their donors. Fourth, more than half of the patients went to Pakistan for transplanta-
tion, which is known as one of the world’s most common destination countries for illegal 
transplantation 17 and the exploitation of donors. 18,19 Finally, the majority of patients paid 
their doctors or brokers directly for their transplant. Consequently, it is highly likely that 
many of the transplantations were illegally performed, even though patients were given 
the impression that the transplantations were legally conducted.
These findings should be interpreted in light of several limitations. First of all, 
considering the delicate nature of the interview questions, it is likely that patients did 
not share information about possible organ purchase with the researchers, which affects 
the reliability of the results. The discrepancy between what the medical records revealed 
and what the patients said points out that not all patients knew or were truthful about 
the manner in which their transplants were obtained. For example, upon return, a patient 
reported that a cousin had donated a kidney, whereas the letter provided by the surgical 
team stated that he had received a ‘suitable donor kidney.’ A second limitation is that 
there are no reporting mechanisms for professionals or transplant centers to report possi-
ble organ purchases. Countries do not have registries of (possible) organ purchases. 20 As 
a result, we relied on information that transplant professionals provided based on their 
experiences, which in Sweden and in The Netherlands consisted only of patients with a 
foreign background. Although other studies also report that patients who travel abroad 
commonly have an affinity with the destination country, it is possible that Swedish and 
Dutch natives traveled specifically for transplantation. However, these were either not 
known or identified by the transplant professionals.
With these limitations, the present findings suggest that certain factors should be 
taken into account when addressing paid transplants abroad. The severity of the compli-
cations experienced by almost half of the patients in the underlying study illustrates the 
importance that transplant professionals (continue to) warn patients against the medical 
risks of undergoing transplants abroad. In addition, transplant professionals should em-
phasize the legal risks that may occur when patients buy organs. 21-23 The results reveal 
that caregivers often find out that patients go abroad after the fact. This demonstrates that 
aside from pretransplant measures, equal consideration should be given to posttransplant 
strategies.
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One such strategy could involve the reporting of suspicious transplants by transplant pro-
fessionals. 24 Research shows that the (possible) purchase of a kidney by a patient can raise 
difficulties for their caregivers. In a survey study among 241 Dutch transplant professionals, 
100 (42%) of them reported that they had treated patients who had traveled between 2008 
and 2013 from The Netherlands to a country outside the European Union for a kidney 
transplant. Thirty-one (31%) of them were certain that patients had bought the kidney; 
65 (65%) had suspicions that the kidney had been bought. Most (85%) reported that they 
understood why their patients bought a kidney, and they (72%) believed that the purchase 
was covered by the secrecy oath. However, they (72%) also felt that they have a duty to 
prevent kidney purchase. The majority (53%) believed that kidney purchase harmed the 
relationship with their patients. The professionals (65%) reported a conflict of duties and a 
need for guidelines (more than 80%) in treating patients who purchase organs. 24
Although transplants abroad commonly involve medical risks, legitimate travel for 
transplantation should not be discouraged if the patient has exhausted domestic trans-
plant opportunities and/or lives in a country that has no transplant activity. Indicators that 
support transplant professionals in differentiating legal from illegal transplantations may 
be a helpful instrument to identify illicit organ purchases. 25 Finally, research should include 
interviews with brokers, transplant professionals, and other facilitators to achieve a full 
picture of the purchase of organs for transplantation.
The authors are grateful to Susanne Lundin, Martin Gunnarson, and Ingela Byström of Department of Arts and Cultural 
Sciences, Lund University, for providing us with the data from Sweden and for their valuable remarks to this article.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL:  INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Patients characteristics 
1 Gender 
2 Date of birth
3 Place of birth
4 Years of schooling
5 Occupation, employment 
6 What did you work with prior to your current occupation?
7 Please describe your family situation. Do you have children? Partner? Do you live together with them?
8 Where do you live? Under what circumstances?
Pre-transplant stage
Tell me about your experiences of illness and treatments prior to going abroad for transplantation.
1 How did you react when you found out that you had kidney failure?
2 How would you describe life on dialysis?
3 Why do/did you want to be transplanted?
4 Experience, feelings about waiting time and organ shortage
5 Did you ask your family/friends to donate a kidney to you? Were they willing?
6 Suspended from wait list?
7 Experience with domestic health care system
8 Relationships with doctors, nurses and others
9 Trust in health care system/doctors 
10 Knowledge about transplant possibilities in your native country
11 Friends, relatives transplanted abroad?
12 What motivated you to look into transplant options abroad and how did you start? How was the trip arranged? 
13 How did you find out about the possibility of going abroad to buy a kidney?
14 Who did you discuss this possibility with? Family? Friends? Fellow patients? Medical practitioners? What did they say?
15 What made you finally choose to go abroad and buy a kidney?
16 Who helped you prepare the transplant? How? 
17 Did you ask for your medical record from your domestic doctors? What did doctors say?
18 Did you explore the transplant costs and whether they could be reimbursed by your health insurance?
19 Did you make payments for the transplant? How? How much? To what/whom?
20 Did you negotiate a price or was it fixed? How did you raise the money?
21 Package deal? What was included?
22 Why did you choose to go to … ? 
23 Who helped facilitate the transplant? Who were the persons? (doctors, nurses, brokers, … ?)
24 Were you accompanied by anyone? 
25 Did you trust the facilitators? 
26 Were copies of medical records asked? Screening? Hla matching?
27 Did you get a visa/go to an embassy? What did you say was your purpose of the trip?
28 What did you know about the origin of your donor kidney?
29 Did you get to meet the donor/seller? Who was he/she? (gender)
30 Were you given the opportunity to view medical evaluations of and choose between potential donors/sellers?
31 What happened when you got there? Tell me about the events that led up to the operation.
32 How would you describe the doctors and nurses that you met?
Transplant stage
1 Where did you travel to?
2 How was the operation organized? Did you and the donor/seller share a ward?
3 Were there other patients in the room with you? If so, from where were they?
Post-transplant stage
1 What happened after the operation? How did you feel? Did you meet the donor/seller afterwards?
2 (Where) did you receive after care?
3 Do you still have contact with the donor/seller? The broker? The surgeons/nephrologists/nurses?
4 Did you experience complications?
5 How would you describe the quality of care? Hygiene, duration of stay, infection, rejection (…)
6 Do you believe commercialization/regulated organ sales would be a good solution to the organ shortage?
7 In retrospect, what do you feel about your choice to go abroad and buy a kidney? Do you have any moral quandaries?
8 What are your feelings towards the seller/donor? Do you think about him/her?
9 Were you aware that it is forbidden by law?
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Patients travel worldwide to purchase kidneys. Transplant professionals can play a 
role in identifying kidney purchase. However, due to the tension between their rights 
and obligations, a lack of understanding and knowledge exists on how to prevent and 
report purchase. We present the results of a national survey that describes transplant 
professionals’ experiences, attitudes, behaviors, conflicts of duties, legal knowledge 
and needs for guidelines toward patients who purchase kidneys abroad. Second, we 
clarify professionals’ rights and obligations regarding organ purchase and propose 
actions that they can take to report purchase. Of the 100/241 (42%) professionals 
who treated patients who traveled to a country outside the European Union for a 
kidney transplant, 31 (31%) were certain that patients purchased kidneys. Sixty-five 
(65%) had suspicions that patients had bought kidneys. The majority reported a con-
flict of duties. Eighty percent reported a need for guidelines. Professionals can help 
prevent organ purchase by disclosing information about organ trafficking networks 
to law enforcement. Such disclosure can support the investigation and prosecution of 
networks. We offer key components for guidelines on disclosure of these networks.
INTRODUCTION
The purchase of organs is prohibited in almost all countries 1. Nevertheless, patients buy 
organs (mostly kidneys) for transplantation and commonly do so by travelling overseas 2. 
Commonly reported destination countries are China, Pakistan and India 2. Transplant 
professionals (tps) who treat these patients pre- and post-operatively can play a role in 
identifying and reporting kidney purchase 3,4. Tps however report a tension between their 
obligations to provide medical care and maintain secrecy on the one hand and their duty 
to prevent harm on the other 5-7. This conflict of rights and duties may underlie ‘the blind 
eye’ 4 that tps turn toward patients who (plan to) purchase an organ 5.
Tps who keep their ‘eyes wide shut’ to kidney purchase juxtapose initiatives fuelled 
by, for instance, the World Health Organisation 8 and the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ 
Trafficking and Transplant Tourism (doi) 9. The doi calls upon tps to help eradicate the 
harm and sufferings inflicted upon victims of organ trade 3,9,10. Building upon the doi, the 
Policy Statement on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism by the Canadian Society 
of Transplantation and Canadian Society of Nephrology (cps) clarifies tps’ rights and ob-
ligations in relation to organ purchase. It also presents guidance and recommendations 
on how doctors can interact with patients 11. The doi Custodian Group (dicg) in its 2013 
‘Doha Communiqué’ resolves to ‘develop […] systematic ways for physicians to identify 
and report to appropriate registries […] patients returning with a donor organ from an 
“unverifiable source”’ 3. It further proposes ‘a “white paper” discussing professional respon-
sibilities in responding to patients who travel or plan to travel abroad for a transplant that 
would be illegal in their country of residence.’
Notwithstanding the importance of these initiatives, there is a lack of knowledge 
and understanding concerning tps’ experiences, conflicts of duties and needs for guidelines 
toward patients who purchase organs. A better understanding of tps’ regard for patients 
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who buy organs, as well as a clarification of their rights and obligations is needed. In this 
paper we first present the results of a national survey that describe tps’ experiences, atti-
tudes, behaviors, conflicts of duties, their legal knowledge and their needs for guidelines 
toward patients who purchase kidneys abroad. We then clarify tps’ rights and obligations 
in relation to organ purchase and propose actions that tps can take to report the purchase 
of organs.
METHODS
Design
This study involved a cross-sectional survey that was distributed to tps in transplant cen-
ters and dialysis units in The Netherlands (nl).
Participants
With the help of the Dutch Transplant Nurses Society and the Dutch Transplant 
Foundation, contact details of transplant surgeons, nephrologists, transplant coordinators, 
nurses, nurse practitioners and social workers were collected. Then, all units were contact-
ed by telephone to verify accuracy of contact information and accuracy of names. During 
this process missing data/new names were added to the list and inaccurate or outdated 
information was removed. This led to a total of 546 transplant professionals (286 nephrol-
ogists, 60 transplant surgeons, 50 nurses/transplant coordinators/nurse practitioners, and 
150 social workers).
Procedure
The survey was built and distributed using Survey Monkey and sent via e-mail to tps be-
tween March and August 2013. Each nonresponding participant received up to two re-
minders. The online survey setting was such that only one response by each participant 
(computer) was possible. The e-mail explained the nature and purpose of the study and 
stated that names of persons and institutions would be kept strictly confidential. Because 
the study participants were tps and not patients, an application for ethical approval to the 
medical ethical committee was not required.
Measures
The survey was created after discussions among tps, lawyers, and criminologists. The sur-
vey was tested by several persons before circulation. It included 50 questions that enquired 
the participants about their socio-demographic characteristics, experiences, attitudes, be-
havior, conflicts of duties, legal knowledge, and need for guidelines.
Socio-demographic data included gender, age, nationality, profession, and career 
duration. tps were asked about their experiences with patients who traveled between 
2008 and 2013 from nl for kidney transplantation, and whether in these cases they were 
certain or had suspicions that the patients had purchased the kidneys. Participants could 
respond to a set of predetermined explanations for their reasons for certainty.
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statements agree disagree
n % n %
Kidney purchase harms the relationship with my patient
Regulated organ trade is acceptable 
As a transplant professional I do not judge my patient for buying a kidney 
I understand why patients buy kidneys 
Patients should be prosecuted for buying kidneys 
The purchase of a kidney is covered by my secrecy oath 
Transplant professionals have a duty to prevent kidney purchase 
It is impossible to prevent kidney purchase 
I approve of the patient’s purchase of a kidney abroad when:
The patient’s chances of survival will otherwise be small 
The patient cannot find a donor in NL 
The patient does not want to burden his/her family with a living donation 
The country of destination does not prohibit the purchase of kidneys 
It appears that the donor sold his/her kidney voluntarily 
It appears that the donor is family 
The patient has the nationality of the country of kidney purchase 
The country of destination is a member of the European Union 
The country of destination is a Western country
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85
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64
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139
50
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13
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52
86
18
15
13
53.1 
21.2 
35.3 
84.6 
26.6 
71.8 
71.8 
57.7
20.7 
12.0 
5.4 
11.2 
21.6 
35.7 
7.6 
6.2 
5.4
67
163
127
15
101
34
36
70
151
176
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114
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67.6 
52.7
6.2 
41.9 
14.1 
14.9 
29.0
62.7 
73.0 
84.6 
72.6 
63.6 
47.3 
71.0 
74.7 
75.1
If I have a suspicion that the patient is 
going to buy a kidney outside the country
yes If the patient tells me that he/she is going 
to buy a kidney outside the country
yes
n % n %
I prepare my patient in the same way as if it 
were for a regular transplant in nl
I share my opinion with the patient
I give the patient his/her medical record
I ask my colleagues for advice
I defer/refer the patient to a colleague in my 
unit for medical care
I refer the patient to a colleague abroad 
I consult a lawyer in my hospital 
I report the patient to the police
82
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19
7
60
0
63.1
90.0 
36.9 
79.2 
14.6
5.4 
46.2
0
I prepare my patient in the same way as if it 
were for a regular transplant in nl
I share my opinion with the patient 
I give the patient his/her medical record 
I ask my colleagues for advice 
I defer/refer the patient to a colleague in my 
unit for medical care 
I refer the patient to a colleague abroad 
I consult a lawyer in my hospital 
I report the patient to the police 
69
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20
7
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6
53.1
93.1 
36.9 
79.2 
15.4
5.4 
57.7 
4.6
n %
Because of my secrecy oath, I cannot protect the possible victim-donor
Because of my secrecy oath, nothing is done to deter the crime
If I give the patient his/her medical record, I possibly participate in an illegal act
If I prepare the patient for the transplant, I possibly participate in an illegal act
Because of my secrecy oath the patient can commit the crime without getting punished
Other reasons
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100
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69
6
74.5
63.7
49.7
47.8
44.0
3.8
true % false % don’t 
know
%
The purchase of kidneys in nl is forbidden
I may report a patient who is considering purchasing a kidney abroad to the police
I must report a patient who is considering purchasing a kidney abroad to the police
I must report a patient who returns from abroad with a purchased kidney to the police 
I may report a patient who returns from abroad with a purchased kidney to the police 
Purchase of kidneys falls under my secrecy oath. I am therefore never allowed to 
report a patient
A patient who has bought a kidney abroad has a right to medical care
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Attitude (table 1) was measured using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 ‘totally agree’ to 5 ‘to-
tally disagree’ to rate 17 statements such as: ‘Kidney purchase harms the relationship with 
my patient,’ ‘Regulated organ trade is acceptable,’ and ‘I approve the purchase of a kidney 
abroad when the patient’s chances of survival would otherwise be small.’
Behavior (table 2) was measured by asking what the participant would do in two 
different situations:
1  the professional has a suspicion that the patient is going to buy a kidney outside nl; 
2  the patient told the professional that he/she is going to buy a kidney outside nl. 
Participants were required to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to 8 propositions portraying possible 
behavioral responses to these two situations. Because of a technical issue in the online 
survey tool, 111 respondents were not able to view and respond to the statements related 
to ‘behavior.’
Participants were also asked whether they experienced (‘yes’ or ‘no’) a conflict of 
duties if they believe that their patient will buy an organ abroad (table 3). If ‘yes,’ respon-
dents could select 5 different reasons for this conflict.
Participants’ knowledge about legal (reporting) requirements was measured with 
7 statements such as: ‘The purchase of kidneys in nl is prohibited’ and ‘I may report a 
patient to the police if he/she considers buying a kidney abroad’ (table 4). Participants 
could respond ‘true’ or ‘false.’
Finally, participants were asked 4 questions about their need for guidelines (‘yes’ or 
‘no’). For example, tps were asked: ‘Do you have a need for guidelines that could guide you 
in treating/dealing with patients whom you suspect are going to buy an organ?’ and ‘Do 
you have a need for guidelines that could guide you in treating/dealing with donors whom 
you suspect have sold an organ?’
Statistical analyses
The data were entered into and analyzed with spss Version 21. Descriptive statistics were 
performed to describe the demographics, experiences, attitudes, behaviors and knowl-
edge of the participants. Univariate analyses (chi-squared statistics, Spearman’s rho, and 
Mann-Whitney) were performed to describe the relationships between the aforemen-
tioned variables. Nonparametric tests were performed due to the skewed distribution of 
the data. For the univariate analyses of ‘attitudes’ we used a 5 point-scale. To summarize 
the findings of ‘attitudes’ more cogently, we dichotomized the answers into ‘totally dis-
agree/disagree’ and ‘totally agree/agree.’ The responses to the ‘neutral’ response category 
are not shown (see table 1). Taking into account the large number of tests of ‘attitudes,’ 
we applied a Bonferroni correction, whereby a value of p<0.001 was considered to be 
statistically significant. Relationships were analyzed between the socio-demographic char-
acteristics on the one hand and attitudes, behaviors and knowledge on the other hand. 
Due to space restrictions, only some significant relationships are presented.
96
RESULTS
Study participants
Of the 546 transplant professionals, 241 (44%) completed the survey. One hundred thirty 
were male (53.9%). The median age was 48 (range 26-68).
Experiences of transplant professionals with patients who purchased  
kidneys abroad
One hundred eleven out of 241 tps (46%) responded that they treated patients between 
2008 and 2013 who had traveled from nl for a kidney transplant. One hundred tps (42%) 
responded that they treated patients who had traveled outside the European Union (eu). 
Thirty-one of these (31%) wrote that they were certain that patients bought the kidneys. 
tps’ reasons for certainty were: ‘The patient said that he/she had bought the kidney’ (29 
tps), ‘The patient said that the donor had received money for the kidney’ (8 tps), ‘The pa-
tient said that he/she had paid a large amount for the transplantation’ (7 tps), ‘The kidney 
purchase was mentioned in the patient’s medical record’ (4 tps). Sixty-five of the 100 tps 
had suspicions that the patients had bought the kidney. Because patients are treated by 
more than one tp, these numbers do not represent the number of patients that travelled. 
However, the survey was completed by tps from all transplant centers, and all centers 
reported clusters of patients that travelled.
Attitudes of transplant professionals toward patients who purchased kidneys
Table 1 reveals that most tps report that they understand why patients buy kidneys (85%), 
believe that the purchase of a kidney is covered by the secrecy oath (72%) but also feel 
that they have a duty to prevent kidney purchase (72%). The majority believes that kidney 
purchase harms the relationship with their patients (53%), deems a regulated organ market 
unacceptable (68%) and judges their patients for buying kidneys abroad (53%). A minority 
(27%) believes that patients should be prosecuted for buying kidneys. On the other hand, 
58% argue that prevention is impossible. Most tps answer that they disagree with a kidney 
purchase abroad, even if the patient’s chances of survival will otherwise be small (63%), 
even if the patient cannot find a domestic donor (73%) and even when the destination 
country does not prohibit kidney purchase (73%). The longer the career of a tp, the more 
likely he/she is to agree with the statement that ‘the purchase of a kidney is covered by my 
secrecy oath’ (rs=0.257, p<0.001). No other significant relationships were found.
Behavior of transplant professionals toward patients who purchased kidneys
The results in table 2 reveal that there are few differences in reported behavior when tps 
have suspicions of intended kidney purchase versus when the patient tells them that he/ 
she is going to buy a kidney. In both situations the majority would share their opinion 
with the patient (90%), they would not give the medical record (63%), they would ask 
colleagues for advice (80%) and they would not refer the patient to a colleague in their 
hospital (85%) or to a colleague abroad (95%). If a patient tells the tp he/she is going to buy 
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a kidney, the tp is more likely to consult a lawyer and less likely to prepare the patient for 
transplant a usual. Although none of the professionals would report their patients in case 
of a suspicion, 6 (out of 130) tps answered that they would report their patient to the police 
if the patient tells them he/she is going to purchase a kidney. These 6 tps however had not 
actually seen or treated patients who traveled abroad for a transplant.
Conflict of duties and confidentiality
The majority of the tps, 157/241 (65%), indicated that they experience a conflict of duties 
when suspicions arise about a patient’s kidney purchase. tps’ most commonly reported 
explanation for a conflict of duties is that because of their secrecy oath, they are unable 
to protect the possible victimdonor (75%). Sixty-four percent emphasized that because 
of their secrecy oath, nothing is done to prevent the crime. Others reasons were that by 
giving the patient his/her medical record, tps possibly participate in an illegal act (50%), 
and because of their secrecy oath, the patient can commit the crime unpunished (44%).
Knowledge about the law against organ purchase
In nl, tps are released from their duty of confidentiality ‘if the patient grants consent, in 
the event of a legal duty to provide information, during consultations with care providers 
who form part of the treatment unit and in the case of conflicting obligations’ 12. Although 
the purchase and sale of organs is forbidden in nl, doctors do not have an obligation to 
report patients who will buy organs to the police. Yet, they may do so if the disclosure 
prevents severe harm to the patient or another individual 13. Doctors are prohibited from 
reporting patients who have committed a crime 13. The Royal Dutch Medical Association 
has installed a reporting mechanism to which tps may report child abuse and domestic 
violence 12. However, no guidelines or bodies exist for the reporting of organ purchases 
and sales.
Almost all tps (98.3%) correctly stated that purchase of kidneys in nl is forbidden. 
A minority correctly believed that they may (15%) and wrongly assumed that they must 
(4%) report a patient to the police who considers to purchase a kidney abroad. Only a 
minority wrongly assumed they may or must report patients that return from abroad with 
a purchased kidney (15% and 8%, respectively). While 53% of the tps believed that they are 
never allowed to report a patient because of the secrecy oath (and 25% did not know), still 
22% disagreed and saw possibilities to report the patient.
Finally, tps’ needs for guidelines were asked. Most participants expressed a need 
for guidelines in treating patients and/or donors who purchase and/or sell organs. The 
indicated need was highest (86%) when tps treat patients whom they suspect are going to 
buy an organ. The need was lowest (71%) when treating donors whom they suspect have 
sold an organ.
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DISCUSSION
This study reveals the large number of tps who have suspicions or are certain that their 
patients purchased kidneys. In particular, it highlights tps’ belief that they carry a duty 
to prevent kidney purchase. This supports the international transplant community’s 
recognition that tps are no longer ‘just’ care givers but that ‘as members of the medical 
community they also have a duty to prevent harm to other individuals’ 11. Despite this 
recognition, little understanding exists on how tps’ actions towards kidney purchase can 
take form. This lack of understanding is illustrated by the tps’ experienced conflict, their 
reported need for guidelines but also by their ambivalent responses: Most (72%), feel a 
duty to prevent purchase, but express understanding toward their patients (85%), believe 
the purchase is covered by their secrecy oath (72%), and feel that it is impossible to prevent 
purchase (58%). Below we explain how kidney purchase affects tps’ rights and duties, and 
we propose actions that tps can take to prevent their patients from purchasing kidneys.
The rights and duties of transplant professionals
Tps’ duties include the duty to ‘first, do no harm’ 14, the duty to uphold confidentiality 
of information shared by the patient (secrecy oath) and the duty to give medical care. 
The secrecy oath, which originates from the Hippocratic Oath and is required of doc-
tors in many countries, exists to maintain confidentiality between patients and their 
physicians  15. Confidentiality is central to trust between doctors and patients. It grants 
doctors the privilege of nondisclosure 16. These rights and duties are universally accepted 
principles endorsed by international organizations such as the World Medical Association 
(wma) 17 and the American Medical Association (ama) 18, and they are codified into legis-
lation worldwide 19-21. Tps’ rights and duties are interlinked and exist in conjunction with 
the rights and duties of patients. They serve to protect the interests of patients in two 
ways: to protect patients’ rights to privacy and autonomy, and to guarantee accessibility 
of care 13. Accessibility of care entails that patients have the right to receive care under all 
circumstances, even after they have committed a crime. When patients experience acute 
medical problems, tps have an obligation to provide care 13. The duty of care however is 
not absolute. In situations that are not life-threatening, doctors may choose to defer care 
to another physician 11,15. The right to privacy is also not absolute 16,22. The ama declares 
that ‘when a patient threatens to inflict serious physical harm to another person or to him 
or herself and there is a reasonable probability that the patient may carry out the threat, 
the physician should take reasonable precautions for the protection of the intended vic-
tim, which may include notification of law enforcement authorities’ 18.
Jurisdictions accept that doctors may disclose confidential information when re-
quired by law, when patients agree to the disclosure, when conflicts of duties arise and/
or in the case of overriding interests 9,13,16,18,23. A conflict of duties arises when a doctor is 
confronted with a situation needing a solution and in which harm can be prevented by a 
breach of his confidentiality 13. Accepted reasons for disclosure are ‘violent crimes’ such as 
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gun and knife wounds, child abuse, and crimes that may lead to death of the victim, as well 
as infectious diseases that threaten the public health 13,19.
How are tps’ rights and duties affected by the prohibition of kidney purchase? The 
CPS clarifies tps’ rights and duties in relation to kidney purchase and offers pretransplant 
and posttransplant guidance for their interactions with their patients 11. Gill et al also offer 
strategies to prevent kidney purchase 10. Although these statements are useful, they over-
look a number of issues that tps should take into consideration before taking action to 
prevent patients from purchasing organs.
First of all, the (intended) purchase and sale of organs is one of the most difficult 
crimes to prove 24. Indeed, the present study illustrates that most tps (70%) were uncertain 
that the kidney was bought. Patients generally do not tell their doctors that they are going 
to purchase an organ 5,25. Patients who return from a commercial transplant overseas also 
commonly do not tell their tps how the organ was obtained 5,10. Most bring back little 
information about the transplant 26, which makes it difficult if not impossible to determine 
that the purchase occurred. Under law, a kidney purchase, commonly defined as ‘trans-
plant commercialism’ 9 or the ‘prohibition of financial gain’ 21 means paying the donor and/
or a broker in return for an organ. Thus, if a patient travels abroad and pays a hospital for a 
kidney transplant, this payment does not qualify as a kidney purchase. In order to establish 
that a kidney purchase will take or has taken place, it needs to be proven that the donor 
and/or broker received or will receive remunerations for the kidney. However, tps do not 
carry an obligation to investigate and prove whether their patients will commit or have 
committed crimes 13.
Second, even if the tp can determine that the patient is going to purchase a kidney, 
this will not instantly mean that the purchase is illegal or punishable 24. Iran for exam-
ple (with the exception of the province of Shiraz) does not forbid recipients to purchase 
kidneys from donors 27,28. Israel prohibits its citizens from buying kidneys in and outside 
the country, but does not prosecute patients who buy organs 29. Although jurisdictions 
generally forbid organ purchase by law, they do not always lay a sentence upon those who 
buy (or sell) kidneys. Furthermore, not all countries have extra-territorial jurisdiction to 
prosecute patients who purchased organs abroad 24,30. With the exception of South Africa, 
no other country, with the appropriate legislation in place, is known to have prosecuted 
patients for buying organs, even when purchase by patients was proven 31. This suggests 
that the global moral condemnation against organ purchase may not be as widely accept-
ed as assumed 32.
Third, there may not always be a ‘reasonable probability’ 18 that kidney purchase 
leads to serious physical harm to patients and/or donors 33,34. The cps declares that ‘health-
care providers cannot speculate regarding the relative safety of commercial transplants 
abroad in different countries’ and subsequently proposes a restriction of patients’ rights 
11. While the most commonly used argument against payment is that buying organs com-
promises donors’ free will and leads to coercion and exploitation 9,35-37, empirical evidence 
shows that kidney purchases in themselves are not always exploitative and in some cases 
can even benefit patients and donors 27,38.
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Any restrictive action toward patients should be based on the probability of severe harm 
inflicted on the patient and/or donor. The current state of knowledge reveals that harm 
is difficult if not impossible to predict and prove, in particular when a patient leaves inde-
pendently to receive a kidney from a ‘relative’ or ‘friend’ abroad. Rather, research shows 
that the probability of harm is largest when brokers and other middlemen who operate 
in organized organ trafficking networks are involved 31,39-41. Severe harm is also inflicted 
amongst executed prisoners in China 42,43. Brokers and other middlemen (which can include 
doctors) exploit donors and patients and inflict harm on them. Only one study reveals that 
severe harm to donors can be committed by patients directly 39.
The foregoing considerations illustrate the complexity of predicting a reasonable 
probability and magnitude of harm, and show that severe harm cannot reasonably be fore-
seen on the sole basis of a patient’s intended kidney purchase. We argue that restricting 
patients’ rights is unjustified when such restrictions are based on the suspicion of an in-
tended kidney purchase. Rather, measures to prevent the crime should be directed toward 
those persons that inflict the harm. This has consequences for possible actions that tps 
can take.
Pretransplant actions
We argue, in line with most respondents of this survey, that disclosing the identity of 
a patient (without the patient’s consent) who has an intention to purchase a kidney to 
any authority or registry is not justified. For the same reasons, we argue that withholding 
care to patients who intend to purchase an organ is also unjustified. The cps encourages 
physicians ‘not to provide medical records to patients if they believe the information will 
be used in support of an illegal transplant performed in an unregulated system and that 
there is a significant risk of harm to the patient or organ vendor’ 11. Sixty-three percent of 
the present study’s participants supports the cps. Yet, half of the tps would prepare the 
patient in the same way as if it were for a legitimate transplant. Withholding medical care 
from patients who leave nonetheless may result in ill-prepared patients who will undergo 
the transplant without the proper documentation and work-up. On the other hand, non-
preparation and nonrelease of the chart may be in the patient’s best interest from a safety 
perspective. Practice however illustrates that patients often leave without taking their 
records and that tests are performed at the center where the transplant takes place 25. In 
most jurisdictions patients have a right of access to their medical records. Withholding pa-
tients’ records may thus constitute a breach of their right of ownership, right of autonomy 
and right to medical care 19. We thus encourage tps to provide patients with their medical 
charts when they request them.
The most straightforward method to prevent purchase, encouraged by the cps and 
dicg, is to inform patients about the ethical, medical, psychosocial and legal risks of buy-
ing kidneys abroad 11,44. Discouragement and a lack of facilitation is the most commonly 
reported method of deterrence amongst tps 5-7,10. The findings of the survey support this 
method as tps indicated to be more inclined to prevent purchase (72%), than reporting 
patients (5%).
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Posttransplant actions
May tps disclose information about patients to the police after the kidney has been pur-
chased, even when it is too late to prevent harm to the patient and/or donor in question? 
The survey reveals tps’ reluctance to do so. Indeed, most jurisdictions will not accept dis-
closure if it will not prevent harm. In particular, the disclosure will be illegitimate if based 
on an assumption that the kidney was purchased and that harm was done. We therefore 
argue that disclosing the identity of a patient (without the patient’s consent) who has 
purchased a kidney to police authorities is not justified.
This however does not constrain all possible forms of disclosure. The dicg in its Doha 
Communiqué encourages tps to report patients to registries 3. However, a more effective 
method is to encourage tps to report organ trafficking networks to reporting centers. 
Appropriate authorities could be the same national institutions that receive information 
from tps on human trafficking, domestic violence and child abuse. A reporting code can be 
established that may correspond with reporting codes and protocols developed by various 
professional groups, but it should be tailored to meet the needs of tps who report organ 
trafficking. Examples of national reporting institutions could be CoMensha 45, the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association 12, and the American Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 18.
After analyzing the reported information, the reporting center can submit the in-
formation to the national police, who in turn contacts the police forces or liaison officers 
of the transplant destination country. This national-international reporting method would 
allow for the information to reach the appropriate authorities and would strengthen the 
cross-border collaboration and enforcement of this crime. Networks include brokers, 
transplant professionals, hospitals, service providers, translators and law enforcement offi-
cials 46. Reporting information such as the names of hospitals, clinics, cities, hospital staff 
and other individuals who are involved in potentially illegal transplant activities, is a more 
effective way to disrupt and deter organ trafficking than reporting patients.
Disclosure of such information may have disadvantages. It may erode the 
 patient-doctor relationship. Patients may provide names of fictitious centers or may even 
avoid seeking care from their treating physicians upon return. On the other hand, disclo-
sure may have a strong preventative effect, causing illegally operating transplant centers 
to think twice before performing an illegitimate transplant.
We encourage governments, together with national police forces, lawyers and tps 
to establish reporting codes that allow for the identification and disclosure of networks 
by tps without them having to reveal patients’ identities. This information can support 
and stimulate the police and judiciary to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute organ traf-
ficking networks. To prevent drawbacks such as distrust and erosion of the patient-doctor 
relationship, these protocols should build in whistleblower protection mechanisms for pa-
tients, tps and other persons who disclose the information. Below we offer key elements 
that such a reporting code could contain.
This study reveals tps’ experiences, attitudes and behaviors toward patients who 
purchase organs and illustrates the complex factors involved in taking measures to prevent 
the crime. Enforcement of organ trafficking should be harm-based and directed toward 
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brokers, doctors or other persons who exploit donors and patients. Tps and law enforce-
ment reporting authorities should collaborate to disclose organized organ trafficking net-
works. We propose a reporting code for such collaboration.
KEY ELEMENTS FOR A REPORTING CODE ON DISCLOSURE  
OF INFORMATION OF ORGAN TRAFFICKING NETWORKS
The code should at a minimum:
1  Be written for tps by tps, lawyers, police and judiciary;
2  Correspond with domestic legislation;
3  Designate a reporting center and include a roadmap that guides the tp through the 
following steps:
a Identification of signals with the help of indicators (see no.10);
b Consultation of colleagues and hospital lawyers;
c Consultation with the reporting center to interpret the signals;
d Talking to the patient;
e Deciding between organizing assistance amongst other tps or filing a report.
4  Explain to tps that disclosure is voluntary and that no consequences will follow 
from (non)reporting;
5  Allow tps to disclose anonymously. The code should build in disclosure protection 
mechanisms similar to whistleblower laws. The identity of patients, tps and/or their 
institutions should be protected and they should be waived from any legal liability 
and/or duty to testify;
6  Allow for consistent monitoring by the reporting center that will follow up on the 
information that tps provide;
7  Enable tps to disclose pretransplant and posttransplant. Tps must be satisfied that 
their rights and duties will not be affected by the timing of their disclosure;
8  Explain to tps the purpose of the disclosure. The purpose is to:
a Disclose information that supports police and judiciary in investigating, dis-
rupting and prosecuting organ trafficking networks (brokers, transplant profes-
sionals, hospitals, service providers, translators, and corrupt law enforcement 
officials) 33. Disclosure may occur without the patient’s consent.
b Clarify the rights and duties of the tps when they treat patients and/or donors 
who wish to purchase/sell an organ abroad and/or who return with a possibly 
purchased organ. The cps can serve as an example 12.
9  Describe what the tp may report: 
a The tp should disclose anonymized or coded information that serves the pur-
pose of the disclosure. This includes data that supports the identification, inves-
tigation and prosecution of the network (as stated in 8a). If known, disclosure 
should contain names and locations of the transplant clinic and/or the name 
of the transplant staff and any other information that serves the disclosure’s 
purpose.
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10  Guide tps through a list of indicators to identify suspicious transplant activity. 
Indicators that may cause suspicion and warrant probing of the patient can occur 
when the patient:
a is preparing to leave to a country or clinic that is known to the tp because other 
patients have gone there and returned maltreated or carried information that 
indicated their donors were harmed;
b returns with lack of information about where and how the transplant took place, 
including a lack of donor information;
c returns with clear signs of maltreatment such as wound infections and/or trans-
mitted diseases such as hiv or tbc;
d tells the tp and/or has information in his record that states that a donor, broker, 
and/or a doctor received payments in return for the organ (transplant).
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INTRODUCTION
The human organ trade receives increasing attention from international (transplant) orga-
nizations, the media, researchers and non-profit organizations. According to the Council of 
Europe it constitutes a ‘major threat to the public health’ 1. The World Health Organization 
(who) has estimated that 5-10% of all organ transplantations take place illegally each 
year 2. With an estimated annual profit of $1.2 billion, the trade features in scale and profit 
alongside the illicit trade in drugs, wildlife and weapons 3. Defined as a form of human 
trafficking 4, the prevailing discourse on organ trade is that of an organized crime, driven 
by mafia-like networks that exploit the poor for their organs 5,6. As such, the trade is exter-
nalised as ‘the dark side of transplantation’ that contaminates the nobility and legacy of 
the legal transplant industry 7,8.
This portrayal of the trade has led to a worldwide adoption of punitive legisla-
tion against it 9,10. Nevertheless, only a few cases have appeared at the judicial level 11. 
Furthermore, with most studies addressing the contexts and consequences of kidney 
sales on the black market 12-14, limited empirical data exists on the role of other actors, 
such as transplant professionals. In incidental cases, transplant doctors have been con-
victed for taking part in organized networks that trafficked persons for their kidneys 11,15. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these cases represent the trade as a whole 14. 
Over the last few decades, a growing number of transplant professionals from 
countries worldwide have published reports in which they state to be ‘unwillingly con-
fronted’ with patients whom they suspect underwent illegal organ transplantations 
abroad  16,17. The most commonly obtained organs are kidneys 18. Often, these patients 
return with serious complications in need of post-operative care with implanted grafts of 
which the origins are unknown 19. These reports however, do not provide information on 
the presumed illegal nature of the transplants, such as how patients obtained the kidneys, 
how much they paid and to what or whom. Information about patients’ kidney donors is 
commonly also absent 20,21. 
Doctors are commonly prohibited from reporting their patients’ alleged wrongdo-
ings. Their rights and duties towards patients are firmly entrenched in national health care 
regulations. These include the duty to provide medical care, the professional secrecy oath, 
and the privilege of nondisclosure 22,23. Nevertheless, in recent years, professional trans-
plantation societies have become increasingly active in the fight against organ trade 24, 
and demand a more proactive role of transplant professionals in preventing patients from 
purchasing organs abroad. The underlying rationale is that donors (organ sellers) should 
be protected from harm. Gill et al., have stated, for example, that doctors have a duty to 
advocate for their patients, but ‘as members of the medical community, they also have a 
duty to prevent harm to other individuals’ 25.
As part of this development, it has been pointed out that legislative frameworks 
should accommodate the reporting of suspicious transplant activities by transplant profes-
sionals to law enforcement 26-28. Caulfield et. al., for example, have stated that ‘given their 
interactions with patients, professionals seem well placed to play a role in the monitoring 
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and perhaps, the reduction of organ trafficking practices’ 29. Yet, in the absence of knowl-
edge and information about these doctor-patient exchanges, it remains unknown how 
much (if anything) professionals know about their patients’ organ purchases, how they 
respond to these patients, and if they are willing (or allowed) to disclose information about 
their patients’ alleged organ purchases. 
Recently, we found, through an explorative survey, that almost half of the Dutch 
transplant professionals involved in the care of kidney patients, treated patients who 
travelled to a country outside The Netherlands for a transplant between 2008 and 2013. a 
Whilst a majority suspected that the patients had purchased the kidneys, one third re-
ported to be certain that patients had bought the kidneys. Their reported reasons were 
because the patient said that he/she had bought the kidney, because the patient said that 
the donor had received money for the kidney and/or because the purchase was mentioned 
in the patient’s medical record. A majority reported a conflict of duties because they felt 
unable to protect the victim-donor and because they felt unable to prevent the crime. 
Almost all expressed a need for guidelines in treating patients who buy organs 30. 
Building further on these results, we conducted a qualitative interview study 
amongst these professionals with the overarching aim to examine their experiences with 
and attitudes towards patients who purchased kidneys more closely. This article poses the 
following questions: what are transplant professionals’ experiences with patients who pur-
chase kidneys and how do they deal with these patients? How can professionals’ attitudes 
and behaviours towards the patients be understood and explained? And finally, how do 
they consider their roles and responsibilities in preventing organ purchases? At the time of 
writing (2016), this is the first qualitative study to shed light on this topic.
METHODOLOGY
We interviewed 41 of the transplant professionals, based in hospitals throughout The 
Netherlands, who completed our previous survey and who reported to have treated pa-
tients whom they suspected or knew had purchased kidneys abroad. The respondents 
ranged in age from 31 to 67 years (mean age 49.2 years). Their career duration was 0-37 
years (mean 13,7 years). We interviewed 29 nephrologists (n), 5 nurse practitioners (np), 5 
social workers (sw), one research nurse and one transplant surgeon. Nephrologists b con-
stituted the largest group of respondents who received and completed the survey which 
is why most interview respondents were nephrologists. All respondents were informed be-
forehand that their names and the names of their institutions would be kept confidential. 
The interviews were semi-structured, lasting between 45 minutes and 1,5 hours 
and took place in the respondents’ offices. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
analysed through a mixture of thematic and open coding, using qsr*nvivo software. The 
participants’ names were coded to ensure anonymity. For the coding process, we used a 
list of predetermined criteria that we defined based on our research questions. Thereafter, 
we assessed and compared codes, discussed overlaps and differences and integrated them 
into one coding structure.
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The interviews covered the following themes: professionals’ experiences with patients 
who purchased kidneys abroad, their opinions and attitudes towards these patients and 
their ideas and views on their roles and responsibilities in deterring organ purchase. With 
the transplant professional being the main focus of this article, the results below reflect 
and represent their experiences, values and perceptions. 
Transplant professionals’ experiences with patients and their kidney purchases
From the interviews it emerged, first and foremost, that the respondents’ experiences with 
patients who purchased kidneys abroad are shrouded in suspicion, secrecy and silence. A 
social worker explained: 
We never know whether the kidney was paid for. We always have a suspicion. 
We ask them but of course we don’t get an honest answer because people aren’t 
stupid. They won’t tell us: ‘Yes, I paid thousands of Euros for it’. We all have a gut 
feeling but we can’t prove it. (sw28) 
Transplant professionals experience the issue incidentally. Over the course of their ca-
reers, the majority treated one to two patients who travelled abroad to obtain a kidney 
transplant that was assumed to have been bought. c Respondents spoke of patients who 
travelled between 2006 and 2013 but they also treated patients who travelled before that 
time period. The majority of patients travelled to Asian and Middle Eastern countries for 
kidney transplantation; a minority went to Western countries (Europe, Canada and United 
States). Many of these patients were still under the care of professionals when the inter-
views took place. 
The professionals’ experiences with these patients varied: whereas the majority 
found out that their patients obtained a kidney transplant abroad after it had taken place, 
a minority reported that they knew beforehand that their patients were going abroad. 
Unaware of their patients’ plans, the former group of professionals stated that their pa-
tients left unannounced and unexpectedly returned with a strange implanted kidney in 
need of aftercare. The following statement captures the limited control and knowledge of 
the respondents regarding their patients’ transplant ventures:
A woman suddenly appeared in our ward and said, ‘Hello, I was in Afghanistan 
and I got very sick and needed a kidney and then my nephew in Pakistan donated 
his kidney’. I never discovered how she had arranged it. I had many questions 
that she didn’t answer. It was a bizarre story. (np24) 
Respondents described their experiences with recipients of suspected kidney purchases as 
an unwelcome issue that they were unwillingly confronted with and had no control over. 
This finding coincides with reports in the literature 19,31. Nonetheless, their information 
and knowledge about the suspected purchases was limited. One reason is that patients 
and their (suspected) kidney purchases are not reported or registered. Furthermore, the 
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documentation that patients bring back from abroad is often incomplete or absent. If avail-
able, only a few details about the medications and post-operative outcome are provided. 
Consequently, professionals couldn’t rely on a registry or comprehensive documentation. 
Rather, they based their accounts on their recollections. Sharing an experience about a 
patient who returned from a transplant in China, a nephrologist recalled: 
He merely said, ‘it had been arranged’. We asked whether the donor had been 
someone from the death list and if he had bought the kidney but he didn’t 
want to tell us. He didn’t answer. There was an awful silence. I remember that. 
Yes, that was quite extraordinary. (n29) 
The participants generally associated their patients’ transplants abroad with organ trade, 
especially those obtained in countries such as India and Pakistan which are renowned for 
their ‘kidney bazaars’ 13,24, and China, for its harvesting of organs from executed prison-
ers 32. In the absence of verifiable information about their patients’ donors, respondents 
often imagined them to be the impoverished kidney sellers or executed prisoners whom 
they had seen, heard or read about in the media. 
What exacerbated their suspicions, was patients’ silence about how they had or-
ganized their transplants. They explained that when they asked their patients how and 
where they obtained the grafts, patients acted ‘vaguely and suspiciously’, avoided answering 
questions or ‘mumbled’ that it ‘had been taken care of’ for them. Others told their caregivers 
that they had received the kidney from a relative. However, because participants could 
not verify this based on the available documentation, these statements were met with 
suspicion and doubt. Only on rare occasions patients told their caregivers that they had 
purchased the kidney. 
The respondents’ limited knowledge about their patients’ transplantations was also 
reported by those who knew beforehand that their patients were going abroad. In most of 
these cases, patients did not say they were getting a transplant but told their doctors that 
they were going ‘on holiday’ and returned with an implanted kidney of which the origin 
was unknown. 
In describing their experiences, the participants predominantly spoke about the 
complex treatment that these patients required due to their post-operative complications. 
Many patients, in particular those who went to Asia or the Middle East, returned with com-
plications such as infections (Hepatitis, Tuberculosis, Typhus), acute graft rejection and/or 
graft loss. One patient died when transplanted in Pakistan. A few others passed away upon 
return. These findings correspond with other doctors’ accounts in the literature 20,33. The 
complications often constituted a source of frustration and worry amongst professionals. 
They pointed out that these patients demanded a more time-consuming treatment than 
‘regular’ kidney transplant recipients. Notably, these reports require some nuance, as not 
all patients who went abroad experienced post-transplant complaints. Some professionals 
treated patients who returned without infections and with properly functioning grafts. 
Others remarked that post-transplant complications are common in The Netherlands as 
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well. Overall, however, most professionals didn’t have a high regard for the quality of care 
that patients received in these regions. They assumed that the complications resulted 
from old-fashioned treatment or overdoses of immunosuppressant drugs, and presumed 
that the transplantations had been performed in ‘shady’ or illegal circumstances. 
‘Cultural’ explanations for cross-border kidney purchases 
Similar to accounts published in the literature 34-36, almost all participants pointed out that 
patients who went abroad for transplantation had an ethnic affinity with their destination 
country. Only a few respondents indicated that they treated native Dutch patients who 
purchased organ transplants abroad. The participants explained that patients usually had 
the nationality of the destination country, had lived or worked there in the past and/or had 
family and friends living there. 
In highlighting patients’ ethnic ties, professionals speculated that it was proba-
bly easier and cheaper for them to buy kidneys abroad than for native Dutch patients. 
Frequently, they brought up these patients’ ‘cultural otherness’ and stated that the pa-
tients came from ‘cultures where everything is for sale, including people and their kidneys’. 
Furthermore, they referred to differences in ethical perspectives towards organ purchase 
between the native Dutch and non-native Dutch, to explain why some patients travel 
overseas to buy kidneys, and most others (i.e. the native Dutch) do not. As one doctor 
pointed out: 
The native Dutch have a different ethical perspective than those who come from 
those countries. I think those people more easily accept that the poor are ex-
ploited for the rich. In their perspective that is probably everyday business. The 
native Dutch, I believe, have a different kind of realisation. They probably find it 
[kidney purchase] more unacceptable. (n14) 
The foregoing reveals the respondents’ rather ‘static’ interpretation of culture 37, given 
that, strictly speaking, a culture that accepts organ purchases does not exist. Their inter-
pretation served to differentiate the ‘suspected’ transplants (in Asia and the Middle East) 
from those obtained in Western countries. The professionals generally assumed the latter 
to be legally obtained and indicated that they felt more ‘reassured’ about these transplants.
The professionals were generally more understanding towards patients who ob-
tained or purchased kidneys in their countries of origin than towards patients of native 
Dutch origin. As a nephrologist pointed out: 
My Turkish patients believe that the health care in Turkey is better and they feel 
more at home there too. I can understand that. It doesn’t mean that I support 
them, but I find it less condemnable. (n22) 
This statement illustrates that patients’ perceived ‘otherness’ or ethnic ties alleviated 
respondents’ condemnation of organ purchase. Consequently, and also because of its 
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incidental nature, most didn’t regard the phenomenon as a serious crime that warranted 
a repressive response. 
Yet, these statements must be understood in light of the fact that patients with a 
migration background are known to have a higher prevalence of kidney disease and de-
creased chances of receiving a kidney transplantation 38-40. Indeed, a few respondents stat-
ed that they treated patients who had complained about the Dutch organ procurement 
system. These patients believed that the wait list only existed for patients of a different 
ethnic origin and told their caregivers that the only solution for them be transplanted 
within a short time frame, was to undergo one overseas. Explanations for patients’ under-
representation in transplantation programmes include language barriers and poor commu-
nication with caregivers. This, in turn, is reported to lead to shortcomings in knowledge 
about their disease and treatment options. Other reported reasons are unwillingness of 
family and friends to donate and reluctance to ask family and friends for a kidney 41,42. In 
the underlying study, professionals also frequently brought up language barriers in their 
exchanges with patients, referred to their families’ unwillingness to donate and referred to 
patients’ reluctance to bring up the subject of a kidney donation with family:
When they raise the issue, we tell them that it’s custom in The Netherlands for 
family members or others in their environment to donate a kidney. But they 
consider that a strange solution. Instead they say, ‘If I need a kidney, I’d rather 
buy one than receive one from a family member’. (n4)
Occasionally, during these exchanges, professionals were told that family members had 
supported patients by finding donors overseas, by paying or raising funds for the transplan-
tations and by accompanying patients on their journeys abroad. 
Nonetheless, the importance that participants attributed to ethnic ties and family 
bonds as an explanation for cross-border kidney purchases, may be somewhat overstat-
ed. First of all, ethnic affiliations didn’t guarantee successful transplant endeavours in all 
cases. A few professionals treated patients who travelled to their countries of origin for 
transplantation but returned ‘empty handed’. Furthermore, a number of patients were not 
ethnically affiliated to their destination countries. Respondents spoke, amongst others, of 
a patient from Morocco who travelled to China, a man from Surinam who was transplant-
ed in Colombia, a Belarusian who travelled to Azerbaijan and a native Dutch patient who 
presumably bought a kidney in Pakistan. How these patients organized their transplanta-
tions, however, is unknown, as most professionals didn’t enquire after the transplants. In 
the following paragraph we address how professionals dealt with their patients’ suspected 
kidney purchases. 
Moral ambivalence in professionals’ attitudes and their appeals to legal duties
The participants largely disagreed with their patients buying kidneys. They pointed out 
that the act was prohibited by law and that it was unethical because of the possible ex-
ploitation of donors. Most added that it could also involve grave medical risks for patients. 
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It is worth noting however, that a number of professionals stated to have less objections 
to kidney purchases if it was strictly government-controlled without middlepersons pock-
eting the profits and wherein donors received adequate protection and compensation. 
Professionals’ concerns about their patients’ suspected kidney purchases thus mainly lay 
in the likelihood that they had bought the kidneys on the black market from exploited 
donors. 
Although they largely condemned kidney purchases, they also understood why pa-
tients bought kidneys. Respondents felt sympathy for their patients, often describing them 
as ‘victims of their illnesses’. As a nephrologist stated: 
We aren’t robots. There’s always an emotional component in which you ask 
yourself, ‘Do I want my patient to benefit from the transplant or not?’ or, ‘What 
would I do if I stood in his shoes?’ (n11)
Professionals referred to patients’ desperation due to the long wait time and their dialy-
sis-related complaints to explain why they travelled overseas. Some criticised the govern-
ment for its failure to procure sufficient organs and felt that patients were not to blame. 
This ambivalence in respondents’ opinions and attitudes towards their patients was 
a recurrent theme in all interviews. Many described their patients’ suspected purchases as 
ethically complex and ‘difficult’. Sharing his mixed feelings about his patient’s transplant 
venture, a respondent elaborated: 
If the patient benefited from the transplant, then I’m happy for him. But if you 
would ask me to share my opinion before he leaves, I would say that I condemn 
it and that I don’t offer my support. Morally we try to find a way out of this, you 
see? Because we just don’t know how to deal with the issue. (n23)
A minority felt less sympathy towards their patients. These participants explained that hav-
ing a kidney disease in The Netherlands wasn’t simply a matter of life or death. Referring 
to the country’s successful living kidney donation programme (The Netherlands has the 
highest rate in living kidney donations p.m.p. in Europe), they explained that patients could 
receive a live donor kidney from friends or family. According to these professionals, going 
abroad for a kidney transplant wasn’t necessary. 
Nevertheless, most refrained from sharing their opinions with patients because 
they didn’t want their ‘moralistic attitude’ to affect their professionalism: 
I really condemned what they did. But when I realized I felt that way, I thought 
to myself, ‘I shouldn’t communicate that to my patients’. I shouldn’t say that I 
condemn what they did or hold a grudge against them. I don’t believe that is 
professional. (n1) 
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Emphasizing the primacy of their Hippocratic Oath (which requires doctors to uphold 
their obligation ‘to first do no harm’, their secrecy oath and their duty of medical care) 43, 
most explained that it was an inherent part of their jobs to set aside their personal, moral 
convictions: 
Even if you find your patient intolerable. Even if he is a pedophile who cannot 
keep his hands off little children. All those persons deserve care. And I will give 
that to them. I switch off those ethical and moral aspects. I will even care for 
that horrible pedophile. In my opinion he is not different from those who pur-
chase kidneys abroad. (n14) 
Universally, codes of medical ethics dictate that doctors have a duty to care for any patient 
in emergent need 22, ‘including patients who may have obtained an organ through trans-
plant tourism’ 25. Yet, these codes also contain ‘conscience clauses’ that allow doctors to 
defer care in non-emergent situations, such as in the case of abortion or euthanasia 44,45. 
In the underlying study however, respondents appealed to their duty of medical care, ex-
plaining that it prevailed over other (ethical or personal) considerations, such as deferring 
care of the patient to a colleague, or protecting the donor from possible harm. 
Gill et al., have stated that doctors have a duty to advocate for their patients, but 
‘as members of the medical community, they also have a duty to prevent harm to other 
individuals’, including the possible exploited donor 25. According to the professionals in this 
study however, the primacy of the secrecy oath and duty of care overrode the protection 
of the donor. Many pointed out that they didn’t feel a connection with the donors and 
were not in the situation to protect them because they were ‘unknown and far away’. 
What consistently arose in this study, is that their appeal to their duty of medical 
care, justified their ‘not wanting to know’ or ‘not needing to know’ about their patients’ 
suspected kidney purchases: 
My patient came back with a need for care that I provided. Whether it was an 
ethically condemnable transplantation or not, has nothing to do with my duty 
of care. For that reason, I didn’t pay attention to whether the donor was paid or 
not. We don’t need to know everything. (n14)
These findings differ from the results of our previously reported survey, where the majority 
of professionals reported a conflict of duties, because they felt unable to protect the pos-
sible victim donor and because they were unable to prevent the crime 30. The underlying 
study, by contrast, revealed that whereas some respondents stated that they experienced 
tensions, others avoided dilemmas by preferring not to know (too much) about their pa-
tients’ alleged wrongdoings.
Cohen has described avoidance to, or ‘turning away’ from crime as a ‘state of de-
nial’: a form of ignorance that lies in between knowing and not knowing 46. Indeed, the 
professionals used a number of justifications or ‘excuses’ 47 for why they didn’t want or 
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need to know about the alleged purchases. Some explained that it happened a long time 
ago and thus considered it a ‘fait accompli’ (‘there’s no use in crying over spilled milk’). Others 
explained that asking their patients would take up too much of their valuable time, or 
stated that they simply weren’t interested in knowing about the purchase, or pointed out 
that they wanted to avoid having ‘guilty knowledge’ about the donor: 
Our policy is that the kidney was purchased outside our institution. We deliber-
ately don’t ask, because we don’t want to know. We don’t want to hear that he 
bought the kidney from a poor person who sold his kidney in order to provide 
shelter for his family. We want to protect ourselves from such sad stories. (n31)
Nonetheless, Cohen’s work and other commonly used criminological theories that are 
used to explain the denial behaviour of perpetrators and bystanders (see for instance Van 
de Bunt’s work on walls of secrecy and silence in the construction industry 48), are not 
fully apt to explain the participants’ attitudes and behaviours towards their organ buying 
patients. Rather, their reasons for looking away should be understood in light of their ap-
peal to ‘higher loyalties’ 49. In this study, this constituted the fulfilment of their legal duties 
towards patients. Emphasizing the importance of maintaining trust in the relationships 
vis-à-vis their patients, professionals explained that they avoided the subject of kidney 
purchase because they didn’t want to give their patients the impression that they were 
being ‘accused’ and feared that ‘interrogating’ them would negatively affect their relation-
ship. Indeed, parallels to other studies can be drawn here, for instance regarding those 
between lawyers and their clients. Mann (1985) found, for example, that lawyers also had 
no interest in knowing about their clients’ wrongdoings because this knowledge could 
affect the quality of their work 50. 
Similar to lawyers, professionals also have a duty to maintain secrecy vis-à-vis their 
clients (patients). This duty similarly trumped their need to know about the kidney pur-
chase, in particular because, as they pointed out, ‘we aren’t allowed to report our patients 
anyway’. Doctors do not have an obligation to investigate and prove whether their patients 
will commit or have committed crimes. In addition, they are exempted from the duty to 
report crimes 51. Jurisdictions generally only permit (and some obligate) doctors to disclose 
confidential information about patients to authorities under exceptional circumstances, 
such as when the disclosure will prevent (severe) physical harm to the patient or another 
individual. Justified reasons for disclosure are child abuse and crimes that may lead to 
death of the victim (i.e. gun and knife wounds) 22,52. 
The participants however, largely doubted whether kidney purchases passed this 
harm-threshold and thus didn’t believe that a kidney purchase would justify a breach of se-
crecy. Many therefore feared legal repercussions if they would report their patients. They 
added that it was practically impossible for them to determine whether patients had, in 
fact, purchased the kidney, and whether harm was going to, or had been inflicted upon 
the donor as a result. Furthermore, many were uncertain whether it was, in fact, illegal for 
patients to purchase organs abroad. It is worth noting that under the Dutch Law on Organ 
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Donation and the Dutch Criminal Code, a cross-border organ purchase is only punishable 
if the double criminality principle is fulfilled. d Nevertheless, in the absence of legal guid-
ance on this issue, professionals’ knowledge of these legal aspects was poor. Indeed, the 
participants expressed a need for legal clarity on this topic. 
Highlighting the demarcation of duties between doctors on the one hand and those 
of police, detectives and judges on the other, participants added that it wasn’t their job or 
business to prove or know about kidney purchase. 
I’m not Sherlock Holmes. I’m not going to try to find out whether they purchased 
the kidney. I’m just not going to do that. I don’t care. Why should I care? (n30)
From their accounts, it was clear that professionals regarded cross-border kidney purchas-
es as links in the illegal transplant chain that they could not wholly prevent and which 
occurred beyond their control. Hence, they did not consider kidney purchases as part of 
their job or duty: 
I don’t feel that I take part in the crime. I’m not the treating physician over there. 
I don’t perform the operation. The patient is with me until a certain moment. 
Then he leaves and comes back. In my opinion, I don’t carry responsibility for 
what happened in the meantime. (n14)
Elaborating on their responsibilities vis-à-vis their patients’ purchases, participants high-
lighted patients’ own autonomy in the matter: 
My patient has his own responsibility for what he does to another. I don’t neces-
sarily carry all of that responsibility. (n12)
They pointed out that all they could do, was discourage patients from going abroad by 
emphasizing the medical and ethical risks and informing them about domestic transplant 
solutions. Many pointed out that their medical duty ended there: 
At a certain point, my medical duty ends. I can’t lie in front of the plane’s wheels 
to stop the patient from going. Besides, we already have enough other problems 
to worry about. (n6)
Cohen has stated that intervention to crimes becomes unlikely when responsibility is 
diffused 46. However, the attitudes and behaviours of the professionals in the underlying 
study must be understood in light of their experiences. These reveal that their patients’ 
kidney purchases cannot be rigorously determined. Rather, they are suspected and assumed. 
Indeed, some of the presented cross-border transplants may not have constituted illegal 
purchases at all. They may have been legally performed, for instance with related donors. 
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And, even if they were illegal, the question remains whether harm or suffering took place, 
and whether the possible harm would justify a breach of secrecy. 
There was some acknowledgment that professionals’ duties functioned as a conve-
nient ‘veil’ behind which the respondents could hide. As a nephrologist articulated: 
It’s easy for a doctor to say, ‘I am his doctor. I’ll do everything for my patient. I 
shall keep my mouth shut. I shall not notify the police. I will treat him and that’s 
that’. In a way, we can hide behind that. (n3) 
Another doctor stated the following:
It’s impossible to tackle transplant tourism if the transplant profession takes on 
this position. (n11) 
When we asked whether professionals would consider reporting their suspicions—without 
revealing the identity of patients—to law enforcement to support them with investigating 
and prosecuting trafficking networks, most replied that they hadn’t thought about that 
possibility. In addition, they were uncertain whether they were (legally) permitted to do so, 
and if yes, where they could report such information. When asked if they would consider 
reporting information such as the name of the transplant center where the patient ob-
tained the transplant or the names of hospital staff who carried out the transplantation (if 
such information was available), many responded that a mandatory, anonymous reporting 
code could be a good solution to acquire more information and increase detection. Most 
added that legal guidelines on the issue would be helpful. 
Nevertheless, they pointed out that such a code should not harm their relationship 
with patients. They reiterated that whilst it is the responsibility of governments to combat 
organ trade, it remains theirs to care for, and protect their patients. 
 
CONCLUSION
Encouraging disclosure of suspicious transplantations
In this study, we have illustrated that Dutch transplant professionals incidentally treat pa-
tients who are suspected of kidney purchases abroad and that they turn a blind eye to their 
patients’ presumed purchases. Their attitudes and behaviors are explained by the (national) 
legal framework in which they fulfil their obligations towards patients. In this framework, 
a hierarchy of rights and duties exists in which secrecy, care and trust in the relationship 
with their patients prevail. These duties override other principles or concerns such as pre-
venting kidney purchases and protecting (foreign) donors from harm. Furthermore, profes-
sionals are exempted from the duty to report patients who buy organs and may, in fact, 
face legal repercussions if they would report their patients to authorities. Professionals’ 
rights and duties thus keep in place a wall of secrecy and silence between them and their 
patients. Secrecy and silence function as a tacit agreement between patients and their 
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caregivers which keeps the subject of kidney purchase at a safe, unspoken distance and 
allows professionals to turn away from its suspected occurrence. 
It can be argued however, that these walls of secrecy and silence do little to curb 
the organ trade, and to prevent kidney purchases in particular. Moreover, professionals’ 
perceived ‘responsibility gap’ towards cross-border kidney purchases contrasts with the 
aforementioned developments in the transplant community, which increasingly demand 
a more pro-active approach from transplant doctors in preventing organ purchase 26,27. 
There is thus a discrepancy between what is encouraged from transplant professionals at 
the international level and their actual attitudes and behaviours towards patients in their 
day-to-day local practices. 
Nonetheless, the results of this study indicate room for advancement in encour-
aging professionals to become more proactive in the international fight against the organ 
trade. First of all, this study shows that organ purchases remain hidden, not because pro-
fessionals have an interest in concealing them, but because the law dictates that they must 
remain silent about their patients’ alleged purchases. Thus, to generate a more proactive 
stance from transplant professionals, changes must be made to the legal framework that 
governs their rights and duties. More specifically, governments need to loosen the condi-
tions under which professionals can legitimately report suspicious transplant activities 29,53. 
Elsewhere, we have proposed the implementation of an anonymous reporting 
code that enables the reporting of suspicious transplant activities (such as the names of 
transplant centers and hospital staff that facilitate the cross-border transplants) without 
revealing patients’ identities 30. The participants accepted the idea of a (mandatory) anony-
mous reporting tool if patients’ identities remained protected, and if the legal procedure 
was clear. 
Such a tool can have various aims and benefits: first, it can support law enforcement 
in investigating those who facilitate illegal organ transplantations abroad. Professionals 
could disclose this information to the same national institutions that receive information 
on human trafficking, domestic violence and child abuse. After analyzing the reported in-
formation, the reporting center can submit the information to the national police, who 
in turn contacts the police forces or liaison officers of the transplant destination country. 
This national-international reporting method would allow for the information to reach the 
appropriate authorities and would strengthen the cross-border collaboration and enforce-
ment of the crime 30.
Second, a reporting tool can help increase empirical information and knowledge 
about the mechanics of organ trading. This, in turn, may help address the question wheth-
er organ trade largely occurs in an organized manner involving trafficking of donors (as 
is portrayed in the literature) or whether it can also be viewed in a different context. 
Although it is not impossible that in this study patients may have organized their trans-
plants with the support of criminal networks, we did not find indications that confirm this 
claim. Rather, the participants’ accounts suggest that patients obtained transplants with 
the help of family. Despite that one does not necessarily rule out the other, it may be 
that cross-border organ purchases are better positioned within the discourse on (illegal) 
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migration and mobility than within a framework of human trafficking and transnational 
organized crime. Indeed, studies on (illegal) migration have shown that the majority of 
migrants organize their arrival into destination countries with the help of relatives, and 
not through organized criminal networks 5,54. More in-depth research will be needed to 
enhance understanding of this topic. 
Finally, increased empirical information on transplants abroad can help distinguish 
illegal transplants from legal ones. It has been suggested that so-called ‘referral schemes’ 
can be a solution in fostering legitimate transplants abroad for patients who are unable to 
receive transplants in their resident countries 28. 
It is likely that cross-border kidney purchases will persist in the absence of disclo-
sure by transplant professionals who suspect they took place. Transplant professionals 
who treat patients who are suspected of kidney purchase are important figures in the fight 
against organ trade and should be considered as such, even if they don’t take active or 
knowing part in the crime. Reporting tools can help break the walls of secrecy and silence 
in the organ trade. At the time of writing (2016) no such tools exists in The Netherlands, 
or in other countries.
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earlier versions of this manuscript. 
121
NOTES
a Because patients are treated by more than one transplant 
professional, this number does not represent the number of 
patients that travelled. However, the survey was completed by 
tps from all transplant centers, and all centers reported clusters 
of patients that travelled.
b Whereas surgeons perform the transplant operations, 
nephrologists specialize in kidney care and treat people with 
(chronic) kidney disease.
c Seven professionals knew three or more patients who 
presumably purchased kidneys. The maximum number of 
patients one respondent said he treated was ten, although 
this respondent was only able to recollect details about four 
patients. Many professionals, in particular those working at 
the same hospital or in the same transplant region, presumably 
spoke about the same patients, although we could not establish 
this with certainty in all cases. Consequently, we were unable to 
determine the total number of patients who travelled abroad for 
(suspicious) kidney transplants.
d This principle requires that the patient needs to be of 
Dutch nationality and the destination country also needs to 
prohibit organ purchases. At the time of writing, the legal 
provisions governing (cross-border) organ purchases have not 
been applied in court or clarified in case law. We discuss the 
legal implications for patients who buy kidneys abroad in: 
Ambagtsheer F, Zaitch D, Van Swaaningen R, Duijst W, Zuidema 
WC, Weimar W. (2012), Cross-Border Quest: The Reality and 
Legality of Transplant Tourism. Journal of Transplantation:1-7 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/391936)
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INTRODUCTION
 
Background and objectives
The present report builds upon the conclusions presented in the hott project’s literature 
review, ‘Trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ removal: a comprehensive 
literature review’ 1. This review concluded that a study of the current literature provides 
limited information and knowledge about the nature and incidence of the crime, and 
needs to be strengthened by other sources of information. 
The hott project‘s objectives are to: 
—  increase knowledge about trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ 
  removal 
—  raise awareness among target groups 
—  improve the non-legislative response
Purpose of study
This case study report addresses the gaps that were already highlighted in the hott 
 project’s literature review. This study’s purpose is to contribute to existing gaps in knowl-
edge concerning (a) the actors and their modus operandi of contemporary organ trafficking 
networks and (b) the experiences of police and prosecution in disrupting and prosecuting 
the persons involved in these networks. 
Selection of countries and cases
To acquire in-depth knowledge about the criminal networks involved in trafficking in hu-
man beings for the purpose of organ removal (thbor), the research team collected infor-
mation in the field by interviewing people worldwide who were directly involved in and 
affected by the events that led to prosecutions and convictions. With the financial support 
of the European Commission Directorate General Home Affairs, the Central Division of 
the National Police of The Netherlands, the Magnus Bergvalls Foundation (Sweden) and 
the Royal Physiographic Society (Sweden), the research team travelled to 4 countries to 
study 3 trafficking cases: 
1  South Africa, Durban (November 2012)—Netcare case
2  Republic of Kosovo, Priština (September 2013)—Medicus Clinic case
3  State of Israel, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (October 2013)—Netcare and Medicus 
  Clinic case
4  United States of America (usa), New York (March 2013)—Rosenbaum case
Visiting these countries made it possible to talk to key persons and to access data that 
would not have been acquired through literature—or desk research. The countries and 
cases were selected because of common features: police and prosecution investigated 
international networks involving (elements of) THBOR and succeeded in gathering suffi-
cient evidence to bring these cases to court that led to convictions of the accused, they 
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relied on assistance from other countries and were able to demonstrate how to achieve 
successes and overcome obstacles in international criminal collaboration.
Aims of study
The research questions were:
1  What were the signals of the illegal activities that led to the police investigation?
2  How was the criminal investigation performed?
3  What were the modus operandi of the actors?
4  Under what laws and charges did the prosecution(s) take place?
5  What were the obstacles to prosecution and how were they addressed? 
6  What was the judgment in the case?
Other cases and countries
The cases presented in this report show that recipients and sellers from European and 
non-European countries have undergone transplantations which were facilitated by crimi-
nal organizations. It’s important to mention that these cases do not fully reflect the current 
global status quo of the human organ trade. Investigations and convictions of (suspected) 
networks took/take place in other countries as well. 
Consultation of Europol, human trafficking police experts in European countries 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe report on trafficking in hu-
man beings for the purpose of organ removal in the osce Region 2 have shown that since 
2000 criminal investigations into human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal have 
taken place in at least five European countries: Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, Ukraine and 
the United Kingdom. These cases are presented in the Dutch police report ‘The trade in 
human organs and human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. An exploratory 
study into the involvement of The Netherlands and Europe’ 6. In addition, investigations 
and convictions took/take place in China, India, Singapore, Jordan, Turkey, Belarus, Costa 
Rica, Spain and Brazil. These cases are presented by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe in its report mentioned above 2, in the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (unodc) Case Law Database 3 and in the media 4. According to Organs Watch, 
networks also exist in Argentina, Cyprus, Honduras, Panama, The Philippines, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Syria, Iran (where brokers infiltrate a regulated system of organs traffick-
ing), Vietnam, Cambodia, Nepal, Thailand, Pakistan, Egypt and Albania.
Furthermore, recent research reveals that indications and suspicions of organ 
trafficking occur in many European countries, that are/have not been investigated. For 
instance, the hott project’s second report 5 illustrates that patients travel abroad from 
Sweden, The Netherlands and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to purchase 
kidney transplants in China, Pakistan, India, Iran and other countries. A 2013 survey held 
amongst transplant professionals in The Netherlands found that almost half of the profes-
sionals have treated patients in the last 5 years who travelled abroad for kidney transplants, 
with suspicions or certainty of organ purchase in 70% of cases. These patients are not 
reported due to doctors’ duty of confidentiality and their privilege of non-disclosure. The 
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Dutch police report mentioned above 6 presents signals of trafficking in human beings for 
the purpose of organ removal in The Netherlands that could not be further investigated, 
because the signals did not contain sufficient information in order for a police investiga-
tion to be performed. The impact of the demand for organs originating in Europe and 
other regions on the global organ trade should not be underestimated and should be more 
rigorously addressed. The organ trade is an international crime that is not confined to the 
regions and countries presented herein.
 
METHODS AND SOURCES
This study is based on the following research methods:
—  in-depth interviews 
—  study of case materials
The interviews were the predominant research method. In addition, the research team 
collected a large number of documents. The team also conducted one field observation. 
This took place during a court hearing in South Africa and was recorded in field diaries. The 
methods are described in more detail below. The research materials were supplemented 
by published research in scholarly, medical and human rights journals and media reports. 
Interviews
The number of interviews and respondents are listed below. Most interviews were held 
with more than one person and some respondents were interviewed more than once. The 
respondents came from a variety of backgrounds. Three interviews were conducted with 
the help of an interpreter: with a police officer, with a representative of the Ministry of 
Health and with an organ recipient. The interviews aimed to get insight into the respon-
dents’ experiences and perspectives.
respondents number of 
respondents
number of 
interviews
Police officer
Prosecutor
Dpt. of International Affairs representatives
Defense lawyer
Ministry of Health representative
Ministry of Internal Affairs representative / National Coordinator Human Trafficking
International organization representative
Insurance company representative
Nephrologist / surgeon
National transplant coordinator
Social worker
Organ recipient
Founders of non-profit organization on organ donation
8
8
2
7
3
2
7
1
4
1
1
3
2
6
5
5
3
1
4
1
3
1
1
6
1
total 49 37
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Selection of the respondents 
Respondents assisted the team members to get in touch with new involved persons after 
their arrival in the country. Interviewees were e-mailed and/or phoned with the request 
for an interview. All were given an information sheet prior to each interview. This sheet de-
scribed the purpose of the hott project, the aims of this study and presented the names, 
affiliations and contact details of the members of the research team. It also emphasized 
that data would be used anonymously and be kept strictly confidential. 
Data processing and analysis
The interviews were tape-recorded if so permitted by the respondent and transcribed 
verbatim by the project team. Due to the sensitive nature of the topics, a number of re-
spondents did not allow being tape-recorded. In these cases, the research team took notes 
during the interview and had written reports based on the notes immediately after the 
interview.
Questions 
The interviews took place using a 15-page, uniform, semi-structured list of prepared ques-
tions that addressed different themes, derived from the research questions. Small modifi-
cations were made in order to adapt questions to the country in question.
Case materials
Case materials formed the second source of this study. The following documents were 
provided by respondents and given to the research team:
—  Kosovo: indictment, closing statement, judgment (containing witness- and victim 
statements), various legislation, defence letters, security council resolutions;
—  South Africa: charge sheets, legislation, judgment, a large number of (court) doc-
uments including notices of motion, respondents’ answering affidavits, applicant’s 
practice notes, admissions of guilt, plea sentence agreement;
—  Usa: transcript of the sentencing hearing, criminal complaint, pre-sentence memo-
randum of the defence, charge sheets;
—  Israel: Organ Transplant Act, Penal Act, Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act 
(Legislative Amendments), Organ Transplantation Regulations, Memorandum of 
the Ministry of Health’s Director General, indictments, protocols of court sessions, 
court’s rulings and judicial decisions, presentation of the deputy general manager 
of a health insurance company, presentation of the director of Overseas Surgeries 
Department in a public healthcare provider and presentations by the Israel 
Transplant Center.
SCOPE AND USE OF TERMS
The hott project is a response to the call by the European Commission Directorate 
General Home Affairs for project proposals focusing on trafficking in human beings 7. The 
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primary scope of this project is therefore trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ 
removal (thbor). Consequently, thbor is the main focus of this report. However, laws 
directed against human trafficking were not applied in all of the studied cases. Because 
these cases contained elements of thbor, they are addressed in this report. 
Thbor is defined and prohibited in Article 4 of the Council of Europe Convention 
on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 8 and the Directive 2011/36/eu of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 9. Thbor is also criminalized in Article 3 of the 
United Nations (un) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children (hereafter Palermo Protocol) which supplements the un 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 10. Thbor is further prohibited by the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 11. In this report the definition is used as laid 
down in Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol. This protocol defines thbor as:
 
Article 3 Palermo Protocol
‘For the purposes of this Protocol:
a ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery 
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; 
b The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this 
article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used […].’
The full article can be found in Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol 10.
This definition includes 3 key elements: an action (e.g. recruitment and transfer), a means 
(e.g. coercion and deception) and a purpose (exploitation). These elements have to be pres-
ent in order for an act to constitute thbor. If the victim is a child however, the presence 
of these means does not have to be proven 12. The definition does not prohibit the trade in 
organs per se. In order to be classified as a criminal act it is not so much the intended sale 
and purchase of organs, but the exploitative actions and means used to remove a person’s 
organs that count 13. The hott project’s literature review addresses this definition in more 
detail as well as other terms a and definitions that are used throughout this report 1.
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CASE STUDIES
SOUTH AFRICA — THE NETCARE CASE
Start of investigation 2003
Charges Fraud; forgery; uttering; unlawful acquisition; use 
or supply of tissue, blood or gamete (minors); use or 
possession of proceeds unlawful activities; illegal receipt 
of payments (minors)
Convicted Netcare represented by Ian Goble, 1 nephrologist, 
1  recipient, 1 translator, 1 local coordinator and 1 broker
Remaining accused 4 transplant surgeons, 2 transplant coordinators
Respondents of the study [r] Police investigators, prosecutors, defense attorney, social 
worker, representative of the Ministry of Health
Case material Charge sheets [d1], legislation [d2], various court papers 
from the proceedings [d3]
Case study by Frederike Ambagtsheer, Susanne Lundin, Martin Gunnarson and Jessica de Jong 
23 November—3 December 2012; Durban, South Africa
‘After seven years of obfuscation and denial, South Africa’s largest private healthcare group, 
Netcare, finally confessed to its role in a cash-for-kidneys scheme and to benefiting from asso-
ciated international trafficking of living donors. […] Netcare’s conviction in the Durban com-
mercial crimes court is said to be a world first—no other hospital group has been found guilty 
of supporting an organised trafficking scheme dealing in organs.’ 14
Signals of illegal activities
In 2003, ‘out of an act of conscience’ a whistle-blower told the police about the illegal 
transplantations that took place at Netcare’s hospital, St Augustine’s, located in Durban b. 
It was suspected that illegal transplants also took place in Cape Town and Johannesburg. 
This was the first signal that reached the police, and it was decisive in the sense that it 
motivated them to initiate an investigation. However, once involved in the investigation, 
the police realized that there had been other signals of illegal transplants taking place prior 
to the moment when the whistle-blower contacted the police. One of the first came from 
the American anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes and her organisation Organs Watch, 
who had picked up on the illegalities and had reported this to various authorities and 
organisations. In conjunction, a South African transplant surgeon working at a public hos-
pital in Cape Town, wrote an ‘open’ letter warning his fellow surgeons about ‘Israeli trans-
plantations’. Furthermore, employees from Netcare’s hospital and a blood bank, where 
the cross-matching of suppliers and recipients took place, asked their superiors what was 
going on or shared their suspicions with their superiors. At an international transplantation 
conference in the usa, surgeons from other countries also accused Netcare and its trans-
plant surgeons [r] 15. 
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Criminal investigation
When the police found out about the illegal transplantations going on at Netcare’s hospi-
tal, St Augustine, they first researched transplantation in general and the law regulating it, 
The Human Tissue Act. According to one of the respondents, knowing the particularities 
of legal transplantations was crucial in identifying the ways in which the transplantations 
at St Augustine’s deviated from this. Following this, the gathering of evidence started. 
Quite early on however, they decided to limit the investigation to St Augustine’s. This was 
where the evidence was the strongest. Still, it became a major investigation [r].
At the outset, the dilemma arose that an immediate search of the transplant clinic 
and blood bank would reveal to the perpetrators that the police was on their tail. Therefore, 
the investigating team chose to take ‘the undercover route’ [r]. But this route failed, due 
to technical problems. However, unexpectedly, one of the organ brokers involved in the 
illegal activities opened a charge of theft in which he openly stated that an organ supplier 
had run off with money that he had received in advance, which was subsequently estab-
lished to be true. Now the police had to act since they were worried that Netcare and 
their accomplices would start destroying evidence. They stopped the supplier and his wife 
at the airport and took their statements. Four days later they obtained a search warrant 
and searched the transplant clinic for the first time. During this search they successfully 
gathered all the ‘transplant files’, which contained the records of the patients, and the 
transplant register, in which all the transplantations that had been performed were re-
corded and where the surgeons were mentioned by name [r]. A couple of weeks later they 
performed a second search at St Augustine’s hospital as they became aware of the need to 
gather the records of the patients’ entire hospital stay and the documentation pertaining 
to the operating theatres where the surgeries had taken place. To get access to these files, 
they brought with them a representative from the Ministry of Health who was authorized 
under the Human Tissue Act to function as an ‘inspector of anatomy’ with access to all of 
the hospital’s documentation. They also performed a search of the blood bank, where they 
collected documents that proved that potential recipients were cross-matched against 
several suppliers which, in turn, indicated that they were not related [r]. The office of a 
nephrologist was also searched and medical files were confiscated. These were mostly files 
related to the recipients of kidneys. Computers were also seized. It was established that 
data entries in these letters provided to recipients were changed from ‘non-related’ to 
‘related’. The typist who changed these letters was identified and she provided a statement 
under oath that she had been instructed to do this. 
An organ broker, a local coordinator, a nephrologist, a transplant coordinator and a 
translator were consequently arrested. These arrests and the hearings that followed also 
became essential evidence. Furthermore crucial was the investigating team’s collaboration 
with the other involved countries. In Brazil and Romania the team interviewed suppliers 
and/or local organ brokers. Establishing collaboration with Israel proved more difficult. A 
request for mutual legal assistance and police assistance was forwarded to Israel in order 
to obtain statements from suppliers and recipients of kidneys. This was done at an early 
stage of the investigations. Statements arrived in ‘drips and drapes’ over a long period of 
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time. Only later, after the withdrawal of the case against the surgeons and coordinators, 
the investigating team finally received permission to visit Israel. After this, they collaborat-
ed successfully with the customs officials and received written statements from suppliers 
and recipients [r]. Despite this vast body of evidence, the South African state decided to 
provisionally withdraw the charges against Netcare in 2007. According to the respondents, 
the withdrawal had several causes. Two major causes were the delay in evidence coming 
from Israel and the failed attempt to have the main organ broker extradited to South 
Africa. In 2010, however, the charges were reinstated [r]. 
Modus operandi
The illegal transplants at St Augustine’s started when an Israeli organ broker approached 
Netcare in 2001. His proposition was that he would provide well-paying Israeli patients in 
need of a kidney and paid suppliers willing to sell one of their kidneys. What Netcare would 
bring to the equation was the provision of transplant services [d1]. 
The vast majority of organ recipients were recruited from Israel. Four recipients 
came from the usa and South Africa. The price of around $120.000 included the kidney, 
the services as well as the travel and accommodation. The suppliers were initially also re-
cruited from Israel and got paid around us$20.000, but later on the organ brokers became 
aware that they could acquire cheaper kidneys in Romania and Brazil. Here, the suppliers 
were willing to take part with a kidney for between us$3.000 and us$6.000. In Brazil, from 
where the vast majority of suppliers came and 2 local recruiters (one an expatriate retired 
Israeli military officer, the other a retired Brazilian military police captain) also took care 
of practical tasks such as assisting the suppliers with passports, visas, travel bookings and 
preparatory blood tests. On arrival in South Africa, the suppliers were chaperoned by local 
actors. Some of them also acted as interpreters. Initially suppliers were housed in hotels 
and later, when the number of suppliers increased, in an apartment at the Durban seafront 
[r,d1].
In South Africa at this time there was a ministerial policy in place that required all 
transplants between non-related donors and recipients to obtain prior approval from a 
ministerial advisory committee. In order to circumvent this requirement, Netcare and its 
accomplices made all suppliers and recipients sign papers that said that they were related 
when in fact they were not. Taking care of this, 2 transplant coordinators were employed 
by Netcare. Another crucial actor was a South African nephrologist who was responsible 
for referring all patients to the transplant clinic. The transplant surgeons were also central 
players. Four of them were charged. Prior to the operations a blood bank performed the 
cross-matching of recipients and suppliers [r,d1].
The payments relating to the transplantations were transferred in different ways 
and at different points in time. The recipients paid the Israeli organ broker in advance, 
who then paid Netcare, who in turn distributed the money to the various involved actors 
in South Africa. The nephrologist who was later convicted also received payments directly 
from the main broker into a bank account in Canada. The suppliers were paid in cash, 
usually after the operation [r,d1]. 
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Laws and charges
At the time of the illegal transplantations at St Augustine’s, South Africa did not have 
legislation specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal. 
Two laws were applied, The Human Tissue Act (dating from 1983), and the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act (dating from 1998). None of them were well suited to the situation. 
The Human Tissue Act ‘was old and badly written’, as one of the respondents expressed 
it [r]. One of the main loopholes in this law was that it only targeted persons or organiza-
tions that received financial remuneration for an organ. The buying of organs was thus not 
illegal. It was also not illegal for so-called authorized institutions to accept money for an 
organ [d2]. The charges that were brought, varied to some extent between the defendants. 
But in the charge sheet issued in 2010—which contained charges against Netcare, the 2 
transplant coordinators, the 4 surgeons, the nephrologist and one of the interpreters—the 
majority of charges that were used were specified. These were: fraud, forgery, uttering, 
unlawful acquisition, use or supply of tissue, blood or gamete (minors), use or possession of 
proceeds from unlawful activities, and illegal receipt of payments (minors) [d1, d2].
Judgment
Since 2003, 12 people have appeared in court records, 12 have been indicted and 6 have 
been convicted. In 2010 the Netcare health group was convicted. Netcare was fined Rand 
4-million (approximately us$380.000) for its role in 109 illegal operations at St Augustine’s 
involving non-related donors and recipients. Five of these operations involved minors, 
which is also illegal, even with parental consent. Netcare also forfeited r3,8-million (ap-
proximately us$345.000) to the Assets Forfeiture Unit. In terms of the plea agreement 
finalised in court, criminal charges were withdrawn against Friedland as Netcare’s chief 
executive [r, d1]. 
The 4 surgeons and 2 transplant coordinators who were accused of involvement 
in the illegal transplants were arrested in 2004 and 2005 but released on bail. In 2011 they 
requested a permanent stay of prosecution c to the Kwazulu-Natal High Court in Durban 
which was granted to them on 14 December 2012 [r, d3]. The court granted them the 
permanent stay because of ‘an inordinate delay in doing what had to be done to facilitate 
the beginning of the trial and driving it to its conclusion’ [d3] and because the evidence 
was deemed insufficient [r]. At the time of writing it is not known whether prosecution 
will appeal the court’s decision.
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REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO — THE MEDICUS CLINIC CASE
Start of investigation 2008
Charges trafficking in persons, organized crime, unlawful exercise 
of medical activity, abusing official position or authority, 
grievous bodily harm, fraud, falsifying documents, 
falsifying official documents
Judgment 29th April 2013 (published 12th November 2013): prison 
sentence for 5 defendants; acquittal of 2 defendants
Defendants (7) urologist/owner of Medicus Clinic, director of Medicus 
Clinic (son of the owner/director), 3 medical doctors, 
specialist anesthesiologist, anesthesiologist, medical 
doctor/anesthesiologist
Fugitives (2) organ broker and transplant surgeon
Respondents of the study [r] police investigator, lead prosecutor, defense attorney, 
senior protection officer unhcr, officer in charge of 
inspection at Health Ministry, task manager/rule of law 
eu Office in Kosovo, head rule of law liaison office unmik, 
senior policy adviser, Interpol officer, Chief of Mission of 
iom, national coordinator trafficking in human beings/
deputy minister Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Case material amended indictment [d1], closing statement [d2], judg-
ment [d3], legislation [d4], security council resolution [d5]
Case study by Frederike Ambagtsheer, Jessica de Jong and Martin Gunnarson
16-20 September 2013; Priština, Republic of Kosovo
‘An eu-led court in Kosovo has found five people guilty in connection with a hu-
man organ-trafficking ring. The five are accused of carrying out dozens of illegal 
transplants at the Medicus Clinic in the capital, Priština. Meanwhile two former 
government officials also charged in the case have been cleared of involvement.’ 16 
Signals of illegal activities
Suspicions first arose among the Kosovo Police (kp) and Immigration Services at Priština 
Airport (exact date unknown) [r, d1-3]. A kp investigator was assigned to lead the investi-
gation in October 2008. He discovered that foreigners upon arrival in Kosovo brought with 
them invitation letters from the Medicus clinic. The letters stated that they were coming 
to Medicus for treatment of heart conditions. This caused suspicion amongst the airport 
authorities because in the foreigners’ countries of origin, heart treatments are considered 
to be superior to those in Kosovo [r]. 
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Criminal investigation
The principal investigator compared these letters and discovered that 2 individuals, a 
and s were actually in Kosovo at that time (a would later turn out to be the organ supplier 
for s). On inspection of a’s flight ticket, the investigator knew when a would return to 
Istanbul. The kp stopped and questioned a at the airport on 4 November 2008. He was 
accompanied by an Israeli broker and the brother of s. During questioning kp noticed that 
a had been coached to provide a particular story, and say that he had undergone heart 
treatment. ‘a’ made a very ‘concerned’ impression [r]. Eventually he admitted that he had 
undergone surgery, but he did not (immediately) explain that he had sold his kidney. The 
investigator asked a to show his scar. He then stated that his kidney had been removed 
and that he had been promised $15.000 for his kidney [r]. After medical examination, a 
was confirmed to be in poor medical condition and incapable of traveling. He was then 
taken into hospital. Following this, kp investigators, medical experts, Ministry of Health 
officials, the Department of Organized Crime and unmik International police searched 
the Medicus clinic. During this search, the recipient of a’s kidney, s (an Israeli national) 
was identified. The director (x) and the owner (u) of the Medicus clinic were arrested on 
4 November 2008. Seizure of medical and business records, medical supplies, medications 
and computers occurred at Medicus until 11 November [d1-3]. At some point (date un-
known), unmik Police took over the lead of the investigation from the kp due to the ‘very 
sensitive nature’. d
After the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (eulex) was deployed in 
Kosovo the case was handed over to eulex. e The alleged nexus between the owners of 
the clinic and certain persons within the political elite, made it difficult for local authorities 
to initiate a robust and independent investigation [r]. A second complication was that a 
search warrant had not been issued by a pre-trial judge, during police operations at the 
clinic, due to exigent circumstances concerning patients and medical care. In addition, 
the actual assistance provided by the local court administration in Kosovo to organize 
expert and forensic testimony, video link witnesses, key translations and court hearings 
was ‘extremely difficult in a very challenging environment’ [r]. Receiving international legal 
assistance was also an issue because Kosovo was not recognized as a sovereign state by a 
number of countries. For that reason receiving cooperation from countries such as Russia 
was ‘dismal and appalling’ [r]. Eventually, once personal relationships were established with 
specialists abroad, international cooperation became ‘very good’ [r]. Evidence included the 
evidence seized at the clinic, forensic evidence, pharmaceuticals, medical records, e-mail 
correspondence, customs records, witness- and victim testimonies and most importantly, 
anesthesiology logs that documented when the transplants took place, which doctors 
were present and on whom (recipients and suppliers) the surgeries were performed [r]. 
Modus operandi
In March 2005 the urologist/owner of Medicus Clinic (u) attended the twentieth Annual 
Congress of the European Association of Urology in Istanbul, Turkey. There he discussed 
the need to make kidney transplants available for the Kosovar people. These transplants at 
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the time did not take place, due to a lack of medical expertise in transplant surgery. f After 
expressing his desire to receive assistance in locating a medical expert, he was provided the 
contact details of a Turkish transplant surgeon (v) [d1]. 
In 2006 u and v contacted each other. Together with x (the director of Medicus) 
and an Israeli organ broker (m) they planned to perform kidney transplants in Kosovo. In 
December 2007 u applied for v to be licensed as a non-Kosovar health professional, which 
was granted by the Ministry of Health (moh) in January 2008. That same month an em-
ployment contract was established between the Medicus clinic and v for him to perform 
(as a general surgeon) living donor kidney transplants. In March 2008 u inquired about the 
possibility of conducting kidney transplants at Medicus. The licensing process involved 
multiple meetings with senior local officials including the then Minister of Health and the 
Health Advisor to the Prime Minister. In May 2008 the Office of the Permanent Secretary 
at the moh issued a confirmation of license approval for performing living donor trans-
plants. This license contravened the prohibition of transplants laid down in the Kosovo 
Health Law and it did not contain all the required constituents to be a proper license [d1]. 
From March-November 2008 at least 24 individuals were recruited in foreign coun-
tries and transported to Kosovo in order to have one of their kidneys removed. These 
24 individuals were matched to 24 recipients, leading to 48 surgeries, all of which took 
place at the Medicus clinic. Although proof was found of only 24 transplants, prosecution 
believes that more transplants actually took place [d1-3]. M played an important role as 
‘fixer’ of the transplants, by maintaining contacts between suppliers and recipients and 
accompanying them and the families of recipients.
The organ suppliers came from Israel (4), Turkey (3), Moldova (1), Russia (3), Ukraine 
(2), Kazakhstan (1) and Belarus (1). Of 9 individuals’ their nationality is unknown [d3]. Most 
were 20-30 years old. Suppliers identified and contacted the brokers (‘fixers’) via internet 
searches or newspaper advertisements [r]. After undergoing blood tests, suppliers flew to 
Priština, via Istanbul. At the immigration office most would present a letter of invitation 
stating that they came for medical check-ups at a ‘certain clinic’ [r]. They would then 
be picked up and brought to the Medicus clinic. The planned surgery was presented to 
suppliers as being a routine medical procedure without risk after which they could re-
sume a healthy life without restrictions. They were not given sufficient time to make a 
‘final and conscious voluntary decision’ to donate their kidney. They would go into the 
operation room almost immediately after their arrival, after signing false declarations in 
the local language that were not explained to them and were often in languages they did 
not speak or understand. They also signed so-called ‘Deeds of Donation’ stating that they 
were donating their kidney for altruistic reasons or to a relative, which in all cases was 
false [r,d1-3]. After 4-5 days the suppliers were discharged and returned to their home 
country. They were not given any documents or medicines. All were promised amounts 
up to $30.000. However some of them were only partially compensated or even received 
nothing at all. Many were later contacted by the ‘fixers’ and urged to find other ‘donors’ 
and given assurances that they would receive the money owed to them, and even more, 
should they cooperate with this proposal. Six of the 24 suppliers testified in trial. By the 
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court they were considered victims of abuse of their position of vulnerability and in certain 
cases victims of coercion, fraud and/or deception and were found to be exploited by the 
removal of their kidneys [d3]. 
Recipients came from Ukraine (1), Israel (14), Turkey (1), Poland (1), Canada (1) and 
Germany (1). Of 5 recipients the nationality is as yet unknown. Recipients were generally 
over 50 years of age. They were ill and desperate for a solution to save them from years 
of dialysis. Most located m and other brokers through word of mouth, and prices up to 
$108.000 would be agreed. Payments were often made in instalments, electronically and/
or in cash at Medicus. Patients would fly to Priština via Istanbul and were often escorted. 
Frequently their prospective suppliers would be on the same flight. Recipients were given 
invitation letters for getting medical treatment at Medicus to use if needed on entry into 
Kosovo or instructed to say they were visiting as tourists. They would met at the airport 
and taken to the Medicus clinic. The operation would take place not long after their arrival 
at the clinic and they would have to sign documents, which were not explained to them. 
After a limited number of days they were discharged and given medicines and instructions 
relating to their condition and the procedures they had undergone to present to the doc-
tors in their home country [r,d1-3]. 
Judgment
On 29 April 2013 u and x were found guilty of trafficking in persons and organized crime. 
The other accused (including u) were found guilty of unlawful exercise of medical activity. 
The charges abusing official position, grievous bodily harm, fraud and falsifying documents 
were rejected. U received 8 years imprisonment and €10.000 fine. X received 7 years and 3 
months, and a €10.000 fine. The other accused received 3 years and 1 year imprisonment. 
Two defendants were acquitted [d3]. g M and v are presently the subject of an Interpol 
International Wanted Notice [d1,d3]. 
STATE OF ISRAEL — THE NETCARE AND MEDICUS CLINIC CASES
Introduction 
The Netcare and Medicus Clinic cases clearly demonstrate the global nature of thbor. 
In these cases, the trafficking networks functioned in several nations and involved Israeli 
brokers. Law enforcement also covered several countries, including Israel. In order to shed 
additional light on the complexity of these 2 cases, the research team travelled to Israel 
and analyzed these cases in the Israeli context, examining the modus operandi, as well as 
the law enforcement measures, which took place in relation to these cases. Hence, this 
chapter complements the preceding chapters on the Netcare case in South Africa and the 
Medicus clinic case in Kosovo and should be read together with them. It will not discuss 
other legal cases in Israel that are not directly related to the cases in South Africa and 
Kosovo 17,18. h 
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STATE OF ISRAEL — THE NETCARE CASE
Respondents of the study [r] Israeli police officers, office of the state attorney 
(prosecutors and department of international affairs 
representatives), deputy general manager of a health 
insurance company, kidney recipients (including director 
of an organization for dialysis patients and kidney 
recipients), nephrologists. 
Note: The Netcare Case was not discussed with Israeli 
police and state attorneys. As a result, they were not able 
to respond to the questions regarding the international 
collaboration in this case.
Case material Israeli Organ Transplant Act [d1], Penal Act [d2], 
Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act (Legislative 
Amendments) [d3], indictments [d4], court’s rulings 
and judicial decisions [d5], presentation of health 
insurance company [d6], presentation of public health-
care provider [d7], Memorandum of the Ministry of 
Health’s Director General No. 7/06 on Funding of 
Organ Transplants in Foreign Countries [d8], Organ 
Transplantation Regulations (Payment of Compensation 
and Reimbursement for Expenses to the Donor) [d9].
Case study by Frederike Ambagtsheer, Jessica de Jong, Martin Gunnarson, Zvika Orr and Linde van Balen 
6-14th October 2013; Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, State of Israel 
The involvement of Israeli nationals and entities in the Netcare case was multi-dimension-
al and included several global organ trafficking networks managed by Israelis, Israeli kidney 
recipients and initially also kidney suppliers, as well as funding of transplants by public 
healthcare providers and private insurance carriers. 
The organ trafficking networks
Significant activity of an Israeli organ trafficking network in South Africa began in 2001. 
Beforehand most Israelis who purchased organs underwent transplantation in Turkey. i In 
order to compete with the flourishing human organ market in Turkey, where prices were 
continually skyrocketing—reaching $200.000 for a kidney transplant—the head of the 
aforementioned organ trafficking network offered transplants in South Africa for a fixed 
price of $108.000 [r]. After the trafficking in Turkey was exposed and Israeli transplants there 
were stopped (temporarily), more and more Israelis began traveling to South Africa. Over 
time, additional Israeli organ trafficking networks began operations in South Africa, includ-
ing the veteran network that had formerly operated in Turkey. For most of this time, 3 major 
and one minor Israeli network cooperated with Netcare. In contrast to Turkey, the sums 
charged to transplant recipients remained fairly constant, reaching a high of $120.000 [r]. 
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Official support for kidney purchase
During the years 2001-2003 South Africa was the main destination for Israelis undergo-
ing organ transplants overseas; mostly in Netcare hospitals in Durban, Johannesburg, and 
Cape Town [r,d6]. These years were characterized by rapid growth in the number of Israeli 
patients who purchased kidneys from living suppliers overseas [d6]. Based on information 
from the public healthcare providers, some 300 Israeli kidney recipients received monetary 
refunds from their public healthcare providers after returning from South Africa; the sums 
ranged from $37.000 to $70.000 [r]. j Kidney recipients who also had private insurance pol-
icies received additional remuneration from their insurance company. So in many cases the 
entire cost of the transplant, or almost all of it, was covered. The Ministry of Defense paid 
the expenses for those entitled to its services [r,d4]. When necessary, non-profit organiza-
tions or employers assisted in raising the missing funds for patients, fundraising campaigns 
in the media were conducted, and the public responded generously [r]. k Information 
about the organ commerce, the costs, the different brokers, the potential destinations and 
their reputation were all well-known to patients. In the words of a woman who underwent 
a transplant in South Africa: ‘Everyone knew about it. It went ear to mouth, between the 
sick people. […] Everyone knew someone who had done that and they got the telephone 
numbers and I spoke to patients, I got recommendations, and I have met 2 persons [who] 
organized this (brokers) and I chose the cheaper one’ [r]. There were Israeli nephrologists 
who provided letters and documents for the South African medical centers where the 
transplants were done. Some even referred their patients to specific organ traffickers, al-
though most refrained from this on ethical grounds [r]. 
The law before 2006
Official funding for these transplants, as well as the unimpeded and transparent actions 
by organ trafficking networks in Israel, were possible because of the Israeli law during 
these years. At this time there were not yet any laws in Israel prohibiting the purchase or 
sale of human organs, brokering in organs, or thbor 22. Consequently, organ brokers were 
not subject to criminal punishment in Israel for the brokerage itself. This legal situation 
expressed and also impacted the dominant moral attitudes in Israel towards the topic of 
buying and selling human organs, which were (and to an extent still are) relatively tolerant 
of these practices 17,23. l
Law enforcement and its challenges
This situation placed challenges and difficulties in the path of those charged with enforce-
ment. For example, in the framework of the investigation by the South African police in the 
Netcare case, Israeli citizens were called upon to testify in Tel Aviv. One kidney recipient, 
who underwent her transplant in Durban and was asked to testify, said in her interview that 
she did not want to incriminate the brokers, towards whom she felt very grateful: ‘They 
took me and [asked]: “How did you pay? How much did you pay?” I didn’t give many details 
because I didn’t want to incriminate anyone. I told them that I didn’t deal with this, it was 
my children, my friends, who handled this. […] I tried to wrangle out of this. […] They [the 
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brokers], after all, did me a favor. Why would I go and incriminate them? So I evaded this 
[issue]’ [r]. The police officers who investigated other cases of organ trafficking, including 
the case in Kosovo, also reported that it was difficult to convince the recipients to make 
statements against the brokers, but they nevertheless managed to convince some of the 
patients to cooperate and give a testimony [r]. Prosecutors added that patients who were 
not doing well after the transplant tended to be more cooperative when asked to testify 
against the brokers. Other patients who perceived the brokers as ‘life savers’ were more 
reluctant to cooperate [r]. As far as South Africa was concerned, a kidney recipient, who 
is also the director of an organization for dialysis patients and kidney recipients in Israel, 
claimed that transplants that were performed in South Africa were the most professional 
and of the highest quality among all the places to which Israelis travelled for kidneys. He 
expressed regret and indignation that this was terminated [r]. Israeli nephrologists who 
had opposed organ trafficking noted that the South African hospitals were on the highest 
professional standard. In the words of the director of nephrology of an Israeli hospital: 
‘They really did a good job. I mean, the best patients we ever had were from South Africa 
[…]. But they really had a business there.’ [r]
The organ trafficker—who headed the first Israeli network for commerce in human 
organs to work in South Africa—was arrested in Israel in July 2002. He was suspected of 
tax evasion to the amount of 25.000.000 nis in Israel (approximately $5.245.000, at the 
exchange rate at that time), on income from the transplants done in South Africa. m He was 
also suspected of document forging in relation to these activities (among which was docu-
mentation from South African hospitals including official receipts and invoices) and the use 
of forged documents for fraudulent acquisition of funds; all in aggravated circumstances 
[d5]. On July 2002 he was released on bail and was not permitted to leave the country. 
On February 2003 he was permitted to leave the country for short periods, conditional 
on posting an additional bond payment [d5]. In 2006 he was arrested in a German airport 
as a result of an international arrest warrant issued in South Africa, but ultimately he was 
released [r]. 
Law enforcement in Brazil
A retired Israeli military officer (‘g’), was a primary organ trafficker who set up the Brazil-
To-South Africa scheme that recruited suppliers in Recife, Brazil. G received $10.000 for 
each successful transplant 24. As Nancy Scheper-Hughes notes, he was indicted in Brazil, 
together with some 24 Brazilians, most of whom were kidney sellers who were wanted for 
information, not for prosecution 25,26. The two co-conspirators—one from Israel, one from 
Brazil—were sentenced to 11 years in prison, a term they began to serve in 2005 24. Later 
on, this sentence was reduced to 8 years and in 2007 g was granted ‘conditional liberty’. 
In 2009 he was granted compassionate leave for one month to visit his elderly mother in 
Israel, but did not return to Brazil. He was a fugitive for 4 years, until he was arrested in 
Rome in 2013 by airport police. He was extradited to Brazil in August 2014 27.
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Changes in Israeli law and policies since 2006
In 2006, the Israeli Ministry of Health published a memorandum which instructed public 
healthcare providers not to provide financial coverage for transplants that involve organ 
trafficking [d8]. In the same year, lawmakers amended the Penal Act to include impris-
onment of up to 16 years as punishment for those who ‘traffic in persons for the purpose 
of removing an organ’ [d2-3]. In 2008, the Organ Transplant Act was passed, a law which 
prohibits giving or receiving compensation for an organ and prohibits ‘brokering organ 
transactions’ [d1]. The punishment for ‘brokering organ transactions’ is imprisonment of 
up to 3 years or a fine of 226.000 nis ($61.870). The law does not set a punishment for 
recipients who buy organs as well as for suppliers. In 2010, regulations based on the Organ 
Transplant Act were formulated that put forth a payment by the state as limited compen-
sation and reimbursement for expenses for living donors [d9]. 
Since 2008 there has been a sharp drop in overseas transplants funded by Israeli 
public healthcare providers and private insurance carriers [r,d6-7]. They have only funded 
cases where they were convinced that the organ transplant was legal, for example kidney 
transplants from deceased donors in Riga (Latvia) and Omsk (Russia). These changes in 
Israeli law and policies, as well as the impact of the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ 
Trafficking and Transplant Tourism 28 and of the work of the Declaration of Istanbul 
Custodian Group in combating organ trafficking in various destination countries n, has led 
to a significant drop in the number of Israeli patients undergoing transplants abroad. Thus, 
the annual number of kidney transplants performed abroad decreased from 155 in 2006 to 
35 in 2011 and 43 in 2013 22 [r]. o Concurrently, since 2011 there has been a marked increase p 
in live kidney donations 29. 22% of these are unspecified donors, q most of whom (17%) are 
matched to recipients on the wait list by the charity organization, ‘Matnat Chaim’ 30,31 [r]. r
STATE OF ISRAEL — THE MEDICUS CLINIC CASE
Start of investigation 2011-present
Indictment indictment is forthcoming and concerns 5 Israeli nationals
Fugitive organ broker (Israeli)
Respondents of the study [r] Israeli police officers, office of the state attorney 
(prosecutors and department of international affairs 
representatives), deputy general manager of a health 
insurance company, kidney recipients (including director 
of an organization for dialysis patients and kidney 
recipients), nephrologists
Case material translated court file [d1], amended indictment Kosovo 
[d2], judgment Kosovo [d3], closing statement Kosovo 
[d4], Israeli Organ Transplant Act [d5]
Case study by Frederike Ambagtsheer, Jessica de Jong, Martin Gunnarson, Zvika Orr, Linde van Balen
6-14th October 2013; Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, State of Israel 
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Signals of illegal activities
The Department of International Affairs at the Office of State Attorney, Israel Ministry of 
Jus tice, received a request for international legal assistance (ila) from eulex-Kosovo con-
cerning the involvement of Israeli nationals in illegal organ transplants there. The request 
also identified Israeli nationals who had travelled to Kosovo for the removal and receipt of 
kidneys [r].
Criminal investigation
As a result of the information which was received from eulex in the context of the ila, the 
investigation in Israel started in 2011 and involved subpoenas of documents from hospitals, 
clinics, insurance companies, travel agencies and brokers. Based on information received 
from eulex-Kosovo, the Israeli police discovered that Israeli brokers who had been or-
ganizing illegal transplants in Kosovo, were now buying tickets to a ‘new’ country where 
illegal organ activities are now taking place [r]. The activities in this country are currently 
the focus of the police’s investigation. In May 2012 6 brokers were arrested; 3 of these are 
suspected for recruiting recipients and suppliers for the transplantations in Kosovo [r,d1].
Modus operandi
M (Israeli nationality, born in Turkey) started his activities in 2008 in Israel and was in 
contact with the Turkish transplant surgeon v by email, sms and mobile phone [d1]. M 
performed the financial and logistic arrangements for suppliers and recipients and accom-
panied them from Istanbul to Pristina [d3]. M received the recipients’ money on a bank 
account in Turkey which he wired to v’s bank account [r]. After the search of the Medicus 
Clinic in November 2008, m gave statements to the police and the pre-trial judge. He 
was released from custody on humanitarian grounds [r] on the condition that he return 
to Kosovo if ordered to do so, but then he fled [d1]. M is now the subject of an Interpol 
International Wanted Notice and an indicted co-conspirator on an indictment filed by the 
Prosecutor in the District Court in Pristina [d1-2,r]. S and z were 2 other Israeli brokers who 
accompanied kidney patients in Israel and handled the financial and logistic arrangements 
for their travel to Kosovo. Z accompanied the recipients to Kosovo and assisted them 
during their stay [d3]. S worked inside Israel and started working as a broker because of 
financial problems [r,d1]. 
Two Israeli doctors were suspected of collaborating with the brokers and facilitat-
ing the transplants in Kosovo by performing medical tests on the recipients in Israel [r]. 
Accusations against one doctor were dropped after the police concluded that he didn’t 
know that his letters were used for the illegal transplants. The other doctor (surgeon) 
is alleged to have performed administrative tasks as part of the network [r]. According 
to the police there is an evidentiary basis to indict him and prosecutors intend to file an 
indictment pursuant to a hearing that will be held by the District Attorney’s office. 
Fourteen of the 24 recipients who underwent transplants in Kosovo were of Israeli 
nationality. Four Israeli suppliers were identified whose kidneys were removed for trans-
plantation purposes in Kosovo [d2-3]. s Most recipients met their suppliers in the Medicus 
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clinic or in the plane from Istanbul and were instructed to sign a document that they were 
relatives [r]. Suppliers and recipients recovered in the same room. Suppliers were usually 
discharged before the recipients, without being given medicines or dismissal forms [d2]. 
Recipients that returned to Israel in a bad condition were picked up by ambulances that 
brought them to a hospital where they received immediate care [r]. 
Some recipients used documents provided to them by the Medicus Clinic [d4] to 
make reimbursement claims for their transplant costs at their public healthcare providers 
and private health insurance companies. Some of them received reimbursements for their 
transplant costs but often not for the amounts agreed [r]. Because since May 2008 Israeli 
public healthcare providers and private health insurance companies have ceased funding 
out-of-country transplants which are suspected to be illegal, reimbursement claims were 
denied. This resulted in civil litigation claims where patients attempted to fight the refusal 
in court. Most claims have been denied by the Israeli courts because these transplant ac-
tivities were viewed in light of the new 2008 law [r]. 
Judgment
The brokers are currently the subject of a police investigation. The Israeli police confis-
cated their assets, froze their bank accounts, seized their bank cards and one apartment; 
however, the seized property has since been released due to the prolonged proceedings 
[r]. Prosecutors from the State Attorneys are now writing the indictment [r]. On 23 May 
2012 there was a court session, but the judge extended the arrest until the end of May 2012. 
In June 2012 all suspects were released on bail. At the time of this writing, an indictment 
against the suspects has not yet been filed [d1]. 
The suspects will be charged for trafficking in organs and acting as intermediaries 
with respect to payments between suppliers and recipients [r] under Section 36 of the 
Organ Transplant Act [d5]. The ongoing investigation of the arrested brokers has focused 
on trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal, organ brokerage, fraud, ex-
ploitation, aggravated assault, conspiracy, money laundering and tax transgressions [d1]. 
One of the Israeli transplant doctors may be charged in the upcoming indictment; the oth-
er doctor will not be charged. Neither recipients nor suppliers will be charged. The Organ 
Transplant Act prohibits organ purchase and sale, and contains criminal sanctions against 
all third parties involved in these activities. However, the law does not contain a criminal 
sanction against the organ recipient or supplier for these activities (the explanatory report 
of the 2008 law details that this is due to consideration of the distress and vulnerability of 
the supplier and recipient which led them to the purchase or sale of human organs) [r] 17.
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UNITED STATES — THE ROSENBAUM CASE
Start of investigation 2008
Charges brokering in human organs and conspiracy
Judgment (11th July 2012) Rosenbaum is sentenced to 2,5 years in federal prison
Defendant Levy Izhak Rosenbaum
Respondents of the study [r] assistant us attorney, fbi-agent, defence lawyer
Case material transcript of the sentencing hearing [d1], criminal com-
plaint [d2], pre-sentence memorandum of the defence 
[d3] and charges [d4]
Case study by Jessica de Jong
18-22 March 2013; New York, the United States of America
‘A man portrayed by his lawyers as a good Samaritan pleaded guilty on Thursday 
to organ trafficking in the United States in what the prosecutor said was the 
first conviction under a federal statute banning sales of kidneys by paid donors. 
The man, Levy Izhak Rosenbaum, admitted in federal court that he had brokered 
three illegal kidney transplants for people in New Jersey in exchange for pay-
ments of $120.000 or more. He also pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to 
broker an illegal kidney sale.’ 32
Signals of illegal activities
In 1999 the fbi initiated ‘Operation Bid Rig’: an extensive investigation into corruption of 
several public officials in New Jersey and money laundering in tax evasion within the or-
thodox Jewish community. One of the involved (‘d’) was running a fraudulent investment 
operation in real estate. When his scheme collapsed in 2006, he was arrested and ‘turned 
into’ a fbi informant. D fully committed himself to the operation. In February 2008, he 
suddenly informed the fbi that his wife’s grandfather was purchasing a kidney through an 
organ broker named Levy Izhak Rosenbaum 21 [r]. t
Criminal investigation
In order to collect evidence, d accompanied an undercover fbi-agent to Rosenbaum. She 
was posing as d’s secretary and claimed that her uncle was in need of a kidney transplant 
[d2,r]. Rosenbaum stated his willingness to find a matching supplier for $160.000. During 
several recorded meetings Rosenbaum mentioned that he had been a ‘matchmaker’ for 
10 years and explained that it would be necessary to create a fictitious relationship be-
tween the recipient and supplier, because of the hospitals’ screening processes. He named 
2 recipients who had received a kidney through his services and provided the agent with 
a telephone number at which she could contact one of them as a reference. Rosenbaum 
wanted 50 percent of the money upfront and 50 percent before the transplant. The first 
fbi payment of bank checks totalling $10.000 was credited to the bank account of a chari-
table religious organization in Brooklyn [d2]. In July 2009, Operation Bid Rig resulted in the 
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arrests of 44 people, including Rosenbaum—whom d and the agent had arranged to meet 
on the day of the take down [r].
Modus operandi
It was established in court that Rosenbaum had been brokering in kidneys since at least 
2001, as a defendant’s witness stated that he had received a kidney from a paid supplier in 
that year [d1]. The undercover operation revealed Rosenbaum’s modus operandi. First, he 
would ask the recipient who approached him for help for a blood sample to find a match-
ing ‘donor’ willing to sell a kidney, who typically would be located by his associates in Israel. 
Rosenbaum would arrange for the supplier to travel to and be housed in the United States, 
where he or she was looked after by one of his associates throughout the pre-transplant 
procedures. Rosenbaum would help the patient and the supplier to coordinate a cover 
story to mislead hospital staff into believing that the donation was a purely voluntary act. 
Finally, he would demand full payment by the date of the transplant [d2-4,r].
In Rosenbaum’s early activities, the recipients and suppliers all came from Israel and 
were presented to one and the same hospital in the name of Rosenbaum’s charity. Their 
story was that they wanted to be treated in the United States, because of better facilities 
and the financial support of the Israeli government, who reimbursed medical treatments 
abroad. The suppliers were actually immigrants from Eastern Europe living in Israel. Five 
years later, Rosenbaum’s charity had gone out of business and his method of operation 
seemed to have changed. At this point, the recipients were overwhelmingly Americans 
from the Orthodox Jewish communities of New Jersey and New York. The suppliers that 
were identified were mainly Israelis being brought over from Israel for the surgery. The 
transplants, reimbursed by American insurance companies, were carried out in different 
United States hospitals, u chosen by the recipient. Hence, the police investigation did not 
uncover anything to suggest that the hospitals and specialists were knowingly complicit in 
the commercial transplants [r].
Even though there is no evidence to suggest that the suppliers were threatened, 
subtle psychological ploys were used, such as ‘you are doing a mitzvah’, to make sure they 
went through with the transplant [r]. The only supplier traced by the United States author-
ities testified that he had had second thoughts on the morning of the surgery. However, he 
was told that he was the only match and that the recipient who would receive his kidney 
had only about 3 weeks to live. He was not informed about the risks and impact of the 
surgery and was misinformed about the duration—Rosenbaum’s associate told him the 
surgery would take 10-15 minutes instead of the actual 4-5 hours [d1]. While he received 
the $25.000 he had been promised for his kidney, it was paid in instalments and he had to 
chase Rosenbaum down for the last $5.000 [d1, r].
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Law and charges
On 27 October 2011, Rosenbaum pleaded guilty to 3 counts of violating 42 us Code §274e, 
which provides that it is unlawful ‘to knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any 
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer 
affects interstate commerce’, and to one count of violating 18 us Code §371, which refers 
to the conspiracy involving his incriminating activities during the undercover operation. As 
a result, Rosenbaum needed to forfeit $420.000—the sum of the amounts that he received 
from the 3 recipients ($120.000, $140.000 and $150.000) and the partial down payment of 
the fbi ($10.000). The authorities were not seeking to charge the recipients or the suppli-
ers: ‘Obviously the recipients were under the distress of being in bad health and needing 
a kidney transplant. The donors, our view was that by and large, if they were desperate 
enough to sell their kidney for $25.000, there was a certain level of economic distress that 
they were under to do this, especially if they were willing to […] come to a country that 
they were unfamiliar with.’ [r] To make it look as if Rosenbaum had actually spent the min-
imal amount of $120.000 on the suppliers, the defence made very specific claims about the 
expenses that he had incurred in finding the suppliers, bringing them to the United States 
and housing them. v But through one supplier’s testimony the prosecutor demonstrated 
that most of the expenses claimed by the defence had not really been incurred on the 
supplier’s behalf [d1]. 
The authorities were not able to identify any of Rosenbaum’s recruiters or pin down 
the number of transplants that Rosenbaum had orchestrated and how much he benefited. 
The criminal charges were limited to the undercover scheme and the 3 transplantations 
involving New Jersey recipients between 2006 and 2009. This was due in large part to the 
statute of limitations, which reaches back only 5 years under the United States law, and the 
fact that the local prosecutor could only charge violations of federal law that have some 
connection to New Jersey [r]. However, the profit margin that Rosenbaum received sug-
gested that his profit must have been millions of dollars over the years [d1,r]. Rosenbaum 
had purchased millions of dollars in real estate in the 2000-2006 period and although he 
disputed that he had bought the properties with ‘kidney money’, the authorities did not 
see any other substantial source of income. Because the prosecution had not located any 
supplier at the time Rosenbaum pleaded guilty, he could not be charged for human traf-
ficking. Eventually one supplier was located about 2 weeks before the sentencing, which 
was initially scheduled in May 2011 but then got pushed back to July 2011. According to the 
prosecutor, coercion was not evident from this supplier’s statement, so it would still have 
been very hard to prove human trafficking [r].
Judgment
As the sentencing guidelines contain no provision applicable for the violation of 42 usc 
§274e, the judge determined under the factors of 18 usc §3553 w an imprisonment of 30 
months. Rosenbaum did not appeal the sentence of the District Court.
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CONCLUSION
With this study, the researchers collected data that would have been difficult if not impos-
sible to collect through desk research. Because of this, the authors were able to fill gaps 
that were highlighted in this project’s literature review 1. The underlying study’s purpose 
was to contribute to gaps concerning: 
a  the actors and their modus operandi of contemporary organ trafficking networks 
b  the experiences of police and prosecution in disrupting and prosecuting the persons 
  involved in these networks. 
The modus operandi of contemporary organ trafficking networks
Although respondents used different legal terms to describe the degree of organization of 
the organ trafficking networks—for example, the scheme in South Africa was described 
as a ‘syndicate’ and the network in Kosovo as a ‘criminal enterprise’—this study illustrates 
that these networks are fluid, with a high degree of organization. This corresponds to the 
literature, in which trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ removal (thbor) 
is often said to require globally active, extensive and highly organized networks 1. 
Initially, the networks operated with limited risk of investigation and prosecution. 
They could continue with their activities despite the presence of (clear) signals for author-
ities. In South Africa for instance, the network could go on because local hospital staff 
was complicit or was told that donations were altruistic, voluntary and related. In Kosovo 
the illegal transplants could be carried out under a false license issued by the Ministry of 
Health. In the usa activities were successful because persons (including recipients and sup-
pliers) misled hospital staff into believing that the donations were voluntary and altruistic. 
The actors were sophisticated in their selection of countries. The reasons why they 
organized their activities in these countries were because of legal loopholes in South Africa 
and Israel at the time when the activities took place, the post-war legal ‘vacuum’ and a 
high level of corruption in Kosovo, and a complicit hospital/clinic and staff in Kosovo and 
South Africa. An important contributing factor in the Netcare and Rosenbaum case was 
that until May 2008 Israeli recipients could be legally reimbursed for their overseas trans-
plant costs by their health insurance companies. Because recipients and suppliers travelled 
from different countries across the world, it was difficult for police and prosecution to 
identify the activities and to establish that the transplants were illegal.
The actors also used sophisticated means to recruit suppliers and recipients. The 
suppliers were carefully selected, based on their dismal economic situation (poverty) and 
vulnerability. Brokers recruited the suppliers from abroad and made sure that suppliers 
approached them by posting ads in the newspaper for example, rather than actively ap-
proaching suppliers themselves. This ‘passive recruitment’ made it more difficult for police 
and prosecution to prove thbor and to declare the suppliers ‘trafficked persons’. By trans-
porting recipients and suppliers via Istanbul and conducting the medical tests there, the 
network in Kosovo was able to cover part of its activities. In South Africa and the usa, re-
cipients and suppliers made efforts to hide the illegality of their transplants and donations 
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from hospital staff. The transplants in the usa were reported to have been performed in 
various hospitals. No evidence was found that hospitals and doctors were complicit. This 
made it more difficult for police and prosecution to trace the recipients and suppliers. 
After recruiting the suppliers however, more coercive and deceptive elements came 
into play. Brokers manipulated the suppliers to ensure that they would not ‘drop out’. In 
Kosovo, kidney donations were presented as a routine medical procedure without risk. 
Suppliers were given virtually no time to make a ‘voluntary decision to donate’. In Kosovo 
and South Africa suppliers were given consent forms that were fraudulent and/or written 
in a language that they did not understand and that stated that they donated for altruistic 
reasons to a relative. The majority of the suppliers who were brought to Kosovo were given 
less compensation than agreed (if anything at all) and were informed they would receive 
remaining compensations on the condition that they would find new suppliers. This way, 
the Kosovo network was able to maintain a consistent, international flow of suppliers. 
The suppliers’ testimonies in Kosovo were ‘fully sufficient’ for the court to conclude that 
thbor, organized crime and grievous bodily harm were committed. In the usa, although 
‘subtle psychological ploys’ were used upon the supplier, these were not proven to be 
sufficiently coercive or abusive to charge thbor. 
The successes and obstacles of police and prosecution
The experiences of police and prosecution differed greatly across countries. The level of 
success of each case depended on the availability of evidence, the dedication of police 
and prosecution and the existing legal frameworks. In South Africa, police and prosecution 
struggled from the very start with outdated laws against organ trade, which led them to 
apply charges of a different nature. Because the country lacked an anti-thb law at the 
time, no charges for thbor or other serious crimes could be made. Although this country 
is the first country to have reached a guilty plea from a hospital for its involvement in organ 
trade activities, its proceedings against the accused surgeons and transplant coordinators 
lasted relatively long (9 years). Police and prosecution in the end did not succeed in getting 
the most important figures—namely the transplant surgeons, transplant coordinators and 
the head of the network, an Israeli organ broker—convicted for their alleged involvement 
in arranging and performing the illegal transplants. Convictions involved relatively low 
penalties (fines, and no prison sentences). A major obstacle according to police and pros-
ecutors was the long time it took to establish international legal collaboration with Israel. 
The case in Kosovo, by contrast, involved the most severe sentences and the largest 
group of transplant doctors that has been convicted until now. This country is the first to 
have prosecuted transplant doctors as a criminal group involved in thbor. Because the 
group operated relatively ‘openly’ under the issuance of a false license, evidence could be 
collected that included the anesthesiology logs of the transplants. These logs were—to-
gether with the recipient and supplier testimonies—the most important piece of evidence. 
Furthermore, according to the prosecution, the defense of the case was ‘extremely poor’. 
A large obstacle is the fact that 2 accused (v and m), who are the subjects of an Interpol 
Wanted Notice and who are seen as ‘the most important figures in the criminal scheme’, 
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have until now not been locked up. x In addition, non-recognition of Kosovo by a number 
of states obstructed international legal collaboration which hampered the issuance of evi-
dence. Other hurdles included an ‘extremely challenging’ trial process. 
The involvement of its nationals in Kosovo and South Africa led to a number of 
arrests in Israel. The head of the Israeli network in South Africa was arrested for tax eva-
sion, but has not received a sentence for illegal organ trading. In addition, 6 organ brokers 
(of which 3 were active in Kosovo) were arrested. However, until now they have not been 
indicted for their involvement in the transplants in Kosovo 33. Because of a lack of evidence 
of thbor, these brokers will be charged for organ brokering/trading (3 years prison maxi-
mum) and not for thbor. It is not known when the indictment will be issued. 
Similarly in the usa, lack of evidence could not substantiate charges which included 
thbor. Only one supplier could be found on whom subtle psychological ploys had been 
used, but explicit coercion could not be proven. Furthermore, police and prosecution did 
not manage to identify the actual number of transplants that were performed, as well as 
the total financial benefits that were gained. 
Tip of the iceberg
This report illustrates that prosecutions in South Africa, Kosovo, usa and Israel were suc-
cessful but leave room for improvement. First of all, prosecutions could have been more 
successful if the appropriate laws would have been in place at the time when the activities 
took place. Second, investigations and prosecutions could have been initiated earlier if 
available signals were identified and picked up already at an early stage and if internation-
al collaboration would have occurred sooner. Recent media reports from Sri Lanka y and 
Costa Rica 34 suggest that Israeli brokers, known to authorities, have relocated their activi-
ties. Meanwhile, a report from the osce 2, new research and recent reports from countries 
including China 4 and Turkey 35 illustrate that the organ trafficking networks presented in 
this report are only the tip of the iceberg. The global organ trade is not confined to the 
regions and countries presented here. 
Further steps z
This study demonstrates the need for:
—  prioritizing prosecution of those who facilitate and conduct illegal transplants, even 
if not all of the thbor elements are fulfilled;
—  enhancing and improving international collaboration in cross-border organ traffick-
ing cases; 
—  formulating indicators for police and other authorities to identify thbor;
—  raising awareness of thbor, in particular amongst law enforcement authorities;
—  concerted action between law enforcement and professional transplant/health 
organizations.
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NOTES
a Chapter 1.5.3. of the literature review presents the terms 
used throughout this report.
b According to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, there were simul-
taneously whistle-blowers reporting the crime in Brazil. These 
were kidney suppliers who went to the Federal Police in Recife 
claiming that they had been cheated and exploited 15.
c A permanent stay of prosecution is a ruling by the court 
in civil and criminal procedure, halting further legal process in 
a trial.
d According to the project adviser, Sergio D’Orsi, unmik had 
executive functions over a number of Units of the kp at the time 
of the investigation. The result of subsequent investigations 
conducted in this phase (including covert measures on the 
phones used by the suspects), resulted also in the identification, 
tracing and arrest of the broker m by hand of the unmik 
investigators after having collected evidence on his involvement 
in the illegal transplant affecting the supplier a and the receiver 
s. The broker m was traced and located in Pristina while he was 
ready to leave Kosovo;
e Following the Kosovo War (1998-1999) a mandate of the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(unmik) was established by the un Security Council (1999). This 
mandate required the un to take over the administration and 
political process in Kosovo. Kosovo declared independence on 
17 February 2008 and it has been recognized by more than 100 
un Member States since. In 2008 the un Secretary-General 
instructed the Head of unmik to facilitate European Union 
preparations to undertake an enhanced operational role in 
Kosovo in the rule of law area. Following this, the European 
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (eulex) deployed 
throughout Kosovo on 9 December 2008. Its mandate runs until 
June 2014. The Medicus case proceedings took place under the 
auspices of eulex.
f Section 46(d) of the Kosovo Health Law declares that 
(private) organ transplantations are forbidden. The reasons for 
this prohibition are because the medical and legal infrastruc-
ture is not in place, the government’s health budget is small, 
there is insufficient expertise, a lack of standards and medical 
oversight, as well as the absence of a national center to oversee 
transplants.
g In April 2013 eulex confirmed that it was launching a new 
investigation (Medicus 2.0) into people suspected of involve-
ment in the organ-trading ring that operated from the Medicus 
clinic. The 8 individuals are being investigated for the criminal 
offences of organized crime, trafficking in persons, grievous 
bodily harm, abusing official position of authority, fraud and 
trading in influence. The statement said that the new inquiry 
was based on revelations arising from investigations and from 
information that came out at the trial which suggested that the 
men who were convicted had help from others in order to traffic 
victims and sell their organs. 
h As of 2007 a number of legal actions were taken against 
organ traffickers in Israel that ended in convictions. Two organ 
brokers were sentenced to prison for the crime of trafficking 
in persons for the purpose of organ removal and for causing 
severe personal injury, exploitation, receipt of goods under false 
pretenses, and imitating a physician (or being an accomplice in 
these offenses). Another broker was given a prison sentence 
for brokering organ transactions and for exploitation, receipt 
of goods under false pretenses, making threats, extortion using 
threats, and other offenses. Six additional organ brokers (in 
2 cases) were given suspended sentences and/or community 
service, and were ordered to pay financial compensation to 
the complainants or a fine [d4-5] (Orr, 2014; Sperling, 2014). In 
August 2014 five organ brokers were indicted and in September 
2014 the court ruled to extend their arrest until proceedings are 
completed. A judgment has not yet been decreed on this case.
i The original international trafficking network began in 
the 1990s between Israel and Turkey, and later expanded to 
Moldova. According to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, the establish-
ment of this network followed Ministry of Health investigations 
(The Cotev Commission) that interrupted the recruitment of 
kidney sellers from the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the 
1990s. In the same years, Palestinian patients from the Occupied 
Territories as well as Palestinian citizens of Israel travelled to 
Iraq for purchased kidneys 15,19,20. 
j The amount of public funding varied with healthcare pro-
viders, the time and location of the transplant. One healthcare 
provider refunded a fixed rate of $70.000 to those with its 
‘complementary insurance’ (this applied to most of the insured). 
Another healthcare provider paid out the equivalent of drg-rate 
of a kidney transplant in Israel, that varied from $37.000 in the 
years 1993-1994 up to $50.000-$55.000 in 2006-2007. As a con-
dition for receiving a refund, some of the healthcare providers 
demanded that the insured present receipts, while others did 
not make this demand (since they assumed they would be 
forged, in any case), and in lieu accepted an Israeli physician’s 
statement that a transplant had indeed been performed [r,d5]. 
k For example, Nancy Scheper-Hughes found that Israeli 
patients raised ‘the money required through a publicity 
campaign aided by a “charitable” organization, Kav LaChayim, 
“United Lifeline”, that has been accused of money laundering 
activities in the us and Israel’ 19. According to Scheper-Hughes, 
this organization was one of the most essential components of 
support of international transplants for Israelis 21.
l Preliminary unpublished results of a survey conducted by 
Ofra Greenberg on the topic ‘public opinion in Israel towards 
commercial organ transplants,’ personal communication with 
Ofra Greenberg, May 30, 2014
m In August 2013 another organ trafficker and his company, 
were indicted for tax evasion of 118.000.000 nis ($32.187.000 
at the exchange rate then) on income received from organ 
trafficking between 1999-2007. Of this, some 47.300.000 nis 
($12.900.000 at the exchange rate then) were received from 
the Israel Ministry of Defense, and the remainder from private 
clients [d4]. A judgment has not yet been decreed on this case. 
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n http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/governance/dicg
o These figures, based on the national dialysis registry, 
do not in clude transplants of pre-dialysis patients that are 
performed abroad [r]. 
p From 56-71 living kidney donors annually in 2007-2010 to 
117 living kidney donors in 2011, 108 in 2012, and 134 in 2013 29.
q Unspecified donation is donation to an anonymous 
recipient without a genetic or emotional relationship 30.
r According to the National Transplant Center 29, 30 of the 
134 living kidney donors in 2013 were altruistic unrelated donors. 
This phenomenon is spearheaded by the Israeli charity, ‘Matnat 
Chaim’ (www.kilya.org.il/en/) which matches altruistic donors 
with kidney patients on a voluntary, not-for-profit basis [r] 31.
s See also ‘Republic of Kosovo—The Medicus Clinic Case’
t During the sentencing hearing, the assistant us attorney 
refers to a would-be whistle-blower who contacted Organs 
Watch back in 2002 by e-mail about Rosenbaum’s illegal 
business [d1]. The attempts of the director of Organs Watch, 
Professor Nancy Scheper-Hughes, to alert the authorities failed: 
‘I was told that the information lacked credibility.’ 21
u According to the prosecutor, transplants were taking place 
in hospitals in Minnesota, Maryland, Pennsylvania and possibly 
Massachusetts and New York [r].
v According to 42 u.s.c. §274e, at that time ‘valuable con-
sideration’ doesn’t include the reasonable payments associated 
with the removal, transportation, implantation, expenses of 
travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the supplier.
w In determining the particular sentence to be imposed, 
the court shall consider the following factors: 1) nature and 
circumstances of the offence and history and characteristics of 
the defendant, 2) the need for the sentence imposed—to reflect 
the seriousness of the offence, to promote respect for the law, 
to provide just punishment for the offence, to afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant, to provide the defendant with 
needed […] correctional treatment in the most effective manner, 
and 3) the kinds of sentences available.
x Though neither have been extradited to Kosovo, both were 
investigated in their home countries related to the Medicus 
Clinic. M is expected to be indicted in Israel for these same 
charges, pursuant to information provided by authorities in 
Kosovo [r].
y The brokers related to Sri Lanka were questioned as 
suspects and are expected to be indicted in Israel. 
z  Indicators and recommendations will be written and 
published under the auspices of the hott project in 2015.
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INTRODUCTION
The trade in human organs is considered a major international concern. In 2007 the World 
Health Organization (who) estimated that approximately 6000 kidney transplants are 
performed illegally each year 1. More recently, the Council of Europe declared that organ 
trade constitutes a ‘major threat to public health’ and that it is growing worldwide due to 
the ‘greed of unscrupulous traffickers’ 3. 
The organ trade consists of different practices, nominally defined in the literature 
as ‘organ trafficking’ 4, ‘trafficking in persons for organ removal’ 6, ‘organ sales’ 7, ‘transplant 
commercialism’ 8 and ‘transplant tourism’ 9. Although there can be some overlap between 
these practices, the official and popular discourse predominantly applies the term, ‘organ 
trafficking’ without distinction as to the variable aspects involved. As a result, the organ 
trade as a whole is presented as a serious organized crime that can only be tackled by a 
punitive response 3,4,10,11. This approach however, as we will explain below, is potentially 
counterproductive. Before discussing the possible implications and offering suggestions to 
improve the response, we first describe the origin of the organ trafficking discourse and 
address the conflation of organ trafficking with trade. 
THE ORIGIN OF THE ORGAN TRAFFICKING DISCOURSE
The who first condemned organ trade in its 1987 World Health Assembly Resolution 14. 
Organ trade became associated with trafficking in the 2000 United Nations Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (henceforth, the Trafficking Protocol). 
The Trafficking Protocol presents a definition of what is generally referred to as ‘trafficking 
in persons for the purpose of organ removal’: 
‘“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the removal 
of organs’ 15.
When the phrase, ‘the removal of organs’, was introduced, there was little empirical data 
or case law demonstrating that criminal networks were involved in trafficking persons 
for their organs 6. Thus, the concept was introduced despite it not being well studied, 
discussed or defined 17. Nevertheless, the definition has been reaffirmed by other legal 
instruments and is now prohibited worldwide 18-20. 
The definition in the Trafficking Protocol only extends to ‘trafficking in persons’. It 
does not cover the sale or purchase of organs. 
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Notably, this definition is the only legally accepted definition of ‘trafficking’, or more spe-
cifically, ‘trafficking in persons’. Although in the popular discourse trafficking is occasionally 
associated with other forbidden activities such as ‘drug trafficking’ and ‘arms trafficking’, 
these activities are connected to an illicit trade. Trafficking on the other hand, is legally 
associated with exploiting persons for various purposes through different means. Hence, 
when one speaks about ‘organ trafficking’ the distinction between what is considered ‘traf-
ficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal’ and ‘trafficking of organs’, independent 
of the body, is not clear. Below we discuss the implications of conflating organ trafficking 
with trade. 
CONFLATING ORGAN TRAFFICKING WITH TRADE 
Attempts after the Trafficking Protocol to establish universal principles in organ trans-
plantation have added confusion to the conceptualization of organ trade. The explanatory 
report to the 2006 Additional Protocol on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues that 
supplements the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine for 
example declares that ‘Organ trafficking […] are important examples of such illegal trading 
and of direct financial gain’ 21. 
The conflation of trafficking with trade or commercialism is also demonstrated in 
the 2008 Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism (henceforth, 
the Declaration of Istanbul). Adopting the terminology from the Trafficking Protocol and 
adding new vocabulary, the Declaration of Istanbul presents a rather broad definition of 
organ trafficking: 
‘Organ trafficking is the recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of 
living or deceased persons or their organs by means of the threat or use of force 
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving to, or the receiving by, a 
third party of payments or benefits to achieve the transfer of control over the 
potential donor, for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of organs for 
transplantation’ 22.
The most recent convention, the 2014 Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in 
Human Organs (henceforth, the Council of Europe Convention), calls for a similarly broad 
prohibition of commercial dealings in organs. It defines ‘trafficking in organs’ as the ‘illicit 
removal of human organs’ 12. Accordingly, even sales that occur with the consent of donors 
are considered to be ‘trafficking’, regardless of the circumstances involved. 
The conflation of trafficking with trade is premised on the assumption that organ 
sales only involve organs that are harvested from trafficked persons 23-25. Therefore, it 
would be immoral to permit the commercial exchange of organs. The reasoning is that 
organ donation should occur altruistically as this would rule out financial motivation for 
organ donation, hence, protecting vulnerable individuals from exploitation. 
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The issue with this line of reasoning however is that it lacks an empirical and normative 
foundation 26-28. Arguments against an all-encompassing prohibition of organ sales have 
been presented by scholars worldwide 26,27,30-32. Hence, we will not reiterate these argu-
ments here. Instead, we address the emerging body of empirical research which demon-
strates that trade does not always constitute trafficking. 
EVIDENCE-BASED RESEARCH ON  
TRAFFICKING AND COMMERCIALISM
The claim that organ trade is (or leads to) human trafficking is not supported by the ma-
jority of empirical studies that position organ sellers as ‘victims of trafficking’ 33-36. While a 
number of studies reveal the financial difficulties that lead vulnerable people into selling 
their organs and the negative consequences that follow 33,37,38, there is little or no informa-
tion to suggest that these cases involve (all elements of) human trafficking 39,40. Rather, 
these studies show that the experiences and outcomes of organs sellers/selling can vary 
extensively 39-41. Yea, who interviewed organ sellers in a slum in The Philippines notes that 
‘trafficking is generally assumed rather than rigorously established’ 39. She points out that 
organ sellers present ‘degrees of trafficking’ as many prospective sellers actively seek out 
brokers 39. Recruiters or brokers are sometimes reported to be the neighbors, relatives or 
friends of organ sellers 39,42. Moreover, some sellers subsequently become brokers them-
selves 6. Though some authors present incidents where victims report to have been (phys-
ically) harmed by brokers and patients, these findings appear to be the exception rather 
than the norm 26,46,48. 
Research amongst other participants in the trade is scarce and poorly-developed, 
in particular research amongst patients, brokers and transplant professionals. For instance, 
only five studies describe why and how patients buy organs 43-47. Also, relatively few or-
gan trade cases appear at the judicial level. In the absence of a larger number of criminal 
investigations and case law research, much remains unknown about the organization of 
the ‘mafia-like’ organ trafficking networks that are reported to dominate the organ trade 
arena 3,6,10,50. 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLATION AND  
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY 
The Council of Europe Convention encourages states to introduce new punitive mea-
sures against all commercial dealings in organs or to strengthen existing ones, regardless 
of whether or not trafficking in persons has occurred 51. Because it does not distinguish 
between organ sales and trafficking in persons, the situation then arises that unless an 
organ seller is considered a victim of trafficking, he or she can be held criminally liable. As 
a result, individuals who have sold an organ may be reluctant to come forward and report 
instances of abuse to authorities when such violations that would amount to ‘trafficking 
in persons’ have actually occurred. Furthermore, extending liability to organ sellers may 
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push the trade further underground and expose them to greater harm 53. Indeed, we have 
found that the reluctance of both sellers and buyers to provide information and to testify 
in criminal cases is one of the reported difficulties of police and prosecutors in attempting 
to successfully prosecute cases involving trafficking in persons for organ removal 48,49. 
Although criminal prosecution is important insofar as it represents society’s intoler-
ance for particular crimes and may act as a deterrent for future offences, punishment does 
little to alleviate the conditions that produce crime. This equally applies to organ trade 54. 
Furthermore, taking into account the poor non-legislative response to even the most ex-
ploitative form of organ trade, a punitive response against all commercial dealings in organs 
may place an unrealistic burden on the criminal justice system. Law enforcers’ decisions 
over which activities to prioritize are often based on chances of securing successful convic-
tions. Prohibition may not then always be accompanied by rigorous enforcement when the 
police face both the challenges of international investigations and difficulties in proving 
that an organ was illegally bought 55. Already in its 1980 Report on Decriminalization, the 
Council of Europe acknowledged that the social costs of criminalizing some activities can 
outweigh the benefits. 56. Thus, it may be more effective to bring only the trafficking in 
persons offences into the realm of the criminal justice system. Less harmful cases (for 
instance organ sales and purchases not involving traffickers or other middlemen) could 
perhaps better be approached through alternative policies, which we discuss below. 
IMPROVING THE RESPONSE TO ORGAN TRADE
To improve the response to organ trade, the international (transplant) community may wish 
to change its approach. First, organizations such as the Council of Europe, the who and 
the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group may wish to clarify the distinction between 
transplant commercialism and trafficking in persons. Their instruments should explain that 
purchasing or selling an organ for material or financial gain is not the same as trafficking a 
person for his or her organs. 
Second, the Council of Europe Convention could consider including a provision 
which explicitly states that organ sellers will not be considered complicit in any criminal 
offence(s) involving the sale of an organ. From a law enforcement perspective, resources 
would be better served by targeting the brokers, recruiters and intermediaries, as well as 
the transplant centers and staff that perform illegal transplants 57.
Relatedly, it should be recognised that the exploitation that organ sellers experi-
ence cannot be reduced to a singular criminal act. Organ sellers are invariably exploited, 
insofar as their economic position is taken advantage of. As a consequence of their poor 
bargaining position organ sellers stand to gain significantly less from a commercial kidney 
exchange than the intermediaries who facilitate the trade. Yet under current legislation 
their exploitation is only recognised in the context of trafficking in persons. As the empir-
ical body of research suggests, the reasons why people are compelled to sell an organ ex-
tend beyond the narrow parameters of trafficking legislation. Efforts aimed at reducing the 
level of exploitation of organ sellers necessitate measures that look beyond the boundaries 
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of criminal intervention, taking into consideration the wider political, social, cultural and 
economic factors that leave people vulnerable to exploitation of various kinds. 
Third, the international (transplant) community could offer guidance to govern-
ments in addressing other aspects of the organ trade (i.e. commercialism). Countries differ 
in their local, cultural and socio-political circumstances which can inhibit the adoption of 
a ‘one size fits all’ punitive response imposed through a Western design 58. Examples of al-
ternative, harm-reductionist strategies could involve not only the removal of punishments 
for sellers, but also of buyers and whistle-blowers, and enhancing their protection. This, 
in turn, may have the added benefit of potentially increasing their willingness to testify in 
criminal cases against trafficking networks. 
Finally, the relatively low number of convictions involving trafficking in persons for 
organ removal suggests that a stronger non-legislative response to those who exploit vul-
nerable sellers and buyers is warranted. Organizations such as the Council of Europe and 
United Nations could encourage national law enforcement agencies to prioritize prosecu-
tion of international organ trafficking networks and facilitate more effective cross-border 
collaborations to detect and prosecute the crime 59. 
In conclusion, more and stricter laws against the organ trade are unlikely to elimi-
nate this practice, and may even be potentially counterproductive. Rather, the internation-
al (transplant) community needs to reconsider its approach to organ trade by separating 
trade from trafficking and introducing harm-reductionist policies. 
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The Declaration of Istanbul is the first document that has been established by the 
international transplant community that defines and prohibits transplant commer-
cialism and organ trafficking. Its Custodian Group has successfully led various coun-
tries to implement legislation against trafficking and commercialism. The question 
arises, however, whether efforts to prohibit organ trade are realistic and effective. 
The Declaration differentiates trafficking from commercialism, yet it does not men-
tion how both acts should be approached by policy. Policies that address transplant 
commercialism work differently from policies that tackle organ trafficking. There is 
considerable room for improvement in the current prohibitive approach to commer-
cialism and organ trafficking. The Custodian Group and World Health Organization 
(who) should address commercialism by encouraging the expansion of living donation 
in the same manner as they encourage deceased donation. Furthermore, the Custodian 
Group and the who can improve their strategy to combat organ trafficking by rais-
ing awareness for enforcement. To achieve a consistent and effective prohibition of 
trafficking, legislation and law enforcement must go hand in hand. Ideally, this can 
best be achieved by close collaboration between the medical field and (international) 
criminal justice agencies.
INTRODUCTION
The Declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism (hereafter 
Declaration) is the first document, drawn up by the international transplant community 
that defines and condemns transplant commercialism, organ trafficking and transplant 
tourism. Its primary aim is to inform, inspire and promote ethical practices in organ do-
nation and transplantation around the world 1. Building on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and World Health Assembly Resolution 57.18, it aspires to achieve this aim 
by endorsing prohibition of transplant commercialism, tourism and trafficking of organs 
and penalization of those that aid or encourage it. The Declaration’s custodian group and 
four task forces have been established to implement and monitor its effects.
The Declaration, by nature nonbinding, has proven to have significant influence. 
Over 100 transplant organizations endorse its principles. Countries including China, Israel, 
The Philippines and Pakistan have passed new legislation or strengthened existing laws 
that ban organ trafficking and organ sales.
This acclaimed success is for a large part because of the World Health Organization 
(who) and its Guiding Principles on human cell, tissue and organ transplantation 2; here-
after Guiding Principles). Whereas the Declaration is intended to influence transplant pro-
fessionals and societies, the who intends to influence governments. Both act in concert to 
address growing problems of transplant commercialism, transplant tourism and trafficking 
by strict prohibition and penalization.
The prohibitionist discourse in the Guiding Principles and Declaration, however, has 
a predominant focus on prohibition (through legislation) of commercialism and trafficking, 
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but the importance of enforcement of the crime is neglected. Furthermore, there is a dis-
comforting lack of criminological and legal expertise about what exactly we are trying 
to prevent by prohibition. Commercialism and trafficking are presented as being equally 
problematic crimes. However, coercion and exploitation of donors (trafficking) differs from 
the sale and purchase of organs (commercialism). Both acts warrant a different policy ap-
proach. The Declaration’s Custodian Group and the who, in their discourse on prohibition, 
do not take account of this distinction. They can improve their strategy to prevent and 
deter commercialism and trafficking in a number of ways. In the following paragraphs we 
explain why and how.
WHY ORGAN TRADE IS  PROHIBITED
The who first declared the prohibition of organ trade in 1987, affirming that such trade is 
inconsistent with the most basic human values and contravenes the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. The who Guiding Principles state the reason why organ sales are pro-
hibited. The commentary to principle five states: ‘Payment for […] organs is likely to take 
unfair advantage of the poorest and most vulnerable groups, undermines altruistic dona-
tion and leads to profiteering and human trafficking. Such payment conveys the idea that 
some persons lack dignity, that they are mere objects to be used by others’ 2.
The organ trade prohibition must be seen in context of when it was formed: at a 
time when there was no shortage of organs and organ trade and trafficking offences barely 
occurred. Back then, the prohibition was successful in its aim to prevent trade and traf-
ficking, simply because the root cause of the crime (organ shortage) was not as rampant 
as it is now. The prohibition worked, not only as a preventative mechanism, but also as a 
universal norm that organs were not to be used commercially. Almost every single country 
endorses the noncommerciality principle in organ transplantation and has implemented it 
into their national laws.
Since the 1990s, however, transplantation has become a victim of its own success, 
with demand for organs far outpacing their supply. Organs have become more valuable 
and profitable to sell. This leads to black markets that involve various actors who increas-
ingly make use of organs’ high profitability.
THE GLOBAL,  ILL ICIT FLOW IN ORGANS
Together with drugs, humans, arms, diamonds, gold and oil, organs are becoming the sub-
ject of an illegal multibillion-dollar industry. A recent report by Global Financial Integrity 
estimates that the illicit organ trade generates illegal profits between $600 million and 
$1.2 billion per year. It ranks the trade in human organs on number 10 of the illegal activ-
ities studied in terms of illegal profits made 3. The report further states that profits from 
these illicit markets are making their way to transnational crime syndicates through vast 
international trade networks. These networks take advantage of globalization and new 
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communication and transportation technologies. Key to the growth and success of global 
criminal networks is their flexibility and versatility, which have expanded their activities 
to a wide diversity of legal and illegal fields 4. Many of these networks are successfully 
integrated in legal structures and institutions 5.
Indeed, an increasing number of organ trafficking rings are globally active that 
involve actors who operate in different countries from where recipients and donors are 
recruited. Organ trafficking accounts come from all over the world, including Egypt, India, 
South Africa, The Philippines, Israel, Colombia, the Balkan Region, Turkey and Eastern 
Europe 6-12. A growing number of countries, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Macedonia and Canada 13-16 report on patients leaving to well-known organ ex-
porting countries who allegedly buy organs on the black market.
Only in very few cases have crime control efforts led to accusations by victims and 
prosecutions of the accused. Indeed, organ trafficking may be one of the most difficult 
crimes to detect. Moreover, its enforcement is not a priority of local, national and interna-
tional law enforcement institutions. The universal response to the crime is characterized 
by punitive condemnation through legislation but awareness and expertise on how to de-
tect and enforce the crime is practically nonexistent.
PROHIBITION OF DEMAND-DRIVEN CRIMES  
MAY HERALD S IGNIF ICANT RISKS
Prohibition of demand-driven crimes is not new to the field of criminology. For centuries, 
countries have been struggling to control criminalized, demand-driven activities often 
with limited effect 17. Disregarding evidence that crime does not readily respond to severe 
sentencing, legislatures have over the years repeatedly adopted a punitive ‘law and order’ 
stance. David Garland describes this ambivalent response as a form of acting out, which 
is to say that legislatures engage in a form of impulsive and unreflective action, avoiding 
realistic recognition of underlying problems 18. The reasons behind these repressive poli-
cies are often political: they are motivated by politically urgent needs to ‘do something’ 
decisive about crime, restore public confidence, illustrate good intention and demonstrate 
state control. These policies are seldom evidence-based, are not aimed at removing the 
root cause of crimes and do not acknowledge the risks that may arise 17-18.
A wealth of studies illustrates the resilience of demand-driven activities such as 
drug use, gambling, alcohol consumption and prostitution to prohibition 17. These studies 
also highlight how harms associated with these demand-driven crimes including violence, 
disorder and corruption are, in fact, caused by their prohibition 17,19-20. These studies show 
how prohibition generates black markets, drives up prices, provides illegal incomes, displac-
es crime to other regions and drives trade underground leading to higher crime rates and 
victimization 20. One illustration is the ‘war on drugs’. A recent report by the International 
Centre for Science in Drug Policy argues that enforced drug control in the United State led 
to unintended, harmful consequences 21. Efforts in the United State to suppress the sale 
167
and use of cannabis have substantially increased in the last years. The costs for stronger 
enforcement rose from $1.5 billion in 1981 to more than $18 billion in 2002.
The report’s authors claim that despite increased repression rates of violence, or-
ganized crime, the availability of illegal cannabis and the number of users substantially 
increased 22. These conclusions on the failures of the system are in line with reviews of 
evidence from a global perspective. The authors advise alternatives to prohibition, such 
as decriminalization and regulation. Indeed, evaluation of more liberal drug and prostitu-
tions policies involving a harm-reduction approach in countries such as The Netherlands 
have shown that the social harms within regulated markets are lower than in prohibited 
markets 17.
Despite substantial differences in nature between demand-driven crimes includ-
ing the organ trade, drug trade and prostitution, the ways in which most states attempt 
to control them are similar. Unintended implications that may arise from prohibition of 
crimes such as the drug trade may be equally relevant and applicable to organ trade. First, 
prohibition of organ trade and drug trade has the similar effect of making them more 
worth and, thus, more profitable 3. Second, arguments often made in favor of regulating 
the drug and organ trade share the view that legalization is likely to reduce social harms 
inflicted upon vulnerable groups 17,25.
We believe that the risks known to arise despite or as a result of prohibition of 
demand-driven crimes should be taken seriously. The evidence that organ trade occurs 
despite its prohibition warrants a careful, critical and realistic approach by the who, the 
Custodian Group and others who prohibit or encourage its criminalization.
The who and Declaration in our view take little account of the possible implications 
that prohibition of organ trade may herald. Their response to organ trade and trafficking 
has little to no recognition for the limits of crime control and limited acceptance of explor-
ing alternative polices that possibly herald less harmful effects. Rather, their belief seems 
to be that prohibition will take away the problem and decrease illegal activity. The passing 
of legislation against organ trade and trafficking is proudly announced and expected to be 
followed by successful tackling of the problem 23. Such announcements, in our opinion, are 
potentially misleading. One example of ineffective prohibition occurs in Pakistan that as a 
result of the Declaration lobby, passed an ordinance in 2008 prohibiting foreign patients 
from purchasing transplants there. Despite the initial hope that the ordinance would pre-
vail 23, a recent Pakistani newspaper article admits how despite the new law, Pakistan is 
being ‘sucked back into the vortex of kidney trade and transplant tourism’ 24. 
The who and Custodian Group should, thus, take measures to prevent the current 
prohibitionist strategy of organ trade from becoming ineffective and symbolic. This does 
not mean that they should let go of prohibition altogether. It is almost impossible to eval-
uate whether or to what extent these risks are a direct consequence of prohibition.
The question can be equally posed, ‘What the effect of decriminalization or regula-
tion would be on the nature and number of demand-driven trade?’. We argue rather that 
between prohibition and decriminalization, a wide range of alternatives exists that can be 
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addressed to control organ trade more effectively. The point is not to choose one over 
the other, but to think critically and be realistic with what we can achieve and with what 
means. Later, we present a number of ways in which the current prohibitionist strategy of 
organ trade can be improved.
WHAT WORKS AND THE WAY FORWARD  
FOR THE DECLARATION OF ISTANBUL
To assess what works, we need to get our definitions straight. Organ trade takes on a wide 
variety of forms: only after we agree on the definition of commercialism and trafficking 
and on what we find condemnable, can we agree on their prohibition. Putting a price on 
organs (commercialism) is different from coercing someone into selling one (trafficking).
The Declaration correctly defines and differentiates trafficking from commercial-
ism, yet it does not mention how both acts should be approached by policy. Its princi-
ples in our opinion wrongly conflate organ trafficking and transplant commercialism to 
constitute one and the same problem that both warrant equally repressive and punitive 
responses. However, policies aimed to suppress or reshape an illegal trade or market work 
differently from policies addressing coercion and other harms associated with trafficking. 
Evaluative studies have shown that criminalization of commercialism is likely to reinforce 
trafficking 17. Indeed, it has been argued that ‘there is much more scope for exploitation 
and abuse when a supply of desperately wanted goods is made illegal’ 25-26. We, therefore, 
claim that the Declaration should clearly differentiate between policies needed to address 
commercialism and those needed to address trafficking.
First of all, to tackle and prevent organ trade, the root cause of the problem (organ 
scarcity) should be addressed. This ultimately means boosting organ supply. One such 
strategy that the Declaration already strongly supports is to help governments implement 
deceased donation programs to increase deceased donation rates and achieve self-suffi-
ciency. Such initiatives are being conducted in the Balkans 27 and Black Sea region 28 with 
the support of the Custodian Group, the who and European Union. Yet promotion of de-
ceased donation alone is not enough to fill the gap between demand and supply of organs.
The who and Custodian Group should therefore, secondly, also encourage expan-
sion of living donation in the same manner as they encourage deceased donation. They 
should do so by explicitly stating the need to promote living donation in the text of the 
Declaration and Guiding Principles. The Custodian Group and who should, furthermore, 
encourage governments to remove restrictions regarding living unrelated or anonymous 
donation to make alternative living donation programs possible 29-30. Such programs should 
be implemented in consistence with international standards to ensure quality and safety of 
donors and recipients. Current restrictions to unrelated donation are based on the belief 
that living unrelated donation induces trade. However, there is no evidence of illegal trade 
in countries with well-organized systems allowing for high numbers of living unrelated 
donation such as in the United States, The Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom.
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A final example is to support regulated trials of incentives for donation 26. This asks for a 
more liberal approach by both the who and the Declaration towards commercialism. In 
our opinion, there is no validation for the Declaration’s and who’s premise that commer-
cialism should be banned because it leads to profiteering and trafficking 2. Trafficking will 
occur as long as scarcity exists, with or without prohibition. A more realistic approach 
would, hence, be the implementation of harm-reduction policies as witnessed in drug 
and prostitution regimes. Incentives for donation may, perhaps, be promising examples 
of a harm-reduction approach. The Declaration should provide scope for governments to 
explore ways to increase donation through incentives. Ultimately, this indeed will entail 
decriminalization of organ purchase and sales.
The Declaration and the who can also improve their strategy to combat organ traf-
ficking. There is no doubt that organ trafficking is and should remain prohibited universally. 
The text of the Declaration already emphasizes the prohibition and penalization of acts 
including brokering and other (medical) practices that aid or encourage trafficking. Indeed, 
organ trafficking cannot occur without the involvement of medical staff. A recent organ 
trafficking network uncovered in South Africa illustrates the criminal involvement of med-
ical staff, including nephrologists, surgeons and administrative staff who were found guilty 
of performing over 100 illegal kidney transplants and receiving payments for them 8. This 
case also demonstrates the immense investment that is needed to eventually bring perpe-
trators to justice. It took investigators 7 years to succeed in gathering enough evidence to 
bring the case to court. However, dedicated investigations and efforts to identify collusion 
in hospitals and other criminal activities, in short, the enforcement and police intelligence 
necessary to bring such cases to court, do not exist in other countries. Organ trafficking 
case law is practically nonexistent. Prohibition of organ trafficking largely remains a paper 
exercise. Strict, legislative prohibitionist efforts, no matter how sophisticated, are fruitless 
if they are not accompanied by enforcement by local, national and international policing 
agencies.
To achieve a consistent and effective prohibition of trafficking, legislation and law 
enforcement must go hand in hand. Enforcement strategies include: prioritization and 
awareness raising of the crime at the local level both with police and judicial authorities, 
training of police investigators regarding evidence gathering, recognition of organ traf-
ficking activity and know-how about the modus operandi of the actors involved, training 
of prosecutors and judges and establishment of bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation 
in cross-border criminal procedures. Ideally, such considerations are best followed when 
close collaboration between the medical field and (international) criminal justice agencies 
is achieved.
Perhaps, the greatest achievement for the who and Declaration of Istanbul will, 
thus, lie in bridging the gap between the medical field and the criminal justice realm. These 
efforts could, for instance, be aimed by lobbying with governments and international or-
ganizations such as interpol, unodc and europol to raise awareness about the crime. 
Indeed, the Declaration and the who are not law enforcers, but both bodies may be the 
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most influential forces to stimulate governments into addressing enforcement strategies 
at the local level. Yet, it must be kept in mind that enforcement is no guarantee that 
trafficking will stop. The root cause of the crime cannot be removed by strict, top down 
penal measures. Black market transactions will exist as long as organ scarcity exists. At the 
very least, successful enforcement might help to disrupt some tip-of-the-iceberg organ 
trafficking networks, but it will not fundamentally affect the crime.
The organ trade problem will persist and worsen unless the Custodian Group, the 
who and policymakers understand the limitations of prohibition and tackle the root cause 
of the crime by promoting both deceased and living donation.
  The authors wish to thank Damián Zaitch, Jeremy Chapman, Francis Delmonico, Gabriel Danovitch,  
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Incentives for organ donation, currently prohibited in most countries, may in-
crease donation and save lives. Discussion of incentives has focused on two areas: 
(1) whether or not there are ethical principles that justify the current prohibition and 
(2) whether incentives would do more good than harm. We herein address the second 
concern and propose for discussion standards and guidelines for an acceptable system 
of incentives for donation. We believe that if systems based on these guidelines were 
developed, harms would be no greater than those to today’s conventional donors. 
Ultimately, until there are trials of incentives, the question of benefits and harms 
cannot be satisfactorily answered.
INTRODUCTION
Every country with an active kidney transplant system is working to increase organ do-
nation. The reasons are clear—for patients with end-stage kidney disease (esrd), a kid-
ney transplant offers significant advantages compared to dialysis: increased longevity 1, 
a better quality of life 2 and cost-effectiveness (including cost saving for the health care 
system 3). Patients can receive a kidney transplant from either a living (biologically related 
or unrelated) or deceased donor. However, kidneys from living (vs. deceased) donors are 
associated with better short- and long-term outcomes 4 and facilitate early or preemptive 
transplantation, thus avoiding the adverse consequences associated with dialysis 5.
Because of the benefits of transplantation, patients with esrd increasingly opt for 
a transplant. Because of the increasing demand for a transplant and a relatively static 
supply of organs, there is a widening gap between the number of patients wanting a kidney 
and the number of available organs. This growing shortage persists in spite of efforts to 
prevent esrd and the recent expansion of both deceased donation (through the use of 
such strategies as expanded donor criteria and donation after cardiac death) and living 
donation (through increased unrelated and nondirected donation, paired exchanges, abo 
incompatible transplants, desensitization and transplant chains). Because of the ongoing 
shortage, many suitable transplant candidates suffer and ultimately die while waiting for 
a transplant.
In most countries donation is limited to ‘altruistic’ donors (in the case of deceased 
donation, donor families) and by law, donors are not allowed to receive anything of ma-
terial value in exchange for giving a kidney. Within some countries, only biologic relatives 
are permitted to be living donors. Yet, because of: (1) the shortage of kidneys, (2) the mor-
bidity and mortality associated with long-term (or no) dialysis, (3) increasing desperation 
of many candidates and (4) the potential for profit, illegal and unregulated organ markets 
have developed throughout the world. Such underground, unregulated markets have been 
associated with exploitation of the poor and vulnerable.
Living donors who participate in these unregulated markets are often poorly in-
formed about the procedure, deprived of appropriate screening and of quality postop-
erative and continuing medical care, and not compensated as agreed upon 6-9. At the 
same time, because of limited donor screening, some recipients have developed serious 
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infections transmitted by the donor organ; others have received little postoperative care 
or immunosuppressive treatment and have returned to their native country with active 
rejection and no knowledge of which immunosuppressive medications they were given 9-13. 
Often, the medical and surgical details have not been sent with them, so that their home 
transplant center has tremendous difficulty with continuation of care. Thus, these un-
regulated markets have been associated with adverse consequences for both donors and 
recipients.
A regulated system of incentives for donation has the potential to increase both 
living and deceased donation while eliminating the harms of unregulated markets. When 
the concept of incentives was first proposed, almost 3 decades ago, there was immediate 
condemnation 14.
Over the ensuing years, the pros and cons of incentive programs have been debat-
ed. At first, many opposed incentives as a matter of principle, claiming that an incentive 
for donation was wrong in itself. Yet, numerous scholars and consensus conferences have 
concluded that there are no ethical principles by which incentives should be rejected un-
der all circumstances 15-19. Surveys have shown that the public: (1) support incentives and 
(2) would be more likely to donate if incentives were offered 20,21. More recently, critics of 
donor incentives have argued on utilitarian grounds that incentives should be prohibited 
because they would do more harm than good 22. However, the ‘evidence’ used as the basis 
of that argument has almost entirely been drawn from observation of unregulated organ 
markets. We are fully cognizant of the harms that have occurred with unregulated markets 
and unreservedly condemn the practice of organ trafficking 23. However, there are no data 
to suggest that similar harms would occur in a carefully controlled, transparent and regu-
lated system of incentives.
The debate surrounding the principle of incentives per se will no doubt continue. 
Our view, however is that there is no objection of principle and that a system of incentives 
for donation could potentially provide enormous benefit to both recipients and donors 
and is worthy of systematic investigation. Instead of treating the hypothetical harms as 
a reason for forgoing these benefits outright, we believe the international community 
should try to devise ways of identifying and eliminating the dangers while maximizing 
the benefits. To further the discussion, we propose principles and guidelines that would, 
assuming legal frameworks were changed to make this permissible, provide the basis for 
an acceptable system of incentives. While not intended as definitive, we suggest that any 
system that conformed to the proposed guidelines would meet the standards, which both 
supporters and opponents of incentives could agree are necessary (if not sufficient) for 
any system of donation and are consistent with the standards that we have developed for 
current conventional donation.
DONOR MOTIVATION
The discipline of transplantation is suffused with assumptions of an idealized vision of 
current motives for donation: that is, all organs are and must henceforth be, given in the 
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spirit of pure ‘altruism’. There are two problems with this reasoning. The first is that any 
realistic discussion of donation must acknowledge the many different and overlapping 
motives that underlie donation within and outside of families 24. Although we speak of 
the ‘gift-of-life’, we also recognize that current donors often have alternative or additional 
motives or external pressures, e.g. a sense of obligation, a need to be accepted or valued 
by family and friends or even an easily identifiable secondary gain 24-28. If we were to limit 
donation to those motivated only by pure altruism, it is likely that donors would be few 
and far between. Conversely, it is entirely possible were incentives permitted, incentivized 
donors might use the reward for altruistic purposes (such as the care of sick family mem-
bers). Rather than confirming a dichotomy of altruism versus no altruism, experience is 
most consistent with a continuum of motivation to donate organs, ranging from complete 
selflessness to blatant self-interest.
The second problem with the mandate for ‘altruism’ is that there is no other context 
in which it is stipulated that something urgently needed must be given without payment or 
not given at all. Creating such a principle of altruism for organ donation is totally arbitrary 
and ignores the fact that our current donors frequently receive secondary gain or other 
unspoken tangible reward. We must also recognize that many highly motivated potential 
donors do not come forward or do not progress through the evaluation and donation pro-
cess because of the substantial financial and logistical obstacles (table 1). Others, though 
initially motivated by the opportunity to help another, might be even more likely to come 
forward if there were incentives.
1 Fear of financial hardship because of:
 a Travel, accommodation, childcare and medication cost at the time of assessment and donation procedures; 
 b Loss of income at the time of donation and during the recovery phase;
 c Loss of or difficulty obtaining health and life insurance after organ donation;
 d Loss of employment opportunities after organ donation.
2 Fear of death, disability or functional restriction. These fears encompass both short- and long-term sequelae of  
 donation, including perceived effects on fertility and childbearing.
3 Fear of a lost opportunity. Potential donors may prefer to retain a kidney for future potential recipients, especially children.
TODAY’S  S ITUATION
Current, unregulated markets that do not offer protection for either the donor or recipient 
are abhorrent. Yet the arbitrary requirement for what is deemed ‘altruistic’ donation must 
be viewed against the backdrop of the organ shortage and its tragic consequences for 
transplant candidates. In countries able to afford dialysis, waiting time from listing until 
transplant continues to increase, as does mortality on the wait list. In developing countries, 
where health care costs are assumed largely by the patients themselves, lifetime dialysis 
is not an option. Some can manage to afford limited and intermittent dialysis by scraping 
together resources, a response that typically results in inadequate care and places a se-
vere burden on the financial well being of their families. In such countries, because of its 
significantly lower long-term costs, transplantation is the only realistic path to long-term 
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survival. Without a significant increase in donor kidneys, in both developed and developing 
nations, preventable morbidity and mortality in patients with renal failure will continue.
Although we have focused on kidney donation, the same concerns (lack of sufficient 
organs; candidates dying while waiting) apply to other solid organ transplant candidates. 
Most liver, lung and pancreas transplants and all heart transplants, come from deceased do-
nors. Incentives for deceased donation may also help provide more extrarenal transplants.
When a product is desired, a market (legal or illegal) will develop; prohibition simply 
drives markets further underground 29,30. The tangible harms of organ trafficking can be 
directly traced to its illicit, underground features: lack of control, regulation and oversight. 
These elements conspire to disenfranchise and damage vulnerable donors and ensure sub-
optimal outcome in recipients. Clamping down on unlawful organ sales without expanding 
the organ pool will not result in less criminal activity. Patients will continue to die as pur-
veyors of this corrupt trade go further underground and other markets develop elsewhere 
around the globe.
PROPOSED SOLUTION
Regulated systems that remove disincentives to donation and reward donors have the 
potential to increase donation, save lives and reduce or eliminate the unregulated markets 
and the harm they cause. We herein propose for discussion principles and guidelines for 
development of acceptable systems of incentives for deceased and living donation.
1  Removal of Disincentives
Donors (or donor families) should suffer no short- or long-term financial burden 
as a consequence of organ donation. Disincentives for living donation should be 
eliminated. At a minimum, this would entail reimbursement of expenses and lost 
income, along with provision of term disability insurance, term life insurance and 
care of donation-related complications.
In some countries, there may also be financial disincentives to deceased do-
nation (e.g. cost of family travel to the medical center to give consent). These should 
be addressed and abrogated. Within each country, policies to maximize the benefit 
of deceased donor programs should be enacted. This is particularly important for 
those waiting for extrarenal transplants, where living donation is not an option.
2  A Regulated System of Incentives
An acceptable system of incentives for donation must ensure—for both the donor 
(and donor family, in the case of deceased donation) and recipient—respect, benefit 
and protection from harm. More specifically:
a  the donor (or family) is respected as a person who is able to make choices in 
his or her best interest (autonomy);
b  the potential donor (or family) is provided with appropriate information to 
support informed decision making (informed consent);
c  donor health is promoted at every step, including evaluation and medical 
follow-up (respect for person);
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d  the live donor incentive should be of adequate value (and able to improve 
the donor’s circumstances);
e  gratitude is expressed for the act of donation.
Critical elements of such a system would be protection, regulation, oversight and transpar-
ency under the auspices of the appropriate government or government-recognized body.
1  Protection: Risk to the donor should be in accord with currently accepted standards 
as defined for our current donors 31. The donor benefit (in addition to helping an-
other person) must be an opportunity to improve their own (or their family’s) life. 
Therefore, the donor must be fully informed, understand the risks, understand the 
nature of the incentive and how it will be distributed and receive the benefit. There 
must be follow-up and an opportunity to redress any wrongdoing.
2  Regulation and Oversight: Each country will need to enact guidelines for evalu-
ation and selection of donors, institution of the program of incentives and over-
sight. Regulations and oversight processes must be clearly defined and available for 
outside review, whether national or international. There must be clearly defined 
policies for follow-up, outcome determination and for detection and correction of 
irregularities. There should be defined consequences for entities within the system 
that do not adhere to policies.
3  Transparency: Although, for political and legislative reasons, regulation and over-
sight are only possible at a national level, there must be transparency so that inter-
national observation is possible.
GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT
Guidelines for development of acceptable regulated incentive systems for deceased or liv-
ing donation are specified in table 2. Critical (in addition to protection, regulation, oversight 
and transparency) are that the donation should be anonymous and nondirected, allocation 
should be to the first person on the list (using a predefined and transparent algorithm) 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Each country implementing a system of incentives should have a legal and regulatory framework for the process.
The entire process must be transparent and subject to government and international oversight.
The incentive should be provided by the state or state-recognized third party. Under well-defined, transparent and
regulated circumstances, prospective recipients may help fund a charity that supports the program. There is no direct
payment from the recipient to the donor and supporting the charity will not result in advancement on the waiting list.
Allocation of the organ(s) should be performed according to the single recognized system of that country (similar to 
unos in the United States) using a predefined and transparent algorithm so that everyone on the list has an opportu-
nity to be transplanted. Kidneys would be allocated to the number 1 person on the list (as determined by defined and 
transparent criteria).
There should be a plan for administration and for rigorous oversight to ensure that criteria for evaluation, acceptance, 
allocation and provision of the incentive to the donor (or donor family) are being followed.
The donation should be anonymous and nondirected.
No other solid organ donor incentive plan would be legal.
There should be legislation to govern wrongdoing and how centers would be censured, including criminal sanctions 
and fines, if wrongdoing is identified.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
There should be a clear and transparent process for providing information about risks to the donor, ensuring that the 
donor understands the operation and its risks and obtaining donor consent.
There should be a thorough donor screening evaluation using defined (and widely available) protocols. There should 
be well- defined and transparent criteria for donor acceptance.
There should be a fixed ‘incentive’ to the donor so that all donors (in any one country) receive equal value. The pack-
age of incentives may vary from one geographic region to another but should be designed to improve the life of the 
donor. Even within the same region, it may be possible to have a choice of benefits recognizing that some incentives 
may be of value to some donors but not others.
The program (donors and recipients) should be limited to citizens and legal residents. This will allow long-term donor 
medical care and follow-up.
The donation should remain anonymous and there should be no contact between donor and recipient.
The donor should understand the need for long-term follow-up and should consent to follow-up.
There should be a well-defined and transparent method to follow incentivized donors and study outcomes. There 
should be:
a Studies of the impact of incentivized donation on the number of deceased and living donors, the number of  
 transplants (covering all organs), the wait list and waiting time for a deceased donor transplant;
b Comparisons of short- and long-term outcomes (including quality-of-life) of incentivized versus  
 nonincentivized donors; 
c Studies of whether the incentive had an impact on the donor’s life.
and the incentive be provided by the state or state-recognized 3rd party. Additional guide-
lines for living donor systems are specified in table 3. Key items include informed consent, 
screening similar to our conventional donors, a fixed ‘incentive’ to the donor, limitation to 
citizens and legal residents and long-term follow-up studies.
DISCUSSION
The test of any regulated system of incentives for organ donation would be its provision of 
clear benefit to both donors and recipients. Patients who desperately need organs would 
obviously benefit if more were available and there is no reason to doubt that many do-
nors would benefit from receiving an incentive under properly controlled circumstances. 
Permitting incentives would allow competent, properly informed adults to make their own 
judgments about their own best interests—widely regarded as an essential feature of re-
spect for human dignity.
Many types of incentives that would meet these criteria are potentially acceptable 
and some donors (within the same system) might prefer different incentives than others. 
The form and substance should be determined by individual governing bodies commen-
surate with the principles outlined above. For deceased donation, it would need to be 
decided if the plan should include predeath benefits (which has the disadvantage that 
many receiving benefits would not be able to donate at the time of death), an incentive 
for registering as a donor where the benefit only accrues in the event that the signatory 
actually becomes a donor, or simply to provide benefits (e.g. funeral expenses) at the time 
of donation. For living donation, in addition to removal of disincentives 23, benefits could 
include (but would not be limited to): long-term health care, tax credit, tuition or job train-
ing; provision of a job; or payment (which could be a small payment and then additional 
annual small payments when returning for follow-up visits). Implementing a regulated 
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system of incentives will clearly be simplest within societies that already have an adequate 
social safety net, registries of health outcomes and provision of long-term health care for 
all citizens and legal residents.
The absolute value of the incentive might legitimately differ from one country to 
another but, for living donors, it should be sufficient to significantly improve the donor’s 
well-being. The gnp and cost of living vary from country to country and the level of ben-
efits within any one country (or geographic area) would obviously have to reflect local 
economic conditions. Given that incentive programs would be limited to citizens and legal 
residents (for both donors and recipients; table 3), travel to another country to receive a 
greater incentive would not be possible. In addition, there could be a ‘cooling-off period’ 
between initial evaluation and donation (so that some tests (e.g. viral testing) could be 
repeated and those seeking an instant payment would have sufficient time to carefully 
consider the risks).
Whether provision of health care is an incentive or removal of a disincentive is con-
troversial. Most developed countries (the United States is an exception) provide govern-
ment-sponsored long-term health care for everyone; in these countries the issue is moot. 
Most developing countries cannot afford universal lifelong health care. At a minimum, 
donors should be provided with health care for all donation-related issues 23. Yet, in reality, 
it will be difficult to determine whether or not many health care issues are related to the 
donor event. Ideally, long-term health care should be provided as a benefit to all donors. 
Publically financed health care would: (1) be of major benefit to citizens of all societies and 
(2) allow donor follow-up and therefore permit the transplant community to prospectively 
identify and correct any unintended consequences of a program of incentives.
Epidemiologic studies have reported that poverty is associated with increased 
chronic kidney disease, poorer health and shorter life expectancy 32. This is of concern 
given the likelihood that the majority of incentivized donors will come from lower income 
groups. However, the same data suggest that the health risks associated with poverty 
are related to increased rates of hypertension and diabetes as well as to reduced access 
to medical care. Currently, low income is not a contraindication to conventional ‘altruis-
tic’ donation and our current selection processes eliminate potential donors at increased 
risk. If we use the same cautious selection and approval process for all donors, long-term 
outcomes are likely to be comparable. In fact, the provision of long-term follow-up and 
long-term health care—as one of the benefits of incentivized donation—has the potential 
to improve overall health of the donors. It is difficult to conceptualize an incentive system 
in which low income is a contraindication to participation. However, if follow-up studies 
were to show that low income incentivized donors had worse outcome than nonincentiv-
ized donors, an income threshold could become a requirement for future participation. All 
arrangements should be adjustable in the light of experience.
Would it be necessary to provide an incentive to all donors, directed and non-
directed? Each country would have to make that decision. Clearly, disincentives should 
be removed for all donors. However, as discussed above, directed donation has potential 
benefits to the donor. For example, a husband donating to his wife benefits from having 
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a healthy spouse. It may be that the optimal system would occur if all donors receive 
incentives; it may be that the optimal system is a two-tier system with more incentives for 
nondirected than directed donors. Trials are necessary to answer this question.
As with any proposal for change, there are potential strengths and weaknesses. The 
major potential advantages of a regulated system of incentives for donation are increased 
organ availability for candidates on the waiting list combined with provision of benefits 
for the donors (or donor families). However, until there are trials, we have no means of 
knowing under precisely what circumstances such a proposal would best succeed. Thus 
one concern is that the total number of transplants (especially for extrarenal organs) might 
decrease. This concern would, however, be mitigated if the opportunity to alter variables 
within the incentive system were used. The reason we do not know which incentives 
might be suitable and effective is the historical blanket prohibition of all such efforts. If this 
prohibition were set aside as we propose, an iterative approach could address all aspects of 
the process so that it is improved over time.
A second concern is that, today, most unregulated markets occur in countries that 
prohibit incentives for donation, but lack the appropriate control or willingness to enforce 
the prohibition. Arguably, similar lack of control could limit the success of our proposed 
system. Our proposal requires clear legislation and national framework, strong government 
control and safe and transparent procedures and screenings. For each country, before a sys-
tem of incentives is tested, policy and guidelines must be developed and a system for their 
strict implementation must be put in place. Donor and recipient protection is paramount. 
The single greatest threat to a regulated system of incentives for donors would be that 
dishonest individuals or groups would seek to subvert that regulation for personal gain, a 
risk that applies to any legal enterprise. Ways of mitigating this threat would include min-
imizing transaction fees and making all payments transparent and open to regular audit.
Whereas every possible circumstance cannot be anticipated, this document out-
lines the broad intent of an ethical framework for a regulated system of incentives for do-
nation. For example, the guidelines (table 3) limit participation (both donor and recipient) 
to citizens and legal residents. In theory, a country could grant rapid citizenship for the 
purpose of either donating or receiving a kidney. This clearly contravenes the spirit and 
intent of this document and such a practice would not meet international acceptance, a 
criterion that the group felt was an essential component of any ethical system. In addition, 
some countries (e.g. the United States) currently allow transplant centers to allocate a 
percentage of deceased donor organs to nonresident foreigners 33. If regulated systems of 
incentives are developed for such countries, it will need to be determined if kidneys from 
incentivized donors could be allocated to foreign nationals.
We recognize that this document—like others of its kind— represents the con-
sensus opinion of the coauthors. Even within our group, some would be more restrictive, 
some more liberal. However, all agreed on the basic principles outlined herein and that any 
arrangement that fulfilled all of these criteria would be ethically acceptable. We present it 
as a pragmatic foundation for developing acceptable systems of incentives for donation.
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International experience with transparent, government approved, fully regulated systems, 
is limited. Once such systems have been developed and tested, the guidelines may need 
modification; however, the overarching principles—protection (donor and recipient), regu-
lation, oversight and transparency—will remain applicable.
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The hott project (2012-2015) was a European Union-funded 
international research project that addressed an exploitative 
form of organ trade: ‘trafficking in human beings for the pur-
pose of organ removal’ 1. Erasmus mc coordinated the project 
in collaboration with Lund University, the Bulgarian Center 
for Bioethics and the Academic Society for the Research of 
Religions and Ideologies. In addition, 10 associated partners participated on a non-fund-
ing basis, amongst which the Dutch National Police, the European Society for Organ 
Transplantation and the University of St. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, Macedonia. It was 
the first international, interdisciplinary research project that aimed to increase knowledge, 
raise awareness and improve the non-legislative response to trafficking in human beings 
for organ removal. 
We initiated the project for various reasons. First of all, we found that although 
information and knowledge exists about the crime, this information is not synthesized or 
shared amongst researchers, transplant professionals, law enforcement and other stake-
holders. Furthermore, there is no awareness of the crime, especially amongst law enforce-
ment authorities. Trafficking in humans for organ removal is not on the ‘enforcement agen-
da’. The lack of multinational partnerships hampers an effective response to the crime. 
We started our research by describing the state of knowledge on trafficking in hu-
man beings for the purpose of organ removal based on the scholarly research. The project’s 
literature review, which was performed through a search of 5 databases and a screening of 
over 10,000 records, presents 243 references on the ethics, causes and the actors involved 
in the trade (the network): recipients, suppliers (donors), brokers, transplant professionals, 
hospitals, service providers, translators and corrupt law enforcement officials. Each chap-
ter describes the roles of these participants, for instance, how brokers recruit patients and 
donors, how much profit is made, where patients travel to and from and if and to what 
extent organ sales constitute trafficking in humans. Each chapter ends with a description 
of the gaps in the literature. The authors conclude that ‘the scholarly research in this area 
is not well-developed’ 2. 
To acquire more knowledge about the ‘demand side’ of the trade, we conducted 
interviews with 22 patients from Sweden, The Netherlands and Macedonia/Kosovo who 
purchased kidney transplants abroad. To date, this is the largest group of patients that has 
been interviewed on this issue. The patients provided information about the transplant 
costs, what/whom they paid, why they went and how their transplants were facilitated. 
The however shared little information about whether their donors were paid and/or ex-
ploited. This makes it difficult to determine the potential illegal nature of their transplants. 
This study revealed that interviewing patients is an insufficient method to find out how 
their transplantations were facilitated 3. Thus, we organized case study research to acquire 
information about the modus operandi of organ trade networks. 
The last study involved research of convicted cases in South Africa, Kosovo, Israel 
and the usa. Conducting 37 interviews with 49 persons (most of which were police offi-
cers and prosecutors), we aimed to find out how police and prosecution discovered each 
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case, how they performed their investigations, what the modus operandi of the actors 
were, under what laws/charges the prosecutions took place, what successes and obstacles 
police and prosecution encountered and what the judgment in each case was. This study 
revealed, among others, the sophisticated and subtle methods that networks use to recruit 
patients and donors, as well as the difficulties that police and prosecutors experience in 
uncovering and convicting these networks 4. 
Almost all of the results that were generated under the hott project are presented 
in the underlying thesis, and are published in a book 5. To share our findings with, and raise 
awareness amongst transplant professionals, law enforcement authorities, ngos, policy 
makers, representatives of governments, international organizations and other stake-
holders, we organized a 2-day event at the Headquarters of the European Police Office 
(Europol) in November 2014 in The Hague, The Netherlands. 
On the first day, 40 experts convened in the project’s ‘Writers’ Conference’ to for-
mulate recommendations to improve non-legislative responses. These recommendations 
address the ethical and legal obligations of health care providers, the protection of persons 
trafficked for the purpose of organ removal, strengthening cross-border collaboration in 
criminal cases and stimulating partnerships between transplant professionals and law en-
forcement 6-9. 
On the second day, we organized a symposium that was attended by 230 partici-
pants from 35 countries. The project’s researchers presented their results and police and 
prosecutors shared their experiences with uncovering organ trafficking networks. In addi-
tion, the experts that convened in the Writers’ Conference, presented their recommen-
dations. Recognizing that prosecuted cases represent only the tip of the iceberg and that 
the response of law enforcement agencies to organ trading is almost ‘entirely reactive’, it 
was emphasized, amongst others, that transplant professionals need to collaborate more 
closely with law enforcement. In particular, the transplant community can help improve 
the non-legislative response by reporting organ trafficking networks to law enforcement 
authorities.
Finally, together with the Central Division of the Dutch National Police, we devel-
oped a list of indicators for transplant professionals, law enforcement and victim support 
workers. The indicators support data collection and identification of trafficking in human 
for organ removal. They identify the legitimate and illegitimate service providers for each 
step in the criminal process: recruitment, transport, entrance, documents, housing, trans-
plant, aftercare and finance 10. 
Until now, only 11 convictions involving organ trade/trafficking are known to have 
taken place worldwide. What is needed is a recognition amongst law enforcement, policy 
makers and the transplant community, to strengthen not only the legislative response, but 
also the non-legislative responses (disruption, investigation and prosecution) to the crime. 
The hott project’s results and recommendations offer strategies for these stakeholders to 
improve such responses. 
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This article presents indicators to support transplant professionals, judicial and law en-
forcement authorities and victim support workers with the identification of traffick-
ing in persons for the purpose of organ removal. It outlines the legal and illegal service 
providers that facilitate trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ removal 
and guides the reader through the following criminal process: recruitment, transport, 
entrance, documents, housing, transplant, aftercare, and finance. Identification of il-
legal transplant activities by transplant professionals can support police and judiciary 
with the investigation, disruption, and prosecuting of trafficking networks.
INTRODUCTION
This article presents indicators to help transplant professionals, law enforcement author-
ities and victim support workers identify trafficking in human beings for the purpose of 
organ removal (thbor). Thbor is defined as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation 
shall include […] the removal of organs’. 1
The indicators are structured along a barrier model. This model identifies the legal 
and illegal service providers for each step (barrier) in the criminal process: recruitment, 
transport, entrance, documents, housing, transplant, aftercare, and finance (figure 1).
Although the indicators are indicative of thbor, they may point to other forms of 
organ trade as well, such as transplant tourism and transplant commercialism—forms of 
organ trade which do not necessarily involve thbor. The indicators are not exhaustive; 
they should be extended or modified in response to changes in the modus operandi of 
traffickers and new research findings.
METHODOLOGY
The indicators are based on empirical research data that has been collected under the 
hott project, an eu-funded project against thbor, titled combating trafficking in human 
beings for the purpose of organ removal (2012-2015). They are derived from the following 
sources: in-depth interviews with police, prosecutors, patients and transplant profession-
als, witness and victim testimonies, and judgments of prosecuted cases.
TARGET GROUPS
The indicators are for persons who may come into contact with (potential) recipients, 
donors, or facilitators who have retrieved or provided organs (or are planning to do so) by 
means of thbor. These persons can be transplant professionals, judicial and law enforce-
ment authorities (including border police and embassy officials), and victim-aid workers.
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INDICATORS
Recruitment
Persons who are going to receive an organ through thbor may:
—  leave for a transplant abroad without notifying their health caregivers;
—  refuse to accept local transplant solutions;
—  search the internet for transplant possibilities abroad;
—  be in (online) contact with a person and/or company that advertises/organizes 
transplants (abroad) and that does not provide information about the organ donors;
—  be in contact with a group of potentially suitable, but unknown donors abroad;
—  not know beforehand where the transplant will take place and/or who their pro-
spective donors abroad will be;
—  have received a personal invitation from a transplant professional to be transplant-
ed abroad;
—  have been asked to send medical test results abroad for review by a person/institu-
tion whose medical expertise lacks certification.
Persons who are going to supply an organ through thbor may:
—  be in (online) contact with a person and/or company that advertises/organizes or-
gan donations abroad,
—  not have received any or incorrect or misleading information about the pre- and 
postoperative risks and/or the duration of the operation,
—  not know who their prospective recipients abroad will be, not have a (clear) motiva-
tion for their donation,
—  have a relative/acquaintance who has sold an organ before.
Transport/entrance
Persons who are going to receive/supply or have received/supplied an organ through 
thbor may:
—  travel together with one or more persons, who do not appear to know each other, 
to the same destination;
—  be accompanied by someone with a medical background;
—  show signs of fear of someone who accompanies them, for example sweating, 
trembling, not speaking;
—  suffer from physical complaints, such as pain in the area where the organ was im-
planted or removed;
—  have not organized their own transport and/or do not know their destination;
—  be carrying a considerable amount of cash;
—  be carrying medical records and/or letters of invitation for medical treatment;
—  travel directly to a hospital or clinic upon arrival in a foreign country.
193
Documents
Persons who are going to receive/supply or have received/supplied an organ through 
thbor may:
—  have received their travel and/or identity documents from someone else;
—  not carry their own travel or identity documents during the travel to or entrance in 
a foreign country;
—  carry identity documents that are very recently issued and/or appear to be forged;
—  carry travel documents that do not correspond with the purpose of their travel.
Housing
Persons who are going to receive/supply or have received/supplied an organ through 
thbor may:
—  be housed in an accommodation owned by a medical professional or a hospital/ clinic;
—  be housed together in the same accommodation;
—  not be allowed or able to leave the accommodation on their own;
—  be escorted whenever they go to and return from the hospital/clinic;
—  not know the location of their accommodation;
—  undergo physical examinations, blood or other tests performed by doctors at their 
accommodation.
Transplant
Persons who are going to receive/supply or have received/supplied an organ through 
thbor may:
 — not have received prior medical screening (in their home country);
 — undergo the transplant procedure abroad within a very short time frame (2 weeks 
to 2 months);
 — not know the location and/or name of the hospital/clinic and/or transplant profes-
sionals involved;
 — have not signed consent forms;
 — be illiterate and/or signed documents that were not written or explained in their 
native language;
 — have a group of potentially suitable, unknown donors;
 — have documents in which the donor-recipient relationship was changed from 
‘ unrelated’ to ‘related’;
 — claim to know each other, but do not actually interact or show interest in one 
 another before and/or after the transplant;
 — claim to be related to the donor or recipient, but have an inconsistent story about 
their relationship or give the impression that they were instructed to feign their 
relationship;
 — have not received any or incorrect or misleading information about the pre- and 
postoperatives risks and/or the duration of the operation;
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 — have second thoughts and/or not have been given the opportunity to withdraw 
prior to the operation;
 — have seen other foreigners at the hospital/clinic (who arrived in groups);
 — have been accompanied by another person when visiting the hospital/clinic, who 
insisted to answer questions on their behalf and/or to translate all conversations 
with the medical staff;
 — have been operated at a hospital/clinic without the availability of a dialysis machine 
or other necessary medical equipment;
 — not have a (clear) motivation for their donation;
 — typically present as a donor/recipient pair consisting of a (foreign) younger donor 
and a (foreign) older recipient.
Aftercare
Persons who are going to receive/supply or have received/supplied an organ through 
thbor may:
 — reappear unannounced at their local hospital with an implanted or removed organ;
 — have not received appropriate medical aftercare and/or necessary medication;
 — have received aftercare in another hospital/clinic than where the transplant took 
place;
 — lack discharge sheets and/or other information about the operation (abroad) in 
their medical records, for example, the name of the hospital/clinic, transplant pro-
fessionals and/or source of the organ;
 — be reluctant to share information about where and how the operation took place;
 — be reluctant to share information about their relationship with the recipient or 
donor;
 — return from an operation abroad with infections, graft failure or other complica-
tions, recipients in particular may carry infections such as hbv, hbc, hcv, pcp, hiv, 
cmv, tb, Pyelonephritis, Aspergillosis, Sepsis, Malaria, liver cirrhosis, uti, abscesses 
and meningitis and/or suffer from graft failure or graft loss and/or carry high doses 
of immunosuppressive regimen, wound drains and/or splints in their bodies;
 — show signs of emotional stress/complaints, such as shame, stigma, and regret, 
about the removal of their organ.
Finance
Persons who are going to receive/supply or have received/supplied an organ through 
thbor may:
 — state that they will give/receive or have given/received payments in return for the 
organ;
 — have not received the agreed amount of money;
 — have paid fees for recruitment, transport and accommodation that were deducted 
directly from the person’s earnings in return for the organ donation;
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 — have been told that they need to pay or will be paid in instalments (in advance of 
the operation);
 — have paid a donor, doctor and/or other facilitator (in cash) for an organ or an organ 
transplant;
 — not know the name of the person to whom they have paid or who received their 
payment;
 — have made payments through an intermediary person or institution;
 — have not received a receipt after payment.
CONCLUSIONS
Indicators are a helpful tool to support transplant professionals, judicial and law enforce-
ment authorities, and victim support workers with the identification of thbor. Such 
identification can encourage police and judiciary to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute 
trafficking networks. The infrastructure that allows transplant professionals to report such 
activity however may not yet exist in every country. We therefore encourage transplant 
professionals to follow the hott project’s recommendations presented in this issue. 2-5 
One example could involve liaising with government officials, lawyers, and police to estab-
lish national reporting codes that allow for the identification and disclosure of trafficking 
networks (ie, brokers, hospitals, hospital staff, and other individuals involved in trafficking) 
without revealing patients’ identities. 6
The authors are grateful for the useful remarks given to this report by Michael Bos, Mihaela Frunza, Manoj John, 
Jordan Yankov and Willem Weimar.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Organ trade constitutes the sale and purchase of organs for financial or material gain. 
Although in the literature numerous terms are used to denote the trade’s various practices 
such as ‘trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ removal’, ‘transplant commer-
cialism’ and ‘transplant tourism’, in the underlying thesis, the term ‘organ trade’ is largely 
used as an umbrella term to cover these activities. 
Although prohibited worldwide, an increasing number of reports indicate the trade’s 
proliferation across the globe. There is, however, a lack of evidence-based research on the 
topic. The underlying thesis strives to fulfil gaps in knowledge through the following aims 
(presented in chapter 1): 
1  Provide insight into the scale of patients who buy organs for transplantation and 
describe why, where, how and from whom they purchased organs.
2  Acquire knowledge and understanding of the experiences, attitudes, behaviors and 
needs of transplant professionals who treat patients before and/or after they buy 
organs.
3  Examine the modus operandi of those who facilitate illegal transplantations and 
study the investigation and prosecution of organ trade networks.
4  Assess the possible implications of a punitive, legislative approach.
5  Propose alternative strategies that may deter organ trade more effectively.
Through these aims, this thesis strives to acquire a better empirical understanding of organ 
trade and to use this knowledge to explore strategies that may eliminate—or regulate—
the trade more effectively. 
Chapter 2 consists of two articles that each present the background and theoretical 
framework of the underlying thesis. The first explores the ethical and legal aspects of live 
kidney donation, including the commercialization of organs. The second article presents 
an in-depth account of organ trade by exploring its trends and patterns, its prohibition 
and the critiques against its prohibition. This article also introduces the first explorative 
empirical study on transplant tourism from The Netherlands. 
In chapter 3 we studied the scale, motivations and experiences of patients who purchased 
organ transplants. First, we systematically reviewed the literature to assess the number of 
patients who buy organs, (from) where they buy organs, and how. We found that almost 
all patients who are reported to buy organs, travel in order to do so. Most patients were 
reported to travel from Taiwan and South Korea to China. China was the most popular 
destination country, followed by Pakistan and India. Most patients traveled for kidney 
transplants, the majority of which were living unrelated. Nevertheless, of the 6002 pa-
tients who were reported to travel between 1971 and 2013, only 1238 (21%) were reported to 
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have paid for their transplants. A small number of patients (187) were reported to have paid 
donors, brokers, hospitals and private companies in return for a kidney. In the remaining 
cases, it could not be verified to what or whom they paid. We conclude that the literature 
does not reflect a substantial practice of organ purchase. It is speculative and anecdotal 
about patients buying organs: their purchases are more often assumed than determined. 
Next, to assess why and how patients go abroad for paid kidney transplantations, 
we interviewed 22 patients who traveled from Macedonia, Kosovo, The Netherlands and 
Sweden between 2000 and 2009. The destination countries were Pakistan, India, Iran, 
Russia, Colombia, China and Iraq. The majority traveled abroad because they felt there 
was no other option available to them. They referred to the long wait time and dialy-
sis-related complaints as reasons for why they went overseas. The patients who traveled 
from Sweden and The Netherlands, were foreign-born, had an (ethnic) affinity with their 
destination countries and arranged their transplants with the help of family and friends 
at home and abroad. Yet, six patients obtained their transplants pre-emptively, which 
means that they were not waitlisted and were not undergoing dialysis treatment at the 
time of transplant. Furthermore, some patients said that they felt discriminated by the 
health care system in their countries of residence, which enhanced their motivations to 
go abroad. This illustrates that a long wait time and dialysis-related complaints are not 
always the primary motivations for patients to travel abroad for transplantation. Rather, 
other factors such as ethnic ties in destination countries, may play a more important role 
in securing transplants overseas. By contrast, the patients who traveled from Macedonia/
Kosovo obtained their transplants abroad because there was no regular transplant activ-
ity in Macedonia at the time. Three of these patients reported that they arranged their 
transplants with the help of brokers. The amount that patients paid varied from €6000 to 
€45000. Payments included service costs (surgery, hospital stay, medications, the kidney 
and food). Seven paid the hospital directly, 4 paid a broker/middleman and of 6 patients 
it is unknown whom they paid. Six patients said that they also paid their donor. Ten of 
the 22 patients returned with complications, including graft rejection and infections. We 
conclude that although our findings raise suspicions of illegality, the interviews provided 
no data on whether the patients’ donors were exploited and limited data on whether they 
were paid. As a result, we could not establish with certainty whether all transplantations 
were illegally performed. 
In chapter 4 we addressed the experiences, attitudes, behaviors and needs of Dutch 
transplant professionals (tps) who treat patients who buy kidneys abroad. First, we ex-
plored their experiences, attitudes and needs for guidelines through a survey that we sent 
to 546 tps. Of these, 241 (44%) completed the survey. We found that one hundred tps 
(42%) treated patients who traveled to a country outside the European Union for a kidney 
transplant between 2008 and 2013. 
—  Thirty-one tps reported to be certain that patients had bought the kidney. 
—  Sixty-five had suspicions that the patients had purchased the kidney. 
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We further found that although 85% of tps understand why patients buy organs, the ma-
jority also believes that kidney purchase harms the relationship with their patients (53%) 
and judges their patients for buying kidneys abroad (53%). A majority (65%) reported a 
conflict of duties because they felt unable to protect the victim-donor and because they 
could not prevent the crime as a result of their secrecy oath. Most tps (>80%) expressed 
a need for guidelines in treating patients who purchase organs. Discussing the rights and 
duties of tps towards patients who purchase organs, we conclude that reporting patients 
who are going to purchase a kidney, or have purchased a kidney, is unjustified. Rather, 
measures to prevent kidney purchase should be directed toward those who inflict harm 
on donors (and/or patients). We propose a reporting code for tps to anonymously disclose 
information on organ trafficking networks, without revealing patient’ identities. This in-
formation can support and stimulate the police and judiciary to investigate, disrupt, and 
prosecute organ trafficking networks. 
In the second part of chapter 4, we present the results of a qualitative interview 
study that we conducted to examine the experiences and attitudes of tps more closely. 
We interviewed 41 tps who, in the survey, reported that they had treated patients whom 
they knew or suspected had purchased kidney transplants abroad. This study confirmed 
that tps’ largely suspect that patients purchased kidneys abroad, instead of being certain 
of kidney purchase. Whereas the majority found out that their patients obtained a kidney 
transplant abroad after it had taken place, a minority reported that they knew beforehand 
that their patients were going abroad. Highlighting patients’ ethnic affiliations to ‘cultures 
that are tolerant to organ purchase’ and emphasizing the incidental nature of the phenom-
enon, many participants didn’t consider the suspected purchases as a serious issue that 
warranted a punitive response. Nevertheless, tps described suspected kidney purchase as 
an unwelcome issue that they were unwillingly confronted with and which occurred with-
out their knowledge and support. Their knowledge about the suspected purchases was 
limited because patients were reluctant to tell, and professionals were reluctant to ask and 
know about the assumed purchases. We conclude that their attitudes and behaviors can 
be explained by a hierarchy of rights and duties in which their secrecy oath, duty of medical 
care, and trust vis-à-vis their patients prevail. These duties override other principles such 
as preventing kidney purchases and protecting (foreign) donors from harm. Professionals 
are not obligated to report patients who are going to buy, or have bought organs. In fact, 
they may face legal repercussions if they would report their patients. Professionals’ rights 
and duties thus keep in place a ‘wall’ of secrecy and silence in professional-patient inter-
actions. Secrecy and silence functioned as a tacit agreement between patients and their 
caregivers which kept the subject of kidney purchase at a safe, unspoken distance, allow-
ing professionals to turn a blind eye to its suspected occurrence. 
Chapter 5 presents a study with a twofold aim: first, to examine the modus operandi of 
organ trade networks and second, to describe the experiences of police and prosecu-
tion in disrupting and prosecuting these networks. We studied three cases in fout coun-
tries: the Netcare Case in South Africa/Israel, the Medicus Case in Kosovo/Israel and the 
200
Rosenbaum Case in the usa. We conducted 37 interviews with 49 persons, most of whom 
were prosecutors and police officers. We also interviewed government officials, transplant 
professionals and patients. In addition, we collected and reviewed a vast amount of (case) 
documentation such as legislation, charge sheets, indictments and witness testimonies. 
The networks were well organized with sophisticated modus operandi. This was 
illustrated, among others, by their careful selection of countries. For instance, South Africa 
did not have adequate legislation against organ trade at the time when the case took 
place. In Kosovo there was a ‘post-war vacuum’ and a high degree of corruption which en-
abled the false issuance of transplant licenses. Most patients were Israeli, whose overseas 
transplants costs (legal or illegal) until 2008, were reimbursed by Israeli health insurance 
companies. Brokers recruited donors from abroad and ensured that donors approached 
them. This ‘passive recruitment’ made it difficult for police and prosecution to prove ex-
ploitation. After recruiting the donors, more coercive and deceptive elements came into 
play. In Kosovo, for instance, donors were given less compensation than agreed (if anything 
at all) and were informed that they would receive remaining compensations on the con-
dition that they would find new donors. In the usa, although ‘subtle psychological ploys’ 
were used upon the donor, these were not proven to be sufficiently coercive or abusive to 
charge human trafficking. 
The level of success of police and prosecution in uncovering and convicting each 
case depended on the availability of evidence, the collaboration with other countries, and 
existing legislation. South Africa for example, did not have adequate laws against organ 
trade. This led police and prosecution to apply alternative charges such as fraud and 
forgery with mild convictions (penalties) as a result. Furthermore, they didn’t succeed in 
convicting the most important defendants—namely the transplant surgeons, transplant 
coordinators and the head of the network, an Israeli organ broker. The Medicus Case, by 
contrast, involved the most severe sentences (up to 8 years imprisonment) and the largest 
group of transplant doctors that has been convicted until now. This country is the first 
to have prosecuted transplant doctors as a criminal group involved in human trafficking 
for organ removal. In the usa, lack of evidence of exploitation could not substantiate hu-
man trafficking charges. Furthermore, police and prosecution could not identify the actual 
number of transplants that were performed, as well as the total financial benefits that 
were gained. 
We conclude that prosecutions in these countries were successful but leave room 
for improvement. First of all, prosecutions could have been more successful if the appro-
priate laws would have been in place at the time when the activities took place. Second, 
investigations could have been initiated earlier if available signals were identified and 
picked up at an early stage and if international collaboration would have occurred sooner. 
In chapter 6 we discuss the implications of the growing, prohibitionist legislative re-
sponse to organ trade. First, we explain that although organ trade consists of diverse prac-
tices such as ‘trafficking in persons for organ removal’, ‘organ sales’, ‘transplant commer-
cialism’ and ‘transplant tourism’, international instruments predominantly apply the term, 
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‘organ trafficking’ without distinction as to the variable aspects involved. This conflation 
is found, amongst others, in the 2015 Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in 
Human Organs which does not distinguish between organ sales and trafficking. The pos-
sible consequences are that individuals who have sold an organ may be reluctant to come 
forward and report instances of abuse to authorities. Furthermore, extending liability to 
organ sellers may push the trade further underground and expose them to greater harm. 
Punishment of all organ trade forms does little to alleviate the conditions that produce 
organ trade and may place an unrealistic burden on the criminal justice system. We con-
clude that more and stricter laws against the organ trade are unlikely to eliminate this 
practice, and may even be potentially counterproductive. Rather, the international (trans-
plant) community needs to reconsider its approach to organ trade by separating trade 
from trafficking and introducing harm-reductionist policies.
In the second part of this chapter, we reiterate the risks of prohibition and refer to 
studies that illustrate the resilience to prohibition of other demand-driven activities such 
as drug use, gambling, alcohol consumption and prostitution. We explain that prohibition 
of such activities is known to produce black markets, drives up prices, provides illegal in-
comes, displaces crime to other regions and drives trade underground which can lead to 
higher crime rates, harms and victimization. Focusing on the Declaration of Istanbul on 
Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, we point out that this and other instruments 
take little account of the possible implications that prohibition of organ trade may herald. 
Their response to organ trade and trafficking has little to no recognition for the limits of 
crime control and limited acceptance of exploring alternative policies that possibly herald 
less harmful effects. We conclude by recommending that the root causes of the trade 
should be addressed by boosting organ supply, removing restrictions in live donations and 
by supporting regulated trials of incentives for donation. In addition, we conclude that 
whilst there is no doubt that trafficking (exploiting) persons for their organs should remain 
prohibited, the response to this form of trade is almost wholly legislative. To achieve a 
consistent and effective prohibition of trafficking, legislation and law enforcement must 
go hand in hand.
Chapter 7 proposes alternative strategies that may deter or regulate organ trade more 
effectively. The first article is a proposal for a regulated system of (financial) incentives 
for deceased and living organ donation. Such a system can potentially increase donation 
while eliminating the harms of unregulated markets. It states that such a system should 
ensure protection of the donor, regulation, oversight and transparency under the auspices 
of a government or government-controlled agency. Key items include informed consent, 
screening similar to conventional donors, a fixed ‘incentive’ to the donor, limitation to 
citizens and legal residents only and long-term follow-up studies. The type of incentives 
(or benefits) for live donors could include long-term health care, tax credit, tuition, job 
training or payment. Implementing a regulated system of incentives will be simplest within 
societies that already have an adequate social safety net, registries of health outcomes and 
provision of long-term health care for all citizens and legal residents. 
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In the second paper we present the hott project, a European Union-funded research proj-
ect that addressed ‘trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ removal’ (2012-
2015). We initiated the project to increase knowledge, raise awareness and to improve the 
non-legislative response to the crime. After conducting various empirical studies (which are 
presented in this thesis), we shared our findings with more than 200 transplant profession-
als, law enforcement authorities, policy makers, government representatives, international 
organizations and other stakeholders at an international symposium at the Headquarters 
of the European Police Office (Europol) in November 2014 in The Hague, The Netherlands. 
At the expert meeting (writers conference) that preceded this event, 40 experts formulat-
ed recommendations to improve non-legislative responses to trafficking in human beings 
for the purpose of organ removal. More specifically, they developed recommendations to 
clarify the ethical and legal obligations of health care providers in relation to the crime, to 
enhance protection of persons trafficked for the purpose of organ removal, to strengthen 
cross-border collaboration in criminal cases and to stimulate partnerships between trans-
plant professionals and law enforcement. Recognizing that the prosecuted cases probably 
only represent the tip of the iceberg and that the response of law enforcement agencies to 
organ trading is almost ‘entirely reactive’, it was emphasized, amongst others, that trans-
plant professionals need to collaborate more closely with law enforcement. 
Finally, in collaboration with the Dutch National Police, we developed a barrier 
model and a list of indicators for transplant professionals, law enforcement and victim 
support workers. The indicators support data collection and identification of trafficking in 
human for organ removal. They identify the legitimate and illegitimate service providers 
for each step in the criminal process: recruitment, transport, entrance, documents, hous-
ing, transplant, aftercare and finance. Indicators are a helpful tool to support transplant 
professionals, judicial and law enforcement authorities, and victim support workers with 
the identification of thbor. Such identification can encourage police and judiciary to in-
vestigate, disrupt, and prosecute trafficking networks. 
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The discrepancy between the reality and rhetoric of organ trade
This thesis reveals, first of all, the discrepancy between how organ trade takes place in 
practice and how it is portrayed in the literature. Our results further illustrate that the 
common conceptualization of organ trade as an organized crime that exists separately 
from the legal transplant industry, is most probably false. Rather, organ trade depends on 
the legal transplant industry (i.e. hospital facilities), and its staff. In addition, organ trade is 
not necessarily exploitative and not all cases take place through organized, human traffick-
ing networks. In fact, the available evidence suggests that exploitation (according to the 
definition of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal) is probably the exception 
rather than the norm. Organ trade involves a variety of practices which can be placed 
along a spectrum ranging from exploitation to voluntary, mutually agreed benefits. Thus, 
instead of conflating all forms of trade with ‘trafficking’, organ trade should be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Removing organ trade from the crime control realm 
The available empirical evidence also reveals that the current prohibitionist response 
to organ trade fails to eradicate it. Not only does the existing information demonstrate 
the trade’s resilience to prohibition, prohibition has also pushed the trade further under-
ground, placing patients and donors at greater risk of harm. In addition, a strong legislative 
framework that governs patients’ privacy rights and doctors’ secrecy oath, hampers the 
acquiring of potential valuable information to help curb the trade. 
Given these facts, it is striking that the international (transplant) community not 
only continues to rely on prohibition as the ‘default position’ 1, but also continues to further 
tighten the existing legislation against organ trade 2. These measures can be viewed as 
symptomatic of the broader ‘late modern’ developments of the penal state wherein poli-
cymakers are more concerned with reassuring a worried public than with offering solutions 
to remove conditions that produce crime 3. Current anti-organ trade responses are more 
concerned with expressing negative sentiments about the organ trade than with effec-
tively eradicating the phenomenon. The worldwide lack of enforcement (including even 
enforcement of the most organized and exploitative forms of organ trade), is illustrative 
thereof. With the existing crime control apparatus being more concerned with ‘priority 
crime areas’ such as terrorism, illegal migration, the weapon trade and the drug trade, it is 
unlikely that the organ trade will feature high on the crime control agenda. 
Hence, the international transplant community’s reliance on crime control to eradi-
cate all forms of organ trade is not only naïve, but also precarious and ineffective. In chap-
ters 6 and 7 we recommend that whilst exploitation of donors (i.e. trafficking in human be-
ings for organ removal) should be subjected to a more proactive non-legislative response 
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(i.e. enforcement of doctors and others who facilitate illegal transplantations), less harmful 
forms of organ trade should be placed outside of the crime control framework. 
Towards a criminology of organ trade 
In positioning less harmful forms of organ trade outside of a criminal justice response, 
medical professionals (and policy makers) could benefit from ‘criminological’ knowledge 
regarding the decriminalization and regulation of other demand-driven phenomena. For 
instance, similar to prostitution policies, organizations that encourage prohibition of organ 
trade could instead consider decriminalizing those that buy and/or sell organs and explore 
safe strategies to incentivize and regulate organ sales. This would, however, require an 
integration of the ‘medical’ and ‘criminological’ realms, combining medical and criminolog-
ical expertise regarding organ trade. In addition, the trade should be given a more promi-
nent place on the criminological research agenda. 4 This thesis strived to fulfil some gaps 
in the (criminological) literature, but has also illustrated that much remains to be learned 
about the trade, and about its regulation and deterrence in particular.
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Orgaanhandel is het kopen en/of verkopen van organen met een financieel of materieel 
winstoogmerk. De handel in organen kent verschillende verschijningsvormen, zoals men-
senhandel met het oogmerk van orgaanverwijdering, transplantatie toerisme en commer-
cialisering van organen. In dit proefschrift wordt ‘orgaanhandel’ grotendeels gehanteerd 
als overkoepelende term voor deze verschijningsvormen. 
Hoewel orgaanhandel wereldwijd verboden is, laat een toenemend aantal (media)
berichten zien dat het in steeds meer landen voorkomt. Er wordt echter relatief weinig 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar orgaanhandel verricht, waardoor er een gebrek aan em-
pirische informatie over dit fenomeen is. Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan het vergroten van 
de kennis en het verbeteren van het begrip van orgaanhandel. Hierdoor kan mogelijk een 
effectievere aanpak van het fenomeen worden bewerkstelligd. 
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een korte introductie over orgaanhandel en presenteert de 
doelstellingen: 
1  Inzicht verschaffen in het aantal patiënten dat organen koopt en uitleggen waarom, 
waar, hoe en van wie zij organen koopt.
2  Het beschrijven, begrijpen en verklaren van de ervaringen, houdingen, gedragingen 
en behoeften van transplantatie professionals die patiënten behandelen vóór en/of 
nadat zij een orgaan hebben gekocht.
3  De werkwijze van criminele orgaanhandel netwerken in kaart brengen en beschrij-
ven hoe deze netwerken zijn berecht.
4  De mogelijke implicaties van een repressieve, wettelijke aanpak van orgaanhandel 
beschrijven.
5  Alternatieve strategieën aanbevelen die orgaanhandel mogelijk effectiever kunnen 
bestrijden of reguleren dan het huidige beleid.
Hoofdstuk 2 is het theoretisch kader van dit proefschrift en bestaat uit twee delen. Het 
eerste artikel verkent de ethische en juridische aspecten van levende nierdonatie en gaat 
in op het debat dat gevoerd wordt rondom de legalisering van orgaanhandel. Het tweede 
artikel verkent de literatuur over orgaanhandel en introduceert een verkennende, empiri-
sche studie naar transplantatietoerisme van nierpatiënten uit Nederland. 
In hoofdstuk 3 rapporteren wij de omvang, motivaties en ervaringen van patiënten die 
organen kopen. Eerst verrichtten wij een systematisch literatuuronderzoek naar het aantal 
patiënten dat organen heeft gekocht. Ook onderzochten wij waar zij de organen kochten 
en hoe ze dat deden. Wij ontdekten dat bijna alle patiënten waarvan bekend is dat zij 
(vermoedelijk) organen gekocht hebben, naar een ander land reisden om deze te kopen 
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en de transplantatie daar te ondergaan. De meerderheid van de patiënten onderging nier-
transplantaties. De meeste reisden vanuit Taiwan en Zuid Korea naar China—het popu-
lairste bestemmingsland, gevolgd door Pakistan en India. De meeste patiënten ontvingen 
een nier van iemand die geen familie was. Desalniettemin, van de ruim 6000 patiënten 
waarvan vermeld werd dat zij tussen 1971 en 2013 naar het buitenland reisden voor een 
niertransplantatie, werd van slechts 1238 (21%) patiënten gerapporteerd dat zij voor de 
transplantaties betaalden. Van een klein aantal patiënten (187) werd vermeld dat zij do-
noren, tussenpersonen, ziekenhuizen en privébedrijven betaalde in ruil voor een nier. In 
de overige gevallen kon niet worden geverifieerd aan wie en/of hoeveel ze betaalden. Wij 
concluderen dat de literatuur speculatief en anekdotisch is wanneer het over patiënten 
gaat die nieren kopen en geen volledig beeld geeft van het daadwerkelijk aantal gekochte 
nieren. 
In het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 3 rapporteren wij de bevindingen van een studie 
waarin wij 22 patiënten interviewden die tussen 2000 en 2009 vanuit Zweden, Macedonië/
Kosovo en Nederland naar het buitenland reisden voor betaalde niertransplantaties. Zij 
reisden naar Pakistan, India, Iran, Rusland, Colombia, China en Irak. De meesten vertrok-
ken omdat zij geen niertransplantatie in eigen land konden krijgen (Macedonië/Kosovo) 
of omdat zij (in de veronderstelling verkeerden dat ze) in eigen land niet tijdig een nier-
transplantatie konden krijgen (Zweden en Nederland). Zij noemden de lange wachttijd en 
dialyse-gerelateerde complicaties als redenen waarom zij naar het buitenland gingen. De 
geïncludeerde patiënten die uit Zweden en Nederland vertrokken, waren in het buiten-
land geboren, hadden veelal een etnische affiniteit met hun bestemmingsland en regelden 
hun transplantaties met behulp van vrienden en familie thuis of in het buitenland. Zes 
patiënten ondergingen zogenoemde pre-emptieve niertransplantaties. Dit betekent dat 
zij op het moment van hun transplantatie niet op de wachtlijst stonden en geen dialysebe-
handelingen ondergingen. Daarnaast gaven enkele patiënten aan zich gediscrimineerd te 
voelen door het gezondheidssysteem in het land waar zij wonen. Dit versterkte hun wens 
om naar het buitenland te gaan voor een transplantatie. Deze bevindingen illustreren dat 
een lange wachttijd en dialyse-gerelateerde complicaties niet altijd de primaire redenen 
zijn waarom patiënten naar een ander land reizen voor een niertransplantatie. Andere fac-
toren, zoals sociale contacten in, en affiniteiten met het bestemmingsland, spelen wellicht 
een belangrijkere rol. Daartegenover staat dat de patiënten uit Macedonië/Kosovo naar 
het buitenland gingen omdat Macedonië in die tijd geen transplantaties uitvoerde. Drie 
van deze patiënten vertelden dat zij hun transplantatie met behulp van handelaren gere-
geld hadden. Patiënten betaalden tussen de €6000 en €45000 voor hun transplantaties. 
Deze bedragen waren inclusief de servicekosten (operatie, verblijf, medicatie, het orgaan, 
eten en drinken). Zeven patiënten betaalden direct aan het ziekenhuis, vier betaalden aan 
handelaren/tussenpersonen en van zes patiënten is niet bekend aan wie ze betaalden. 
Zes patiënten vertelden dat ze daarnaast hun donoren hadden betaald. Tien van de 22 
patiënten keerden terug met complicaties, waaronder infecties en afstoting van de nier. 
Hoewel er vermoedens bestaan dat niet alle nieren legaal verkregen zijn, blijft de vraag 
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onbeantwoord of de donoren zijn uitgebuit of betaald. Wij kunnen dus niet met zekerheid 
vaststellen of alle transplantaties illegaal zijn verricht. 
Hoofdstuk 4 bestaat uit twee delen en beschrijft de ervaringen, houdingen, gedragingen 
en behoeften van Nederlandse transplantatie professionals (tp’s) ten aanzien van pa-
tiënten die in het buitenland nieren kopen. Het eerste deel bevat de resultaten van een 
verkennende enquête die wij aan 546 tp’s hebben gestuurd. Van deze tp’s vulden 241 (44%) 
de vragenlijst in. Tussen 2008-2013 behandelden 100 tp’s (42%) patiënten die naar een land 
buiten de Europese Unie reisden voor een niertransplantatie: 
—  In 65% van deze gevallen vermoedden tp’s dat patiënten de nieren kochten. 
—  In 31% van de gevallen rapporteerden de tp’s dat ze het zeker wisten. 
Een meerderheid van de tp’s vond dat het kopen van een nier de relatie met hun patiënten 
schond (53%) en veroordeelde hen dan ook voor het kopen van nieren (53%). Vrijwel alle 
tp’s begrepen tegelijkertijd waarom patiënten de nieren kochten (85%). Een meerderheid 
van de tp’s (65%) gaf verder aan dat zij een conflict van plichten ervaarden wanneer zij 
een vermoeden hadden dat hun patiënt een nier ging kopen. De meest genoemde reden 
voor dit conflict was dat zij vanwege het beroepsgeheim de mogelijke slachtoffer-donor 
niet konden beschermen en dat zij—vanwege hun beroepsgeheim—de koop niet konden 
voorkomen. De meesten (>80%) gaven aan behoefte te hebben aan richtlijnen bij het be-
handelen van patiënten die vermoedelijk organen gaan kopen. 
In onze beschouwing over de rechten en plichten van tp’s jegens patiënten die nie-
ren kopen, concluderen wij dat het kopen van nieren door patiënten een doorbreking van 
het beroepsgeheim van tp’s niet legitimeert. De aanpak van orgaanhandel zou zich moe-
ten richten op degenen die schade toebrengen aan donoren en/of patiënten. Wij pleiten 
daarom voor een meldcode die het mogelijk maakt voor tp’s om anoniem vermoedens van 
orgaanhandel te rapporteren bij politie en justitie, waarbij de bescherming van de identi-
teit van patiënten gewaarborgd blijft. Het doel van deze meldcode is om politie en justitie 
te ondersteunen bij het opsporen en berechten van orgaanhandel. 
In het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 4 presenteren wij de bevindingen van een kwali-
tatieve interview studie die wij verrichtten om de ervaringen en attitudes van tp’s beter te 
begrijpen en te verklaren. Wij interviewden 41 tp’s die in de enquête hebben aangegeven 
patiënten behandeld te hebben waarvan zij vermoedden of zeker wisten dat zij nieren in 
het buitenland hadden gekocht. De meerderheid van de tp’s ontdekte de vermoede koop 
nadat patiënten terugkeerden uit het buitenland met een geïmplanteerde nier waarvan 
de herkomst vaag of onbekend was. tp’s benadrukten de etnische affiniteit van patiën-
ten met hun bestemmingslanden die tp’s veelal typeerden als ‘koopculturen’. Daarnaast 
benadrukten ze dat ze het fenomeen incidenteel meemaken. De meesten vonden het 
kopen van nieren in het buitenland daarom geen serieus probleem dat een harde aanpak 
legitimeerde. Desondanks beschreven tp’s de vermoede aanschaf van nieren door hun 
patiënten als een fenomeen waar ze ongewild mee werden geconfronteerd en dat ‘buiten 
hen om’ plaatsvond zonder hun medeweten en medewerking. De kennis en informatie 
van tp’s over de vermoedelijke nier aankopen was gering omdat hun patiënten niet over 
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de aanschaf wilden vertellen en omdat tp’s er liever niet (te veel) over wilden weten. Wij 
concluderen dat de attituden en gedragingen van de tp’s verklaard kunnen worden door 
een hiërarchie van rechten en plichten, waarin hun beroepsgeheim, hun zorgplicht en het 
behoud van een goede behandelrelatie met hun patiënten prevaleren. Deze plichten vin-
den tp’s belangrijker dan het voorkomen van het kopen van nieren door hun patiënten en 
het beschermen van de onbekende, verre donor. tp’s zijn niet verplicht om patiënten aan 
te geven die nieren gaan kopen of hebben gekocht. tp’s riskeren juridische implicaties als 
ze deze patiënten zouden aangeven, zelfs wanneer zij wel voldoende informatie over de 
aanschaf zouden hebben. De rechten en plichten van tp’s houden een muur van stilzwijgen 
in stand waarin tp’s zich afzijdig kunnen houden van de vermoede nier aanschaf door 
hun patiënten. Dit zwijgen functioneert als een ‘stille’ overeenkomst tussen tp’s en hun 
patiënten waardoor het onderwerp van de nieraanschaf onbesproken blijft. 
Het onderzoek dat in hoofdstuk 5 gepresenteerd wordt, diende een tweeledig doel: ten 
eerste om de werkwijze van orgaanhandelaren te beschrijven en ten tweede om de erva-
ringen van politie en justitie met de berechting van deze handelaren in kaart te brengen. 
Wij onderzochten 3 zaken in 4 landen: de ‘Netcare’ zaak in Zuid-Afrika/Israël, de ‘Medicus’ 
zaak in Kosovo/Israël en de ‘Rosenbaum’ zaak in Noord-Amerika. We verrichtten 37 inter-
views met 49 personen, waaronder politieofficieren, officieren van justitie, beleidsambte-
naren, transplantatie professionals en patiënten. Daarnaast verzamelden we documenten 
zoals wetgeving, tenlasteleggingen, getuigenverklaringen en rechterlijke uitspraken. 
De netwerken waren goed georganiseerd en gingen geraffineerd te werk. Dit bleek 
onder andere uit hun keuze van de landen waar ze opereerden. Zuid-Afrika werd gekozen 
vanwege de verouderde en gebrekkige wetgeving tegen orgaanhandel. Kosovo kampte 
met de nasleep van een oorlog waardoor er een gebrekkige overheidsstructuur en hoge 
mate van corruptie heerste. Hierdoor kon er van overheidswege een licentie uitgevaardigd 
worden om de transplantaties te kunnen verrichten, ondanks het landelijk verbod op het 
verrichten van transplantaties (of ze nu legaal of illegaal waren). De meeste patiënten die 
in Zuid-Afrika en Kosovo getransplanteerd werden, kwamen uit Israël. Zij kregen tot 2008 
hun buitenlandse niertransplantaties vergoed door hun ziektekosten verzekeraars. Deze 
verzekeraars stelden geen vragen of de transplantaties legaal of illegaal waren verricht, 
omdat er tot 2008 geen wet was in Israël die transplantaties in het buitenland waarbij de 
afkomst van het orgaan onduidelijk was verbood. De handelaren in Kosovo rekruteerden 
donoren uit het buitenland door middel van advertenties in kranten en op het internet. 
Doordat donoren instemden met de verkoop van hun nieren, hadden politie en justitie 
moeite om uitbuiting van donoren te bewijzen. Nadat de donoren in Kosovo aankwamen, 
nam de (kans op) uitbuiting van donoren toe. De donoren kregen (onder andere) minder 
betaald dan hen beloofd was. Daarnaast werd hen verteld dat ze het resterende bedrag pas 
zouden ontvangen als ze nieuwe potentiële donoren wierven. In Noord-Amerika werd een 
donor overgehaald om te doneren, maar uitbuiting (mensenhandel met het oogmerk van 
orgaanverwijdering) werd in deze zaak niet bewezen. 
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De mate van succes van politie en justitie in de berechting van deze zaken varieerde en was 
afhankelijk van de beschikbaarheid van het bewijs, de samenwerking met andere landen en 
de wetgeving. Zuid-Afrika bijvoorbeeld, had in de tijd dat de ‘Netcare’ zaak speelde, geen 
wetgeving die orgaanhandel (en mensenhandel met het oogmerk van orgaanverwijdering) 
verbood. Hierdoor moesten politie en justitie alternatieve delicten met lage straffen (geld-
boetes) ten laste leggen. Daarnaast lukte het hen niet om de belangrijkste verdachten te 
veroordelen, namelijk de transplantatie chirurgen, de transplantatie coördinatoren en het 
hoofd van het netwerk: een Israëlische handelaar. In Kosovo daarentegen (de ‘Medicus’ 
zaak), werden hoge gevangenisstraffen opgelegd en werd de grootste groep artsen tot nu 
toe veroordeeld. Dit was de eerste strafzaak waarin artsen veroordeeld werden voor hun 
deelname aan een criminele groepering en voor mensenhandel met het oogmerk van or-
gaanverwijdering. In Noord-Amerika (de Rosenbaum zaak) kon door een gebrek aan bewijs 
geen uitbuiting (en dus geen mensenhandel met het oogmerk van orgaanverwijdering) ten 
laste gelegd worden. Daarnaast lukte het politie en justitie in deze zaak niet om het daad-
werkelijk vermoede aantal illegale niertransplantaties en de daarmee behaalde winsten 
vast te stellen. 
Wij concluderen dat de veroordelingen in deze landen wisselend succesvol waren. 
Allereerst hadden de veroordelingen succesvoller kunnen zijn als landen zoals Zuid-Afrika 
gedegen wetgeving tegen orgaanhandel gehad hadden. Ten tweede hadden de opspo-
ringsonderzoeken eerder geïnitieerd kunnen worden als signalen eerder waren opgepikt en 
als internationale samenwerking sneller en efficiënter was verlopen.
In hoofdstuk 6 gaan we in op de implicaties van het toenemende, repressieve, wet-
telijk beleid tegen orgaanhandel. In het eerste artikel leggen we uit dat orgaanhandel 
uit diverse activiteiten bestaat, waaronder mensenhandel met het oogmerk van orgaan-
verwijdering, transplantatie toerisme, orgaankoop en ‘transplant commercialism’. Echter, 
internationale verdragen en verklaringen gebruiken steeds vaker de term ‘organ trafficking’ 
zonder onderscheid te maken tussen de verschillende vormen van orgaanhandel. Deze 
zgn. ‘conflatie’ is onder meer te vinden in de brede formulering van de strafbaarstelling in 
het nieuwe verdrag tegen orgaanhandel van de Raad van Europa (2015). Dit verdrag maakt 
geen onderscheid tussen mensenhandel en orgaanverkoop. Het mogelijke gevolg hiervan 
is dat donoren die hun organen verkopen, en wellicht slachtoffers van uitbuiting zijn, deze 
uitbuiting niet snel zullen rapporteren bij instanties uit angst voor vervolging. Daarnaast 
heeft een ruime strafbaarstelling van orgaanhandel als risico dat de handel dieper onder-
gronds gaat en dat de kans op slachtofferschap toeneemt. Het bestraffen van alle vormen 
van orgaanhandel lost niet de oorzaken van het misdrijf op, en legt een onrealistische 
last op de schouders van politie en justitie. Wij concluderen dat het niet waarschijnlijk is 
dat door strengere wetgeving het misdrijf bestreden zal worden. Wij bevelen aan dat de 
internationale (transplantatie) gemeenschap in haar verdragen en verklaringen een duide-
lijker onderscheid moet maken tussen het kopen en verkopen van organen enerzijds en 
uitbuiting/mensenhandel met het oogmerk van orgaanverwijdering anderzijds. Daarnaast 
zou de internationale gemeenschap lidstaten moeten toelaten om alternatief beleid te 
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voeren dat gericht is op het terugdringen van uitbuiting van kwetsbare donoren. Een voor-
beeld is de introductie van financiële stimuli van orgaandonaties en het decriminaliseren 
en reguleren van orgaanverkoop. 
In het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk benadrukken wij de risico’s van een brede 
strafbaarstelling van orgaanhandel door te verwijzen naar aangetoonde schadelijke effec-
ten ten aanzien van andere vormen van vraag gedreven handel, zoals drugs, gokken, alcohol 
en prostitutie. We leggen uit dat een verbod op handel kan leiden tot zwarte markten, ho-
gere prijzen en illegale inkomens. Bovendien bestaat het risico dat de handel ondergronds 
gaat met hogere criminaliteitscijfers en een grotere kans op slachtofferschap tot gevolg. 
In dit artikel gaan wij vooral in op de formulering van het orgaanhandel verbod in de zgn. 
‘Verklaring van Istanbul’ (2008). Deze verklaring besteedt geen aandacht aan de mogelijke 
implicaties van een brede, strenge strafbaarstelling en biedt geen ruimte voor alternatieve 
oplossingen zoals decriminalisering en regulering. Wij concluderen dat orgaanhandel bij 
de wortel aan moet worden gepakt door het aanbod van organen te vergroten, levende 
orgaandonaties te stimuleren en te experimenteren met financiële stimuli voor orgaan-
donatie. Tot slot leggen we uit dat het verbod op mensenhandel met het oogmerk van 
orgaanverwijdering gehandhaafd moet worden. Echter, de opsporing en vervolging van dit 
misdrijf vinden niet of nauwelijks plaats. Om deze vorm van orgaanhandel effectief aan te 
pakken, bevelen we een proactieve opsporing en berechting aan. 
In hoofdstuk 7, dat uit drie artikelen bestaat, gaan wij dieper in op onze aanbevelingen. 
In het eerste artikel presenteren we een voorstel voor een door de overheid gereguleerd 
systeem van financiële stimulering van orgaandonatie. Het doel van een dergelijk systeem 
is om het aantal orgaandonaties te vergroten en uitbuiting in huidige ongereguleerde 
markten tegen te gaan. In het voorstel leggen we uit dat een dergelijk systeem aan strikte 
voorwaarden moet voldoen. Zo moet de lange termijn nazorg en bescherming van do-
noren optimaal georganiseerd zijn en moet het overheidsapparaat op transparante wijze 
functioneren. Verder moet het systeem gelimiteerd zijn tot de inwoners van het land in 
kwestie. Voorbeelden van stimuli zijn levenslange vrijstelling van ziektekostenpremies, 
belastingvoordelen of een geldbedrag. Een dergelijk systeem zal het makkelijkst te imple-
menteren zijn in een land met bestaande adequate sociale vangnetten, registraties van 
data van donor follow-up en ziektekostenverzekeringen voor alle ingezetenen. 
In het tweede artikel presenteren wij het zgn. ‘hott’ project (‘combating traffic-
king in persons for the purpose of organ removal’). Dit internationale onderzoeksproject, 
dat door de Europese Commissie gefinancierd werd, richtte zich op mensenhandel met 
het oogmerk van orgaanverwijdering (2012-2015). Wij initieerden dit project om kennis 
en bewustwording over deze vorm van orgaanhandel te vergroten, en om de handhaving 
(opsporing en berechting) te verbeteren. De resultaten van de uitgevoerde studies (die 
tevens in dit proefschrift worden gerapporteerd), presenteerden wij aan meer dan 200 
transplantatie professionals, politie- en justitieofficieren, beleidsmakers, vertegenwoordi-
gers van internationale organisaties en andere stakeholders op een internationaal sym-
posium dat in november 2014 op het hoofdkwartier van Europol in Den Haag gehouden 
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werd. Voorafgaand aan dit symposium, organiseerden wij een expert meeting (de zgn. 
‘Writers Conference’) waarin 40 experts bijeenkwamen en aanbevelingen formuleerden 
om de handhaving van het misdrijf te verbeteren. In het bijzonder deden zij aanbevelingen 
om de rechten en plichten van transplantatie professionals ten aanzien van het misdrijf 
te verduidelijken, de bescherming van slachtoffers te verbeteren, internationale samen-
werking in strafzaken te bevorderen en om samenwerkingsverbanden te smeden tussen 
transplantatie professionals enerzijds en politie en justitie anderzijds. Zij benadrukten dat 
politie en justitie pro-actiever tegen het misdrijf moeten optreden. Hiervoor is het nodig 
dat transplantatie professionals nauwer samenwerken met politie en justitie. 
Tot slot ontwikkelden wij, in samenwerking met de Landelijke Eenheid van de 
Nationale Politie, een barrièremodel en indicatorenlijst voor transplantatie professionals, 
politie, justitie en hulpverleners. De indicatoren dienen om signalering van mensenhandel 
met het oogmerk van orgaanverwijdering te bevorderen. Het barrièremodel maakt inzich-
telijk welke stappen handelaren zetten om hun criminele activiteit te kunnen uitoefenen 
en laten zien welke organisaties een rol kunnen spelen bij het bemoeilijken of sanctioneren 
daarvan. Bij dit misdrijf zijn rekrutering, transport, entrée, documenten, huisvesting, trans-
plantatie, nazorg en financiën benoemd als barrières. Indicatoren zijn een praktisch instru-
ment om politie en justitie te ondersteunen in hun opsporing en berechting van strafzaken.
212

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 
  PORTFOLIO 
CURRICULUM VITAE
213
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
PUBLICATIONS IN PEER-REVIEWED JOURNALS
2017
 · Ambagtsheer, F., De Jong, J., Bramer, W.M., Weimar, W. Reply to comment on the 
article: On patients who purchase organ transplants abroad, American Journal of 
Transplantation; 17(1):305
 · Columb, S., Ambagtsheer, F., Bos, M., Ivanovski, N., Moorlock, G., Weimar, W., on behalf 
of the elpat Working Group on Organ Tourism and Paid Donation. Re-conceptualizing 
organ trade: separating ‘trafficking’ from ‘trade’ and the implications for law and policy. 
Transplant International 30(2):209-213
2016
 · Ambagtsheer, F., De Jong, J., Bramer, W.M., Weimar, W. On patients who purchase 
organ transplants abroad, American Journal of Transplantation; 16(10):2800-2815
 · Ambagtsheer, F., Weimar, W. Organ Trade: Knowledge, Awareness, and Nonlegislative 
Responses, Transplantation; 100(1):5-6
 · Van Balen, L., Ambagtsheer, F., Ivanovski, N., Weimar, W. Interviews with patients 
who traveled from Macedonia/Kosovo, The Netherlands and Sweden for paid kidney 
transplantations, Progress in Transplantation; 26(4):328-334
 · De Jong, J., Ambagtsheer, F. Indicators to Identify Trafficking in Human Beings for the 
Purpose of Organ Removal, Transplantation Direct; 2(2):e56 
 · Ambagtsheer, F., Weimar, W. The Hague Recommendations: Improving Nonlegislative 
Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purpose of Organ Removal, 
Transplantation Direct; 2(2):261 
2015
 · Ambagtsheer, F., Van Balen, L.J., Duijst-Heesters, W.L., Massey, E.K., Weimar, W. 
Reporting Organ Trafficking Networks: a Survey-Based Plea to Breach the Secrecy 
Oath, American Journal of Transplantation; 15(7):1759-1767 
2013
 · Ambagtsheer F., Zaitch D, Weimar W. The battle for human organs: Organ trafficking 
and transplant tourism in a global context, Global Crime; 14(1):1-26 
 · Lennerling, A., Lovén, C., Dor, F.J.M.F., Ambagtsheer, F., Duerinckx, N., Frunza, M., 
Pascalev, A., Zuidema, W., Weimar, W., Dobbels, F. Living Donation Practices in Europe. 
Results from an Online Survey, Transplant International 26 (2): 145-53 
214
2012
 · Ambagtsheer, F., Zaitch, D., Swaaningen, van R., Duijst, W. Zuidema, W., Weimar, W., 
Cross-border quest: The reality and legality of transplant tourism. Journal of 
Transplantation; 2012: 1-7 
 · Ambagtsheer, F. & Weimar, W. A Criminological Perspective: Why Prohibition of Organ 
Trade is not Effective and How the Declaration of Istanbul can Move Forward, American 
Journal of Transplantation; 12(3): 571-575 
 · Working Group on Incentives for Living Donation, Matas, A.J., Satel S., Munn, S., 
Richards, J.R., Tan-Alora, A., Ambagtsheer, F., Asis, M.D., Baloloy, L., et al., Incentives for 
Organ Donation: Proposed Standards for an Internationally Accepted System, American 
Journal of Transplantation; 12:306-212 
 · Matas, A.J., Ambagtsheer, F., Gaston, R., Gutmann, T., Hippen, B., Munn, S., Ona, 
E.T., RadcliffeRichards, J., Reed, A., Satel, S., Weimar, W., Danguilan, R., A realistic 
proposal—incentives may increase donation—we need trials now!, American Journal of 
Transplantation; 12(8): 2261
EDITED BOOKS
2017
 · Massey,  M., Ambagtsheer, F., Weimar., W. Organ Transplantation: Ethical, Legal and 
Psychosocial Aspects. Global Challenges. Pabst Science Publishers. Lengerich (in press)
2016
 · Ambagtsheer, F. & Weimar, W. The hott project. Results and Recommendations. 
Pabst Science Publishers. Lengerich, pp. 1-149
2013
 · Ambagtsheer, F. & Weimar, W. The eulod project. Results and Recommendations. 
Pabst Science Publishers. Lengerich, pp. 1-183
CHAPTERS IN EDITED VOLUMES
2014
 · Ambagtsheer, F., Weimar, W. Ethical and Legal Aspects of Kidney Donation, in: Kidney Trans-
plantation. Principles and Practice. 7th Edition, Morris and Knechtle (eds.) Elsevier, pp. 715-772
2011
 · Ambagtsheer, F., Zaitch, D., Weimar W. The Paradox of Organ Trafficking Prohibition: 
How to Control the Potential Adverse Effects of the Declaration of Istanbul, in: 
Organ Transplantation: Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects. Expanding the European 
Platform, Vol. ii, W. Weimar, J. Busschbach, M. Bos (eds.). Pabst Science Publishers. 
Lengerich, pp. 73-80
 · Ambagtsheer, F. The Black Market in Human Organs, in: Deviant Globalization. Black Market 
Economy in the 21st Century, N. Gilman, J. Goldhammer, S. Weber (eds.) Continuum, pp. 72-82
215
PORTFOLIO
Courses
 · Young Women in Academia
 · Starting Supervision in Science
 · Basis Introduction Course on spss
Grants
 · European Commission Directorate General Home Affairs, Prevention of 
and Fight Against Crime, ‘The hott project: Combating Trafficking in 
Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal’ (€600,000), 4 beneficiaries, 
10 associate partners.
 · European Commission Executive Agency for Health and Consumers 
(dg sanco) for the 3rd elpat Conference on Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial 
Aspects of Transplantation, Rotterdam, €100,000.
Conferences 
 · Organized an international symposium and expert meeting on trafficking in 
human beings for the purpose of organ removal (hott project) at Europol 
Headquarters, The Hague, The Netherlands (230 participants);
 · Organized the 3rd elpat Congress on Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial 
Aspects of Transplantation, Rotterdam, The Netherlands (300 participants);
 · Organized 3 elpat Working Group Meetings on Ethical, Legal and 
Psychosocial Aspects of Transplantation (Sicily 2012, Juan les Pins 2013, 
The Hague 2014) (60-70 participants).
Presentations
 · Vsr Jaarcongres 2017. Empirical legal studies: Fad or Feud? Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam
 · Round Table Discussion: ‘Together against Human Trafficking: Human Trafficking 
and Exploitation in the Wake of the Refugee Crisis’, European Center for Legal 
Education and Research, Bucharest, Romania (invited)
 · 26th International Congress of the Transplantation Society, Hong Kong, China 
(2 orals, 1 mini oral) 
 · 4th elpat Congress. Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects of Transplantation, 
Rome, ltaly (2 invited, 2 orals) 
 · Congress of the Dutch Transplantation Society, Groningen, The Netherlands (oral) 
 · Abdominal Transplant Conference, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium 
(invited) 
2017
2015
2012
2012-2015
2013
2014
2013
2012-2014
2017
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
216
 · 8th elpat Working Group Meeting. Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects of 
Transplantation, Lisbon, Portugal (invited) 
 · Regiodag Noord, Grolschveste, Enschede (invited) 
 · Competent Authorities Meeting, European Commission. dg Health & Food 
Safety (Sante), Brussels, Belgium (invited) 
 · International Round Table. Health and Gender Aspects and Implications of 
Human Trafficking. Organ Removal. Establishment of National Health Focal 
Points, Vienna, Austria (invited) 
 · 17th Congress of the European Society for Organ Transplantation, Brussels, 
Belgium (1 invited, 1 oral, 1 brief oral) 
 · Surveille Project Workshop on Human Trafficking, Birmingham, United Kingdom 
(invited) 
 · Workshop on Global Bodies in Grey Zones: Health, Hope, Bio-economy, 
Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, Stellenbosch, South Africa (invited) 
 · Criminologie in Actie, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, The Netherlands (invited) 
 · International Federation of Medical Students’ Associations (ifmsa), University 
Medical Center, Groningen, The Netherlands (invited) 
 · Hott Project Symposium. Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purpose of Organ 
Removal, Europol Headquarters, The Hague, The Netherlands 
 · European Donation and Transplant Coordination Organization Conference, 
Budapest, Hungary (invited) 
 · World Transplant Congress, San Francisco, usa (1 invited, 1 oral, 1 poster) 
 · Congress of the Dutch Transplantation Society, Leiden, The Netherlands, 
(1 oral, 1 brief oral) 
 · University College Amsterdam, The Netherlands (invited) 
 · Nederlandse Nefrologiedagen, Veldhoven (invited) 
 · Competent Authorities Meeting. European Commission. dg Health & Food 
Safety (Sante), Brussels, Belgium (invited) 
 · International research symposium, globalization and commodification of the hu-
man body: a cannibal market?, Brocher Foundation, Geneva, Switzerland (invited) 
 · United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Expert Group Meeting on Trafficking 
in Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal, Vienna, Austria (invited)
 · 16th Congress of the European Society for Organ Transplantation, Vienna, Austria 
(1 invited, 1 brief oral)
 · Studentenvereniging voor Internationale Betrekkingen, Utrecht, 
The Netherlands (invited)
 · 24th Congress of the Transplantation Society, Berlin, Germany (1 invited, 1 oral) 
 · Astellas Symposium, Zeist, The Netherlands (invited) 
 · Rotary, Rotterdam, The Netherlands (invited) 
 · Congress of the Dutch Transplantation Society, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 
(1 brief oral)
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Lecturing and supervision
 · Erasmus mc, lectures to students of medicine and philosophy 
 · Erasmus School of Law, guest lectures for students of criminology 
 · Hospitals in The Netherlands, lectures to transplant professionals 
 · University of Oxford, Summer School lecture for transplant professionals 
 · Supervision of 2nd year medical students on writing a literature review
 · Astellas Development Programme in Transplantation (adept Course),  
lectures for transplant professionals in Cannes, Nice, Rome, Copenhagen,  
Paris, Prague, Amsterdam, Vienna, Budapest, Madrid and Barcelona
Other activities
 · Reviewer for transplant journals and journals on bioethics 
 · Consultant to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc), 
Division for Treaty Affairs, Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking Branch, 
Vienna, Austria
 · Moderator/chair at transplant conferences 
 · Member of elpat (Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects of 
Transplantation), Working Group on Organ Tourism and Paid Donation 
Interviews and media
 · ‘Rechtszaak “Nier te Koop”’, rtl Nieuws, 8th May
 · ‘Onderzoek naar Orgaanhandel’, Rotterdams Gezondheidsrecht Dispuut 
Magazine #3, p.10 
 · ‘Internationaal Onderzoek. Orgaanhandel op de Kaart’, Transparant #60 
(magazine of the Dutch Transplant Foundation), December
 · ‘Ook in Nederland orgaanhandel’, Dutch news broadcasters (tv, radio, 
newspapers, including nos Journaal, De Volkskrant), 21st October
 · ‘Profijt voor de hele samenleving. De maatschappelijke waarde van het 
medisch wetenschappelijk onderzoek’, Profiel, Erasmus mc
 · ‘Op zoek naar een nier’, kro Brandpunt Reporter, 14th April
 · ‘De schimmige handel in organen’, Erasmus Magazine #13, 14th March
 · ‘Illegale Orgaanhandel in Nederland’, Studio Erasmus Talkshow, 28th March
 · ‘Dutch academic hospital to lead organ trafficking enquiry’, International 
and national news broadcasters (tv, radio, newspapers, including BBC News, 
New York Times, Huffington Post, Washington Post), 15th November
 · ‘Nier te koop’, hp De Tijd, week 7, p.18, 17th February
Column
 · ‘Nieuw Europees verdrag tegen de handel in organen is door 
 slaapwandelaars opgesteld’, 111 Jaar Gezondheidsraad
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Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift Organ Trade
1 Het tekort aan nieren is niet altijd de reden waarom patiënten naar een ander land 
reizen voor een niertransplantatie. (dit proefschrift)
2  Tussen patiënten en hun behandelaars bestaat een stilzwijgende overeenkomst 
over het kopen van nieren: wat niet weet, wat niet deert. (dit proefschrift)
3  De bestrijding van orgaanhandel is geen prioriteit van politie en justitie. 
(dit proefschrift)
4  Donoren dienen te worden beloond voor hun nierdonatie. (dit proefschrift)
5  In de huidige wetgeving wordt orgaanhandel onterecht met uitbuiting 
geassocieerd. (dit proefschrift)
6  Een algeheel verbod op vraag-gerelateerde fenomenen, zoals drugs en prostitutie, 
werkt averechts. 
7  Meer wetgeving maakt de wereld niet veiliger.
8  Risicosporters zijn emotioneel stabieler, creatiever, onafhankelijker en hebben een 
groter leiderschapspotentieel dan niet-risicosporters. (Ogilvie, 1974)
9  Nederland heeft weinig vrouwelijke hoogleraren, maar dat is géén reden om een 
vrouwenquotum in te voeren.
10  Stellingen bij proefschriften zijn overbodig.
11  Nature does not hurry, yet everything is accomplished. (Lao Tzu)
Frederike Ambagtsheer 6 juni 2017
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